McDonald Wins!

The above link will bring up a pdf of the decision.

I must admit that reading through it drives me nuts. The intellectual dishonesty of those who wish to tear down the constitution is staggering.

Peruse the decision, and check out some of the following commentary if you wish.

http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/06/28/john-lott-supreme-court-guns-ban-washington-chicago-daley-kagan-sotomayor/#content

http://stossel.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2010/06/28/supremes-say-“yes”-to-guns/

http://article.nationalreview.com/437253/gun-prohibition-rip/david-rittgers

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062802134_pf.html

http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Daley-Vows-New-Gun-Ordinances-97328384.html

The Escapist

Here is a surprisingly thoughtful article. Take a gander at it and tell me what you think.

http://www.escapistmagazine.com/articles/view/issues/issue_245/7299-Gunners-and-Gamers

Guns and games typically only come up in the same news story when it involves a horrific act of violence. But what about all the responsible enthusiasts out there who simply want to enjoy their favorite pastimes? Russ Pitts speaks with gamers and gun owners about their dual hobbies.

Gov. Palin's speech

So I really enjoyed reading this speech because this woman doesn't seem to be afraid of doing the right thing, and saying the right thing even when, or maybe especially when, it is going to annoy and antagonize the media. I think I like her. I just hope she is really like this, and not just putting on a really good act. What do all of you think?

Wow..... Just read it.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. HELLER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 07–290. Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime
to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of
handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed
handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses;
and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms
unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.
Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a
handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He
filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the
city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement
insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in
the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the
use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed
the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and
that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that
firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for
self-defense, violated that right.
Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Pp. 2–53.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but
does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative
clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it
connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation
2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Syllabus
of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists
feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in
order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing
army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress
power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear
arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved.
Pp. 22–28.
(c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous armsbearing
rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately
followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28–30.
(d) The Second Amendment’s drafting history, while of dubious
interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals
that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.
Pp. 30–32.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts
and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the
late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation.
Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265, refutes the individualrights
interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not
limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather
limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by
the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.
It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed
weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment
or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those
“in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.
Pp. 54–56.
3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to
self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District’s total ban
on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an
entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the
lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny
the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Syllabus
prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense
of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional
muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the
home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible
for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and
is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument
that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily
and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy
his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement.
Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment
rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and
must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56–64.
478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS,
SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 07–290
_________________
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2008]
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition
on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates
the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
I
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession
of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered
firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited.
See D. C. Code §§7–2501.01(12), 7–2502.01(a), 7–
2502.02(a)(4) (2001). Wholly apart from that prohibition,
no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the
chief of police may issue licenses for 1-year periods. See
§§22–4504(a), 22–4506. District of Columbia law also
requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms,
such as registered long guns, “unloaded and dissembled or
bound by a trigger lock or similar device” unless they are
located in a place of business or are being used for lawful
recreational activities. See §7–2507.02.1
——————
1 There are minor exceptions to all of these prohibitions, none of
which is relevant here.
2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
Respondent Dick Heller is a D. C. special police officer
authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal
Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate
for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but
the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking,
on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city
from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns,
the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying
of a firearm in the home without a license, and the
trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of
“functional firearms within the home.” App. 59a. The
District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint, see
Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109
(2004). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, construing his complaint as seeking the right to
render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in
that condition only when necessary for self-defense,2 reversed,
see Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F. 3d 370,
401 (2007). It held that the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to possess firearms and that the city’s
total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that
firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when
necessary for self-defense, violated that right. See id., at
395, 399–401. The Court of Appeals directed the District
Court to enter summary judgment for respondent.
We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
II
We turn first to the meaning of the Second Amendment.
A
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
——————
2 That construction has not been challenged here.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Opinion of the Court
infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood
by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731
(1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824).
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation.
The two sides in this case have set out very different
interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today’s
dissenting Justices believe that it protects only the
right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with
militia service. See Brief for Petitioners 11–12; post, at 1
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). Respondent argues that it
protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected
with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within
the home. See Brief for Respondent 2–4.
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two
parts: its prefatory clause and its operative clause. The
former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather
announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased,
“Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms shall not be infringed.” See J. Tiffany, A
Treatise on Government and Constitutional Law §585,
p. 394 (1867); Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English
as Amici Curiae 3 (hereinafter Linguists’ Brief).
Although this structure of the Second Amendment is
unique in our Constitution, other legal documents of the
founding era, particularly individual-rights provisions of
state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement
of purpose. See generally Volokh, The Commonplace
Second Amendment, 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 793, 814–821
4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
(1998).
Logic demands that there be a link between the stated
purpose and the command. The Second Amendment
would be nonsensical if it read, “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to petition for redress of grievances shall not be
infringed.” That requirement of logical connection may
cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the
operative clause (“The separation of church and state
being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall
have no place in our jurisprudence.” The preface makes
clear that the operative clause refers not to canons of
interpretation but to clergymen.) But apart from that
clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not limit or
expand the scope of the operative clause. See F. Dwarris,
A General Treatise on Statutes 268–269 (P. Potter ed.
1871) (hereinafter Dwarris); T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation
and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
42–45 (2d ed. 1874).3 “ ‘It is nothing unusual in acts . . . for
the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the remedy
often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which
first suggested the necessity of the law.’ ” J. Bishop,
——————
3 As Sutherland explains, the key 18th-century English case on the
effect of preambles, Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wms. 314, 24 Eng. Rep.
404 (1716), stated that “the preamble could not be used to restrict the
effect of the words of the purview.” J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory
Construction, 47.04 (N. Singer ed. 5th ed. 1992). This rule was
modified in England in an 1826 case to give more importance to the
preamble, but in America “the settled principle of law is that the
preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where
the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.” Ibid.
JUSTICE STEVENS says that we violate the general rule that every
clause in a statute must have effect. Post, at 8. But where the text of a
clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as
“whereas” clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution’s preamble,
a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do. Or
to put the point differently, operative provisions should be given effect
as operative provisions, and prologues as prologues.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
Opinion of the Court
Commentaries on Written Laws and Their Interpretation
§51, p. 49 (1882) (quoting Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 157, 165
(K. B. 1802)). Therefore, while we will begin our textual
analysis with the operative clause, we will return to the
prefatory clause to ensure that our reading of the operative
clause is consistent with the announced purpose.4
1. Operative Clause.
a. “Right of the People.” The first salient feature of
the operative clause is that it codifies a “right of the people.”
The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights
use the phrase “right of the people” two other times, in the
First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in
the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The
Ninth Amendment uses very similar terminology (“The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people”). All three of these instances unambiguously
refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights
that may be exercised only through participation in some
corporate body.5
——————
4 JUSTICE STEVENS criticizes us for discussing the prologue last. Post,
at 8. But if a prologue can be used only to clarify an ambiguous operative
provision, surely the first step must be to determine whether the
operative provision is ambiguous. It might be argued, we suppose, that
the prologue itself should be one of the factors that go into the determination
of whether the operative provision is ambiguous—but that
would cause the prologue to be used to produce ambiguity rather than
just to resolve it. In any event, even if we considered the prologue
along with the operative provision we would reach the same result we
do today, since (as we explain) our interpretation of “the right of the
people to keep and bear arms” furthers the purpose of an effective
militia no less than (indeed, more than) the dissent’s interpretation.
See infra, at 26–27.
5 JUSTICE STEVENS is of course correct, post, at 10, that the right to
assemble cannot be exercised alone, but it is still an individual right,
and not one conditioned upon membership in some defined “assembly,”
as he contends the right to bear arms is conditioned upon membership
6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people”
in a context other than “rights”—the famous preamble
(“We the people”), §2 of Article I (providing that “the people”
will choose members of the House), and the Tenth
Amendment (providing that those powers not given the
Federal Government remain with “the States” or “the
people”). Those provisions arguably refer to “the people”
acting collectively—but they deal with the exercise or
reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else in the
Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer
to anything other than an individual right.6
What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution
that mention “the people,” the term unambiguously
refers to all members of the political community, not an
unspecified subset. As we said in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990):
“ ‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art employed
in select parts of the Constitution. . . . [Its
uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the
——————
in a defined militia. And JUSTICE STEVENS is dead wrong to think that
the right to petition is “primarily collective in nature.” Ibid. See
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U. S. 479, 482–484 (1985) (describing historical
origins of right to petition).
6 If we look to other founding-era documents, we find that some state
constitutions used the term “the people” to refer to the people collectively,
in contrast to “citizen,” which was used to invoke individual
rights. See Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, in
The Second Amendment in Law and History 179, 193–195 (C. Bogus
ed. 2000) (hereinafter Bogus). But that usage was not remotely uniform.
See, e.g., N. C. Declaration of Rights §XIV (1776), in 5 The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws 2787, 2788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe) (jury trial);
Md. Declaration of Rights §XVIII (1776), in 3 id., at 1686, 1688 (vicinage
requirement); Vt. Declaration of Rights ch. 1, §XI (1777), in 6 id.,
at 3737, 3741 (searches and seizures); Pa. Declaration of Rights §XII
(1776), in 5 id., at 3081, 3083 (free speech). And, most importantly, it
was clearly not the terminology used in the Federal Constitution, given
the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
Opinion of the Court
Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved
in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to
a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that
community.”
This contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in
the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, the “militia”
in colonial America consisted of a subset of “the people”—
those who were male, able bodied, and within a
certain age range. Reading the Second Amendment as
protecting only the right to “keep and bear Arms” in an
organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative
clause’s description of the holder of that right as “the
people.”
We start therefore with a strong presumption that the
Second Amendment right is exercised individually and
belongs to all Americans.
b. “Keep and bear Arms.” We move now from the
holder of the right—“the people”—to the substance of the
right: “to keep and bear Arms.”
Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret
their object: “Arms.” The 18th-century meaning is no
different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons
of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the
English Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson).
Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary
defined “arms” as “any thing that a man wears for his
defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast
at or strike another.” 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary
(1771); see also N. Webster, American Dictionary
of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter
Webster) (similar).
8 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that
were not specifically designed for military use and were
not employed in a military capacity. For instance, Cunningham’s
legal dictionary gave as an example of usage:
“Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on
Sundays, &c. and not bear other arms.” See also, e.g., An
Act for the trial of Negroes, 1797 Del. Laws ch. XLIII, §6,
p. 104, in 1 First Laws of the State of Delaware 102, 104
(J. Cushing ed. 1981 (pt. 1)); see generally State v. Duke,
42 Tex. 455, 458 (1874) (citing decisions of state courts
construing “arms”). Although one founding-era thesaurus
limited “arms” (as opposed to “weapons”) to “instruments
of offence generally made use of in war,” even that source
stated that all firearms constituted “arms.” 1 J. Trusler,
The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in
the English Language 37 (1794) (emphasis added).
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous,
that only those arms in existence in the 18th century
are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret
constitutional rights that way. Just as the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communications,
e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844,
849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern
forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27,
35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,
even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.
We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.”
Johnson defined “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain;
not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Johnson 1095.
Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or
possession.” No party has apprised us of an idiomatic
meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading
of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have
weapons.”
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
Opinion of the Court
The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written
documents of the founding period that we have found,
but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing
the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected
with militia service. William Blackstone, for example,
wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending
service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties,
one of which was that they were not permitted to
“keep arms in their houses.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 55 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone); see also 1
W. & M., c. 15, §4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 422 (1689)
(“[N]o Papist . . . shall or may have or keep in his House
. . . any Arms . . . ”); 1 Hawkins, Treatise on the Pleas of
the Crown 26 (1771) (similar). Petitioners point to militia
laws of the founding period that required militia members
to “keep” arms in connection with militia service, and they
conclude from this that the phrase “keep Arms” has a
militia-related connotation. See Brief for Petitioners 16–
17 (citing laws of Delaware, New Jersey, and Virginia).
This is rather like saying that, since there are many statutes
that authorize aggrieved employees to “file complaints”
with federal agencies, the phrase “file complaints”
has an employment-related connotation. “Keep arms” was
simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for
militiamen and everyone else.7
——————
7 See, e.g., 3 A Compleat Collection of State-Tryals 185 (1719) (“Hath
not every Subject power to keep Arms, as well as Servants in his House
for defence of his Person?”); T. Wood, A New Institute of the Imperial or
Civil Law 282 (1730) (“Those are guilty of publick Force, who keep
Arms in their Houses, and make use of them otherwise than upon
Journeys or Hunting, or for Sale . . .”); A Collection of All the Acts of
Assembly, Now in Force, in the Colony of Virginia 596 (1733) (“Free
Negros, Mulattos, or Indians, and Owners of Slaves, seated at Frontier
Plantations, may obtain Licence from a Justice of Peace, for keeping
Arms, &c.”); J. Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law 195 (1734)
(“Yet a Person might keep Arms in his House, or on his Estate, on the
Account of Hunting, Navigation, Travelling, and on the Score of Selling
10 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to
“carry.” See Johnson 161; Webster; T. Sheridan, A Complete
Dictionary of the English Language (1796); 2 Oxford
English Dictionary 20 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter Oxford).
When used with “arms,” however, the term has a meaning
that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—
confrontation. In Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S.
125 (1998), in the course of analyzing the meaning of
“carries a firearm” in a federal criminal statute, JUSTICE
GINSBURG wrote that “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is,
as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]:
‘wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing
or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict
with another person.’ ” Id., at 143 (dissenting opinion)
——————
them in the way of Trade or Commerce, or such Arms as accrued to him
by way of Inheritance”); J. Trusler, A Concise View of the Common Law
and Statute Law of England 270 (1781) (“if [papists] keep arms in their
houses, such arms may be seized by a justice of the peace”); Some
Considerations on the Game Laws 54 (1796) (“Who has been deprived
by [the law] of keeping arms for his own defence? What law forbids the
veriest pauper, if he can raise a sum sufficient for the purchase of it,
from mounting his Gun on his Chimney Piece . . . ?”); 3 B. Wilson, The
Works of the Honourable James Wilson 84 (1804) (with reference to
state constitutional right: “This is one of our many renewals of the
Saxon regulations. ‘They were bound,’ says Mr. Selden, ‘to keep arms
for the preservation of the kingdom, and of their own person’ ”); W.
Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States
31–32 (1833) (with reference to colonists’ English rights: “The right of
every individual to keep arms for his defence, suitable to his condition
and degree; which was the public allowance, under due restrictions of
the natural right of resistance and self-preservation”); 3 R. Burn,
Justice of the Peace and the Parish Officer 88 (1815) (“It is, however,
laid down by Serjeant Hawkins, . . . that if a lessee, after the end of the
term, keep arms in his house to oppose the entry of the lessor, . . .”);
State v. Dempsey, 31 N. C. 384, 385 (1849) (citing 1840 state law
making it a misdemeanor for a member of certain racial groups “to
carry about his person or keep in his house any shot gun or other
arms”).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11
Opinion of the Court
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1998)). We
think that JUSTICE GINSBURG accurately captured the
natural meaning of “bear arms.” Although the phrase
implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose
of “offensive or defensive action,” it in no way connotes
participation in a structured military organization.
From our review of founding-era sources, we conclude
that this natural meaning was also the meaning that
“bear arms” had in the 18th century. In numerous instances,
“bear arms” was unambiguously used to refer to
the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia.
The most prominent examples are those most relevant to
the Second Amendment: Nine state constitutional provisions
written in the 18th century or the first two decades
of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens to “bear
arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms
in defense of himself and the state.” 8 It is clear from those
formulations that “bear arms” did not refer only to carry-
——————
8 See Pa. Declaration of Rights §XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3083 (“That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state. . . ”); Vt. Declaration of Rights §XV, in 6 id., at 3741 (“That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
State. . .”); Ky. Const., Art. XII, cl. 23 (1792), in 3 id., at 1264, 1275
(“That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves
and the State shall not be questioned”); Ohio Const., Art. VIII, §20
(1802), in 5 id., at 2901, 2911 (“That the people have a right to bear
arms for the defence of themselves and the State . . . ”); Ind. Const., Art.
I, §20 (1816), in 2 id., at 1057, 1059 (“That the people have a right to
bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State. . . ”); Miss.
Const., Art. I, §23 (1817), in 4 id., at 2032, 2034 (“Every citizen has a
right to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State”); Conn. Const.,
Art. I, §17 (1818), in 1 id., at 536, 538 (“Every citizen has a right to bear
arms in defence of himself and the state”); Ala. Const., Art. I, §23
(1819), in 1 id., at 96, 98 (“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in
defence of himself and the State”); Mo. Const., Art. XIII, §3 (1820), in 4
id., at 2150, 2163 (“[T]hat their right to bear arms in defence of themselves
and of the State cannot be questioned”). See generally Volokh,
State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. &
Politics 191 (2006).
12 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
ing a weapon in an organized military unit. Justice James
Wilson interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution’s armsbearing
right, for example, as a recognition of the natural
right of defense “of one’s person or house”—what he called
the law of “self preservation.” 2 Collected Works of James
Wilson 1142, and n. x (K. Hall & M. Hall eds. 2007) (citing
Pa. Const., Art. IX, §21 (1790)); see also T. Walker, Introduction
to American Law 198 (1837) (“Thus the right of
self-defence [is] guaranteed by the [Ohio] constitution”);
see also id., at 157 (equating Second Amendment with
that provision of the Ohio Constitution). That was also
the interpretation of those state constitutional provisions
adopted by pre-Civil War state courts.9 These provisions
demonstrate—again, in the most analogous linguistic
context—that “bear arms” was not limited to the carrying
of arms in a militia.
The phrase “bear Arms” also had at the time of the
founding an idiomatic meaning that was significantly
different from its natural meaning: “to serve as a soldier,
do military service, fight” or “to wage war.” See Linguists’
Brief 18; post, at 11 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But it
unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when
followed by the preposition “against,” which was in turn
followed by the target of the hostilities. See 2 Oxford 21.
(That is how, for example, our Declaration of Independence
¶28, used the phrase: “He has constrained our fellow
Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms
against their Country . . . .”) Every example given by
petitioners’ amici for the idiomatic meaning of “bear arms”
——————
9 See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 91–92 (Ky. 1822); State v.
Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–617 (1840); State v. Schoultz, 25 Mo. 128, 155
(1857); see also Simpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360 (Tenn. 1833) (interpreting
similar provision with “common defence” purpose); State v.
Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, 422–423 (1843) (same); cf. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243, 250–251 (1846) (construing Second Amendment); State v. Chandler,
5 La. Ann. 489, 489–490 (1850) (same).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13
Opinion of the Court
from the founding period either includes the preposition
“against” or is not clearly idiomatic. See Linguists’ Brief
18–23. Without the preposition, “bear arms” normally
meant (as it continues to mean today) what JUSTICE
GINSBURG’s opinion in Muscarello said.
In any event, the meaning of “bear arms” that petitioners
and JUSTICE STEVENS propose is not even the (sometimes)
idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a
hybrid definition, whereby “bear arms” connotes the
actual carrying of arms (and therefore is not really an
idiom) but only in the service of an organized militia. No
dictionary has ever adopted that definition, and we have
been apprised of no source that indicates that it carried
that meaning at the time of the founding. But it is easy
to see why petitioners and the dissent are driven to the
hybrid definition. Giving “bear Arms” its idiomatic meaning
would cause the protected right to consist of the right
to be a soldier or to wage war—an absurdity that no
commentator has ever endorsed. See L. Levy, Origins of
the Bill of Rights 135 (1999). Worse still, the phrase
“keep and bear Arms” would be incoherent. The word
“Arms” would have two different meanings at once:
“weapons” (as the object of “keep”) and (as the object of
“bear”) one-half of an idiom. It would be rather like saying
“He filled and kicked the bucket” to mean “He filled
the bucket and died.” Grotesque.
Petitioners justify their limitation of “bear arms” to the
military context by pointing out the unremarkable fact
that it was often used in that context—the same mistake
they made with respect to “keep arms.” It is especially
unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a military
context in the federal legal sources (such as records of
congressional debate) that have been the focus of petitioners’
inquiry. Those sources would have had little occasion
to use it except in discussions about the standing army and
the militia. And the phrases used primarily in those
14 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
military discussions include not only “bear arms” but also
“carry arms,” “possess arms,” and “have arms”—though no
one thinks that those other phrases also had special military
meanings. See Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?,
83 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 261 (2004). The common references
to those “fit to bear arms” in congressional discussions
about the militia are matched by use of the same
phrase in the few nonmilitary federal contexts where the
concept would be relevant. See, e.g., 30 Journals of Continental
Congress 349–351 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934). Other
legal sources frequently used “bear arms” in nonmilitary
contexts.10 Cunningham’s legal dictionary, cited above,
——————
10 See J. Brydall, Privilegia Magnatud apud Anglos 14 (1704) (Privilege
XXXIII) (“In the 21st Year of King Edward the Third, a Proclamation
Issued, that no Person should bear any Arms within London, and
the Suburbs”); J. Bond, A Compleat Guide to Justices of the Peace 43
(1707) (“Sheriffs, and all other Officers in executing their Offices, and
all other persons pursuing Hu[e] and Cry may lawfully bear arms”); 1
An Abridgment of the Public Statutes in Force and Use Relative to
Scotland (1755) (entry for “Arms”: “And if any person above described
shall have in his custody, use, or bear arms, being thereof convicted
before one justice of peace, or other judge competent, summarily, he
shall for the first offense forfeit all such arms” (quoting 1 Geo. 1, c. 54,
§1)); Statute Law of Scotland Abridged 132–133 (2d ed. 1769) (“Acts for
disarming the highlands” but “exempting those who have particular
licenses to bear arms”); E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles
of the Law of Nature 144 (1792) (“Since custom has allowed persons of
rank and gentlemen of the army to bear arms in time of peace, strict
care should be taken that none but these should be allowed to wear
swords”); E. Roche, Proceedings of a Court-Martial, Held at the Council-
Chamber, in the City of Cork 3 (1798) (charge VI: “With having held
traitorous conferences, and with having conspired, with the like intent,
for the purpose of attacking and despoiling of the arms of several of the
King’s subjects, qualified by law to bear arms”); C. Humphreys, A
Compendium of the Common Law in force in Kentucky 482 (1822) (“[I]n
this country the constitution guaranties to all persons the right to bear
arms; then it can only be a crime to exercise this right in such a manner,
as to terrify people unnecessarily”).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15
Opinion of the Court
gave as an example of its usage a sentence unrelated to
military affairs (“Servants and labourers shall use bows
and arrows on Sundays, &c. and not bear other arms”).
And if one looks beyond legal sources, “bear arms” was
frequently used in nonmilitary contexts. See Cramer &
Olson, What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment?,
6 Georgetown J. L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming Sept.
2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1086176
(as visited June 24, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file) (identifying numerous nonmilitary uses of “bear
arms” from the founding period).
JUSTICE STEVENS points to a study by amici supposedly
showing that the phrase “bear arms” was most frequently
used in the military context. See post, at 12–13, n. 9;
Linguists’ Brief 24. Of course, as we have said, the fact
that the phrase was commonly used in a particular context
does not show that it is limited to that context, and, in any
event, we have given many sources where the phrase was
used in nonmilitary contexts. Moreover, the study’s collection
appears to include (who knows how many times) the
idiomatic phrase “bear arms against,” which is irrelevant.
The amici also dismiss examples such as “ ‘bear arms . . .
for the purpose of killing game’ ” because those uses are
“expressly qualified.” Linguists’ Brief 24. (JUSTICE
STEVENS uses the same excuse for dismissing the state
constitutional provisions analogous to the Second Amendment
that identify private-use purposes for which the
individual right can be asserted. See post, at 12.) That
analysis is faulty. A purposive qualifying phrase that
contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this
side of the looking glass (except, apparently, in some
courses on Linguistics). If “bear arms” means, as we
think, simply the carrying of arms, a modifier can limit
the purpose of the carriage (“for the purpose of selfdefense”
or “to make war against the King”). But if “bear
arms” means, as the petitioners and the dissent think, the
16 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
carrying of arms only for military purposes, one simply
cannot add “for the purpose of killing game.” The right “to
carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game”
is worthy of the mad hatter. Thus, these purposive qualifying
phrases positively establish that “to bear arms” is
not limited to military use.11
JUSTICE STEVENS places great weight on James Madison’s
inclusion of a conscientious-objector clause in his
original draft of the Second Amendment: “but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled
to render military service in person.” Creating the Bill of
Rights 12 (H. Veit, K. Bowling, & C. Bickford eds. 1991)
(hereinafter Veit). He argues that this clause establishes
that the drafters of the Second Amendment intended “bear
Arms” to refer only to military service. See post, at 26. It
is always perilous to derive the meaning of an adopted
provision from another provision deleted in the drafting
process.12 In any case, what JUSTICE STEVENS would
conclude from the deleted provision does not follow. It was
not meant to exempt from military service those who
——————
11 JUSTICE STEVENS contends, post, at 15, that since we assert that
adding “against” to “bear arms” gives it a military meaning we must
concede that adding a purposive qualifying phrase to “bear arms” can
alter its meaning. But the difference is that we do not maintain that
“against” alters the meaning of “bear arms” but merely that it clarifies
which of various meanings (one of which is military) is intended.
JUSTICE STEVENS, however, argues that “[t]he term ‘bear arms’ is a
familiar idiom; when used unadorned by any additional words, its
meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.’ ” Post, at
11. He therefore must establish that adding a contradictory purposive
phrase can alter a word’s meaning.
12 JUSTICE STEVENS finds support for his legislative history inference
from the recorded views of one Antifederalist member of the House.
Post, at 26 n. 25. “The claim that the best or most representative
reading of the [language of the] amendments would conform to the
understanding and concerns of [the Antifederalists] is . . . highly
problematic.” Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of
Originalism, Bogus 74, 81.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17
Opinion of the Court
objected to going to war but had no scruples about personal
gunfights. Quakers opposed the use of arms not just
for militia service, but for any violent purpose whatsoever—
so much so that Quaker frontiersmen were forbidden
to use arms to defend their families, even though “[i]n
such circumstances the temptation to seize a hunting rifle
or knife in self-defense . . . must sometimes have been
almost overwhelming.” P. Brock, Pacifism in the United
States 359 (1968); see M. Hirst, The Quakers in Peace and
War 336–339 (1923); 3 T. Clarkson, Portraiture of Quakerism
103–104 (3d ed. 1807). The Pennsylvania Militia Act
of 1757 exempted from service those “scrupling the use of
arms”—a phrase that no one contends had an idiomatic
meaning. See 5 Stat. at Large of Pa. 613 (J. Mitchell & H.
Flanders eds. 1898) (emphasis added). Thus, the most
natural interpretation of Madison’s deleted text is that
those opposed to carrying weapons for potential violent
confrontation would not be “compelled to render military
service,” in which such carrying would be required.13
Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that “keep and bear
Arms” was some sort of term of art, presumably akin to
“hue and cry” or “cease and desist.” (This suggestion
usefully evades the problem that there is no evidence
whatsoever to support a military reading of “keep arms.”)
JUSTICE STEVENS believes that the unitary meaning of
——————
13 The same applies to the conscientious-objector amendments proposed
by Virginia and North Carolina, which said: “That any person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon
payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”
See Veit 19; 4 J. Eliot, The Debates in the Several State Constitutions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 243, 244 (2d ed. 1836)
(reprinted 1941). Certainly their second use of the phrase (“bear arms
in his stead”) refers, by reason of context, to compulsory bearing of
arms for military duty. But their first use of the phrase (“any person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms”) assuredly did not refer to
people whose God allowed them to bear arms for defense of themselves
but not for defense of their country.
18 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
“keep and bear Arms” is established by the Second
Amendment’s calling it a “right” (singular) rather than
“rights” (plural). See post, at 16. There is nothing to this.
State constitutions of the founding period routinely
grouped multiple (related) guarantees under a singular
“right,” and the First Amendment protects the “right
[singular] of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” See,
e.g., Pa. Declaration of Rights §§IX, XII, XVI, in 5 Thorpe
3083–3084; Ohio Const., Arts. VIII, §§11, 19 (1802), in id.,
at 2910–2911.14 And even if “keep and bear Arms” were a
unitary phrase, we find no evidence that it bore a military
meaning. Although the phrase was not at all common
(which would be unusual for a term of art), we have found
instances of its use with a clearly nonmilitary connotation.
In a 1780 debate in the House of Lords, for example, Lord
Richmond described an order to disarm private citizens
(not militia members) as “a violation of the constitutional
right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for
their own defense.” 49 The London Magazine or Gentleman’s
Monthly Intelligencer 467 (1780). In response,
another member of Parliament referred to “the right of
bearing arms for personal defence,” making clear that no
special military meaning for “keep and bear arms” was
intended in the discussion. Id., at 467–468.15
——————
14 Faced with this clear historical usage, JUSTICE STEVENS resorts to
the bizarre argument that because the word “to” is not included before
“bear” (whereas it is included before “petition” in the First Amendment),
the unitary meaning of “to keep and bear” is established. Post,
at 16, n. 13. We have never heard of the proposition that omitting
repetition of the “to” causes two verbs with different meanings to
become one. A promise “to support and to defend the Constitution of
the United States” is not a whit different from a promise “to support
and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
15 Cf. 3 Geo., 34, §3, in 7 Eng. Stat. at Large 126 (1748) (“That the
Prohibition contained . . . in this Act, of having, keeping, bearing, or
wearing any Arms or Warlike Weapons . . . shall not extend . . . to any
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19
Opinion of the Court
c. Meaning of the Operative Clause. Putting all of
these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed
by the historical background of the Second Amendment.
We look to this because it has always been widely understood
that the Second Amendment, like the First and
Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The
very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes
the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it
“shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The
Second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed
. . . .”16
Between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution,
the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in
using select militias loyal to them to suppress political
dissidents, in part by disarming their opponents. See J.
Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms 31–53 (1994) (hereinafter
Malcolm); L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights,
1689, p. 76 (1981). Under the auspices of the 1671 Game
Act, for example, the Catholic James II had ordered general
disarmaments of regions home to his Protestant
enemies. See Malcolm 103–106. These experiences
caused Englishmen to be extremely wary of concentrated
military forces run by the state and to be jealous of their
arms. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William
and Mary, in the Declaration of Right (which was
codified as the English Bill of Rights), that Protestants
——————
Officers or their Assistants, employed in the Execution of Justice . . .”).
16 Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS’ wholly unsupported assertion, post,
at 17, there was no pre-existing right in English law “to use weapons
for certain military purposes” or to use arms in an organized militia.
20 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
would never be disarmed: “That the subjects which are
Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable to
their conditions and as allowed by law.” 1 W. & M., c. 2,
§7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689). This right has
long been understood to be the predecessor to our Second
Amendment. See E. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and
What It Means Today 51 (1957); W. Rawle, A View of the
Constitution of the United States of America 122 (1825)
(hereinafter Rawle). It was clearly an individual right,
having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia.
To be sure, it was an individual right not available to the
whole population, given that it was restricted to Protestants,
and like all written English rights it was held only
against the Crown, not Parliament. See Schwoerer, To
Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, in Bogus
207, 218; but see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States §1858 (1833) (hereinafter
Story) (contending that the “right to bear arms” is a “limitatio[
n] upon the power of parliament” as well). But it was
secured to them as individuals, according to “libertarian
political principles,” not as members of a fighting force.
Schwoerer, Declaration of Rights, at 283; see also id., at
78; G. Jellinek, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of Citizens 49, and n. 7 (1901) (reprinted 1979).
By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had
become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm
122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted
the preeminent authority on English law for the
founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715
(1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one
of the fundamental rights of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone
136, 139–140 (1765). His description of it cannot
possibly be thought to tie it to militia or military service.
It was, he said, “the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation,”
id., at 139, and “the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defence,” id., at 140;
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 21
Opinion of the Court
see also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities
concurred. See G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the
Ancient and Only True Legal Means of National Defence,
by a Free Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme,
The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–
887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Desultory
Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured
in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ abuses was by the
time of the founding understood to be an individual right
protecting against both public and private violence.
And, of course, what the Stuarts had tried to do to their
political enemies, George III had tried to do to the colonists.
In the tumultuous decades of the 1760’s and 1770’s,
the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most
rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by
Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep
arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that “[i]t is a
natural right which the people have reserved to themselves,
confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for
their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New
York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under
Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936); see also, e.g.,
Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings
of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1968). They understood
the right to enable individuals to defend themselves.
As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries (by the law professor and former
Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes
to the description of the arms right, Americans understood
the “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to
“repe[l] force by force” when “the intervention of society in
his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.” 1 Blackstone’s
Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter
Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32
(1833).
22 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the
right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s
right of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 553 U. S. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry
arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read
the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to
speak for any purpose. Before turning to limitations upon
the individual right, however, we must determine whether
the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment comports
with our interpretation of the operative clause.
2. Prefatory Clause.
The prefatory clause reads: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State . . . .”
a. “Well-Regulated Militia.” In United States v.
Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained that “the
Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense.” That definition comports
with founding-era sources. See, e.g., Webster (“The militia
of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies,
regiments and brigades . . . and required by law to
attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other
times left to pursue their usual occupations”); The Federalist
No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison)
(“near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands”);
Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable
Thomas Jefferson 520, 524 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (“[T]he
militia of the State, that is to say, of every man in it able
to bear arms”).
Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia,
stating that “[m]ilitias are the state- and congressionally-
regulated military forces described in the Militia
Clauses (art. I, §8, cls. 15–16).” Brief for Petitioners 12.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 23
Opinion of the Court
Although we agree with petitioners’ interpretive assumption
that “militia” means the same thing in Article I and
the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners identify
the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia.
Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the
power to create (“to raise . . . Armies”; “to provide . . . a
Navy,” Art. I, §8, cls. 12–13), the militia is assumed by
Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the
power to “provide for calling forth the militia,” §8, cl. 15;
and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and not
to organize “a” militia, which is what one would expect if
the militia were to be a federal creation, but to organize
“the” militia, connoting a body already in existence, ibid.,
cl. 16. This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition
of the militia as all able-bodied men. From that pool,
Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will
make up an effective fighting force. That is what Congress
did in the first militia Act, which specified that “each
and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective
states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the
age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years
(except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and
respectively be enrolled in the militia.” Act of May 8,
1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Congress need not conscript
every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in
Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize,
discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon
the entire body. Although the militia consists of all ablebodied
men, the federally organized militia may consist of
a subset of them.
Finally, the adjective “well-regulated” implies nothing
more than the imposition of proper discipline and training.
See Johnson 1619 (“Regulate”: “To adjust by rule or
method”); Rawle 121–122; cf. Va. Declaration of Rights
§13 (1776), in 7 Thorpe 3812, 3814 (referring to “a wellregulated
militia, composed of the body of the people,
24 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
trained to arms”).
b. “Security of a Free State.” The phrase “security of
a free state” meant “security of a free polity,” not security
of each of the several States as the dissent below argued,
see 478 F. 3d, at 405, and n. 10. Joseph Story wrote in his
treatise on the Constitution that “the word ‘state’ is used
in various senses [and in] its most enlarged sense, it
means the people composing a particular nation or community.”
1 Story §208; see also 3 id., §1890 (in reference
to the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause: “The militia
is the natural defence of a free country”). It is true that
the term “State” elsewhere in the Constitution refers to
individual States, but the phrase “security of a free state”
and close variations seem to have been terms of art in
18th-century political discourse, meaning a “ ‘free country’
” or free polity. See Volokh, “Necessary to the Security
of a Free State,” 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 5 (2007); see,
e.g., 4 Blackstone 151 (1769); Brutus Essay III (Nov. 15,
1787), in The Essential Antifederalist 251, 253 (W. Allen
& G. Lloyd eds., 2d ed. 2002). Moreover, the other instances
of “state” in the Constitution are typically accompanied
by modifiers making clear that the reference is to
the several States—“each state,” “several states,” “any
state,” “that state,” “particular states,” “one state,” “no
state.” And the presence of the term “foreign state” in
Article I and Article III shows that the word “state” did
not have a single meaning in the Constitution.
There are many reasons why the militia was thought to
be “necessary to the security of a free state.” See 3 Story
§1890. First, of course, it is useful in repelling invasions
and suppressing insurrections. Second, it renders large
standing armies unnecessary—an argument that Alexander
Hamilton made in favor of federal control over the
militia. The Federalist No. 29, pp. 226, 227 (B. Wright ed.
1961) (A. Hamilton). Third, when the able-bodied men of
a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 25
Opinion of the Court
better able to resist tyranny.
3. Relationship between Prefatory Clause and
Operative Clause
We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with
an operative clause that creates an individual right to
keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the
history that the founding generation knew and that we
have described above. That history showed that the way
tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the ablebodied
men was not by banning the militia but simply by
taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or
standing army to suppress political opponents. This is
what had occurred in England that prompted codification
of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.
The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear
arms, as with other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was
not over whether it was desirable (all agreed that it was)
but over whether it needed to be codified in the Constitution.
During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that
the federal government would disarm the people in order
to impose rule through a standing army or select militia
was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e.g., Letters
from The Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
John Smilie, for example, worried not only that Congress’s
“command of the militia” could be used to create a “select
militia,” or to have “no militia at all,” but also, as a separate
concern, that “[w]hen a select militia is formed; the
people in general may be disarmed.” 2 Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 508–509 (M.
Jensen ed. 1976) (hereinafter Documentary Hist.). Federalists
responded that because Congress was given no
power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep
and bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people.
See, e.g., A Pennsylvanian III (Feb. 20, 1788), in The
26 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Young ed.,
2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To the Citizens of
Virginia, Feb. 22, 1788, in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen of
America, (Oct. 10, 1787) in id., at 38, 40; Remarks on the
Amendments to the federal Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in
id., at 556. It was understood across the political spectrum
that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen
militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive
military force if the constitutional order broke down.
It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s
prefatory clause announces the purpose for which
the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.
The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving
the militia was the only reason Americans valued the
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more
important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat
that the new Federal Government would destroy the
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason
that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified
in a written Constitution. JUSTICE BREYER’s assertion
that individual self-defense is merely a “subsidiary
interest” of the right to keep and bear arms, see post, at
36, is profoundly mistaken. He bases that assertion solely
upon the prologue—but that can only show that selfdefense
had little to do with the right’s codification; it was
the central component of the right itself.
Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second
Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[
e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our
English ancestors,” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275,
281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even
achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification
of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment
right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as
a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petititioners
8—if, that is, the organized militia is the sole instituCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 27
Opinion of the Court
tional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—
it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a
safeguard against tyranny. For Congress retains plenary
authority to organize the militia, which must include the
authority to say who will belong to the organized force.17
That is why the first Militia Act’s requirement that only
whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to
exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s
Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev.
477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, the
Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in
an organization from which Congress has plenary authority
to exclude them. It guarantees a select militia of the
sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people’s
militia that was the concern of the founding generation.
B
Our interpretation is confirmed by analogous armsbearing
rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.
Four States adopted analogues to the Federal Second
Amendment in the period between independence and the
——————
17 Article I, §8, cl. 16 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
“[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”
It could not be clearer that Congress’s “organizing” power, unlike its
“governing” power, can be invoked even for that part of the militia not
“employed in the Service of the United States.” JUSTICE STEVENS
provides no support whatever for his contrary view, see post, at 19 n.
20. Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists read the provision as it
was written, to permit the creation of a “select” militia. See The Federalist
No. 29, pp. 226, 227 (B. Wright ed. 1961); Centinel, Revived, No.
XXIX, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, Sept. 9, 1789, in Young
711, 712.
28 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
ratification of the Bill of Rights. Two of them—
Pennsylvania and Vermont—clearly adopted individual
rights unconnected to militia service. Pennsylvania’s
Declaration of Rights of 1776 said: “That the people have a
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the
state . . . .” §XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3082, 3083 (emphasis
added). In 1777, Vermont adopted the identical provision,
except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and
capitalization. See Vt. Const., ch. 1, §15, in 6 id., at 3741.
North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms in
1776: “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the
defence of the State . . . .” Declaration of Rights §XVII, in
id., at 2787, 2788. This could plausibly be read to support
only a right to bear arms in a militia—but that is a peculiar
way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere
repeatedly mentions the militia explicitly. See §§14, 18,
35, in 5 id., 2789, 2791, 2793. Many colonial statutes
required individual arms-bearing for public-safety reasons—
such as the 1770 Georgia law that “for the security
and defence of this province from internal dangers and
insurrections” required those men who qualified for militia
duty individually “to carry fire arms” “to places of public
worship.” 19 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 137–
139 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)) (emphasis added). That
broad public-safety understanding was the connotation
given to the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme
Court in 1843. See State v. Huntly, 3 Ired. 418, 422–423.
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution presented another
variation on the theme: “The people have a right to keep
and to bear arms for the common defence. . . .” Pt. First,
Art. XVII, in 3 Thorpe 1888, 1892. Once again, if one
gives narrow meaning to the phrase “common defence”
this can be thought to limit the right to the bearing of
arms in a state-organized military force. But once again
the State’s highest court thought otherwise. Writing for
the court in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker wrote:
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 29
Opinion of the Court
“The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he
who used it was to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like
the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him
who uses them for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth
v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–314. The analogy
makes no sense if firearms could not be used for any individual
purpose at all. See also Kates, Handgun Prohibition
and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 244 (1983) (19th-century courts
never read “common defence” to limit the use of weapons
to militia service).
We therefore believe that the most likely reading of all
four of these pre-Second Amendment state constitutional
provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear
arms for defensive purposes. Other States did not include
rights to bear arms in their pre-1789 constitutions—
although in Virginia a Second Amendment analogue was
proposed (unsuccessfully) by Thomas Jefferson. (It read:
“No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms
[within his own lands or tenements].”18 1 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)).
Between 1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second
Amendment analogues. Four of them—Kentucky, Ohio,
Indiana, and Missouri—referred to the right of the people
to “bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.” See
n. 8, supra. Another three States—Mississippi, Connecticut,
and Alabama—used the even more individualistic
phrasing that each citizen has the “right to bear arms in
defence of himself and the State.” See ibid. Finally, two
States—Tennessee and Maine—used the “common defence”
language of Massachusetts. See Tenn. Const., Art.
——————
18 JUSTICE STEVENS says that the drafters of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights rejected this proposal and adopted “instead” a provision
written by George Mason stressing the importance of the militia. See
post, at 24, and n. 24. There is no evidence that the drafters regarded
the Mason proposal as a substitute for the Jefferson proposal.
30 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
XI, §26 (1796), in 6 Thorpe 3414, 3424; Me. Const., Art. I,
§16 (1819), in 3 id., at 1646, 1648. That of the nine state
constitutional protections for the right to bear arms enacted
immediately after 1789 at least seven unequivocally
protected an individual citizen’s right to self-defense is
strong evidence that that is how the founding generation
conceived of the right. And with one possible exception
that we discuss in Part II–D–2, 19th-century courts and
commentators interpreted these state constitutional provisions
to protect an individual right to use arms for selfdefense.
See n. 9, supra; Simpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360
(Tenn. 1833).
The historical narrative that petitioners must endorse
would thus treat the Federal Second Amendment as an
odd outlier, protecting a right unknown in state constitutions
or at English common law, based on little more than
an overreading of the prefatory clause.
C
JUSTICE STEVENS relies on the drafting history of the
Second Amendment—the various proposals in the state
conventions and the debates in Congress. It is dubious to
rely on such history to interpret a text that was widely
understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather than to
fashion a new one. But even assuming that this legislative
history is relevant, JUSTICE STEVENS flatly misreads
the historical record.
It is true, as JUSTICE STEVENS says, that there was
concern that the Federal Government would abolish the
institution of the state militia. See post, at 20. That
concern found expression, however, not in the various
Second Amendment precursors proposed in the State
conventions, but in separate structural provisions that
would have given the States concurrent and seemingly
nonpre-emptible authority to organize, discipline, and arm
the militia when the Federal Government failed to do so.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 31
Opinion of the Court
See Veit 17, 20 (Virginia proposal); 4 J. Eliot, The Debates
in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 244, 245 (2d ed. 1836) (reprinted
1941) (North Carolina proposal); see also 2 Documentary
Hist. 624 (Pennsylvania minority’s proposal). The Second
Amendment precursors, by contrast, referred to the individual
English right already codified in two (and probably
four) State constitutions. The Federalist-dominated first
Congress chose to reject virtually all major structural
revisions favored by the Antifederalists, including the
proposed militia amendments. Rather, it adopted primarily
the popular and uncontroversial (though, in the Federalists’
view, unnecessary) individual-rights amendments.
The Second Amendment right, protecting only individuals’
liberty to keep and carry arms, did nothing to assuage
Antifederalists’ concerns about federal control of the militia.
See, e.g., Centinel, Revived, No. XXIX, Philadelphia
Independent Gazetteer, Sept. 9, 1789, in Young 711, 712.
JUSTICE STEVENS thinks it significant that the Virginia,
New York, and North Carolina Second Amendment proposals
were “embedded . . . within a group of principles
that are distinctly military in meaning,” such as statements
about the danger of standing armies. Post, at 22.
But so was the highly influential minority proposal in
Pennsylvania, yet that proposal, with its reference to
hunting, plainly referred to an individual right. See 2
Documentary Hist. 624. Other than that erroneous point,
JUSTICE STEVENS has brought forward absolutely no
evidence that those proposals conferred only a right to
carry arms in a militia. By contrast, New Hampshire’s
proposal, the Pennsylvania minority’s proposal, and Samuel
Adams’ proposal in Massachusetts unequivocally
referred to individual rights, as did two state constitutional
provisions at the time. See Veit 16, 17 (New Hampshire
proposal); 6 Documentary Hist. 1452, 1453 (J.
Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 2000) (Samuel Adams’ pro32
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
posal). JUSTICE STEVENS’ view thus relies on the proposition,
unsupported by any evidence, that different people of
the founding period had vastly different conceptions of the
right to keep and bear arms. That simply does not comport
with our longstanding view that the Bill of Rights
codified venerable, widely understood liberties.
D
We now address how the Second Amendment was interpreted
from immediately after its ratification through the
end of the 19th century. Before proceeding, however, we
take issue with JUSTICE STEVENS’ equating of these
sources with postenactment legislative history, a comparison
that betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of a
court’s interpretive task. See post, at 27, n. 28. “Legislative
history,” of course, refers to the pre-enactment statements
of those who drafted or voted for a law; it is considered
persuasive by some, not because they reflect the
general understanding of the disputed terms, but because
the legislators who heard or read those statements presumably
voted with that understanding. Ibid. “Postenactment
legislative history,” ibid., a deprecatory contradiction
in terms, refers to statements of those who
drafted or voted for the law that are made after its enactment
and hence could have had no effect on the congressional
vote. It most certainly does not refer to the examination
of a variety of legal and other sources to determine
the public understanding of a legal text in the period after
its enactment or ratification. That sort of inquiry is a
critical tool of constitutional interpretation. As we will
show, virtually all interpreters of the Second Amendment
in the century after its enactment interpreted the amendment
as we do.
1. Post-ratification Commentary
Three important founding-era legal scholars interpreted
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 33
Opinion of the Court
the Second Amendment in published writings. All three
understood it to protect an individual right unconnected
with militia service.
St. George Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s Commentaries,
as we explained above, conceived of the Blackstonian
arms right as necessary for self-defense. He equated that
right, absent the religious and class-based restrictions,
with the Second Amendment. See 2 Tucker’s Blackstone
143. In Note D, entitled, “View of the Constitution of the
United States,” Tucker elaborated on the Second Amendment:
“This may be considered as the true palladium of
liberty . . . . The right to self-defence is the first law of
nature: in most governments it has been the study of
rulers to confine the right within the narrowest limits
possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the
right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any
colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.” 1 id.,
at App. 300 (ellipsis in original). He believed that the
English game laws had abridged the right by prohibiting
“keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of
game.” Ibid; see also 2 id., at 143, and nn. 40 and 41. He
later grouped the right with some of the individual rights
included in the First Amendment and said that if “a law
be passed by congress, prohibiting” any of those rights, it
would “be the province of the judiciary to pronounce
whether any such act were constitutional, or not; and if
not, to acquit the accused . . . .” 1 id., at App. 357. It is
unlikely that Tucker was referring to a person’s being
“accused” of violating a law making it a crime to bear arms
in a state militia.19
——————
19 JUSTICE STEVENS quotes some of Tucker’s unpublished notes, which
he claims show that Tucker had ambiguous views about the Second
Amendment. See post, at 31, and n. 32. But it is clear from the notes
that Tucker located the power of States to arm their militias in the
Tenth Amendment, and that he cited the Second Amendment for the
34 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
In 1825, William Rawle, a prominent lawyer who had
been a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly that ratified
the Bill of Rights, published an influential treatise, which
analyzed the Second Amendment as follows:
“The first [principle] is a declaration that a well
regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free
state; a proposition from which few will dissent. . . .
“The corollary, from the first position is, that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
“The prohibition is general. No clause in the constitution
could by any rule of construction be conceived
to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such
a flagitious attempt could only be made under some
general pretence by a state legislature. But if in any
blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt
it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint
on both.” Rawle 121–122.20
Like Tucker, Rawle regarded the English game laws as
violating the right codified in the Second Amendment. See
id., 122–123. Rawle clearly differentiated between the
people’s right to bear arms and their service in a militia:
“In a people permitted and accustomed to bear arms, we
have the rudiments of a militia, which properly consists of
armed citizens, divided into military bands, and instructed
——————
proposition that such armament could not run afoul of any power of the
federal government (since the amendment prohibits Congress from
ordering disarmament). Nothing in the passage implies that the
Second Amendment pertains only to the carrying of arms in the organized
militia.
20 Rawle, writing before our decision in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), believed that the Second
Amendment could be applied against the States. Such a belief would of
course be nonsensical on petitioners’ view that it protected only a right
to possess and carry arms when conscripted by the State itself into
militia service.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 35
Opinion of the Court
at least in part, in the use of arms for the purposes of
war.” Id., at 140. Rawle further said that the Second
Amendment right ought not “be abused to the disturbance
of the public peace,” such as by assembling with other
armed individuals “for an unlawful purpose”—statements
that make no sense if the right does not extend to any
individual purpose.
Joseph Story published his famous Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States in 1833. JUSTICE
STEVENS suggests that “[t]here is not so much as a whisper”
in Story’s explanation of the Second Amendment that
favors the individual-rights view. Post, at 34. That is
wrong. Story explained that the English Bill of Rights had
also included a “right to bear arms,” a right that, as we
have discussed, had nothing to do with militia service. 3
Story §1858. He then equated the English right with the
Second Amendment:
Ҥ1891. A similar provision [to the Second Amendment]
in favour of protestants (for to them it is confined)
is to be found in the bill of rights of 1688, it being
declared, ‘that the subjects, which are protestants,
may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition,
and as allowed by law.’ But under various pretences
the effect of this provision has been greatly
narrowed; and it is at present in England more nominal
than real, as a defensive privilege.” (Footnotes
omitted.)
This comparison to the Declaration of Right would not
make sense if the Second Amendment right was the right
to use a gun in a militia, which was plainly not what the
English right protected. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
recognized 38 years after Story wrote his Commentaries,
“[t]he passage from Story, shows clearly that this right
was intended . . . and was guaranteed to, and to be exercised
and enjoyed by the citizen as such, and not by him as
36 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
a soldier, or in defense solely of his political rights.” Andrews
v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 183 (1871). Story’s Commentaries
also cite as support Tucker and Rawle, both of
whom clearly viewed the right as unconnected to militia
service. See 3 Story §1890, n. 2; §1891, n. 3. In addition,
in a shorter 1840 work Story wrote: “One of the ordinary
modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purposes without
resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it
an offence to keep arms, and by substituting a regular
army in the stead of a resort to the militia.” A Familiar
Exposition of the Constitution of the United States §450
(reprinted in 1986).
Antislavery advocates routinely invoked the right to
bear arms for self-defense. Joel Tiffany, for example,
citing Blackstone’s description of the right, wrote that “the
right to keep and bear arms, also implies the right to use
them if necessary in self defence; without this right to use
the guaranty would have hardly been worth the paper it
consumed.” A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of
American Slavery 117–118 (1849); see also L. Spooner, The
Unconstitutionality of Slavery 116 (1845) (right enables
“personal defence”). In his famous Senate speech about
the 1856 “Bleeding Kansas” conflict, Charles Sumner
proclaimed:
“The rifle has ever been the companion of the pioneer
and, under God, his tutelary protector against the red
man and the beast of the forest. Never was this efficient
weapon more needed in just self-defence, than
now in Kansas, and at least one article in our National
Constitution must be blotted out, before the
complete right to it can in any way be impeached.
And yet such is the madness of the hour, that, in defiance
of the solemn guarantee, embodied in the
Amendments to the Constitution, that ‘the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,’
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 37
Opinion of the Court
the people of Kansas have been arraigned for keeping
and bearing them, and the Senator from South Carolina
has had the face to say openly, on this floor, that
they should be disarmed—of course, that the fanatics
of Slavery, his allies and constituents, may meet no
impediment.” The Crime Against Kansas, May 19–20,
1856, in American Speeches: Political Oratory from
the Revolution to the Civil War 553, 606–607 (2006).
We have found only one early 19th-century commentator
who clearly conditioned the right to keep and bear
arms upon service in the militia—and he recognized that
the prevailing view was to the contrary. “The provision of
the constitution, declaring the right of the people to keep
and bear arms, &c. was probably intended to apply to the
right of the people to bear arms for such [militia-related]
purposes only, and not to prevent congress or the legislatures
of the different states from enacting laws to prevent
the citizens from always going armed. A different construction
however has been given to it.” B. Oliver, The
Rights of an American Citizen 177 (1832).
2. Pre-Civil War Case Law
The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second
Amendment universally support an individual right unconnected
to militia service. In Houston v. Moore, 5
Wheat. 1, 24 (1820), this Court held that States have
concurrent power over the militia, at least where not preempted
by Congress. Agreeing in dissent that States
could “organize, discipline, and arm” the militia in the
absence of conflicting federal regulation, Justice Story said
that the Second Amendment “may not, perhaps, be
thought to have any important bearing on this point. If it
have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the
reasoning already suggested.” Id., at 51–53. Of course, if
the Amendment simply “protect[ed] the right of the people
of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated
38 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
militia,” post, at 1 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), it would have
enormous and obvious bearing on the point. But the Court
and Story derived the States’ power over the militia from
the nonexclusive nature of federal power, not from the
Second Amendment, whose preamble merely “confirms
and illustrates” the importance of the militia. Even
clearer was Justice Baldwin. In the famous fugitive-slave
case of Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 850, 852 (CC
Pa. 1833), Baldwin, sitting as a circuit judge, cited both
the Second Amendment and the Pennsylvania analogue
for his conclusion that a citizen has “a right to carry arms
in defence of his property or person, and to use them, if
either were assailed with such force, numbers or violence
as made it necessary for the protection or safety of either.”
Many early 19th-century state cases indicated that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms was an individual
right unconnected to militia service, though subject to
certain restrictions. A Virginia case in 1824 holding that
the Constitution did not extend to free blacks explained
that “numerous restrictions imposed on [blacks] in our
Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and
of the United States as respects the free whites, demonstrate,
that, here, those instruments have not been considered
to extend equally to both classes of our population.
We will only instance the restriction upon the migration of
free blacks into this State, and upon their right to bear
arms.” Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, 449
(Gen. Ct.). The claim was obviously not that blacks were
prevented from carrying guns in the militia.21 See also
——————
21 JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that this is not obvious because free
blacks in Virginia had been required to muster without arms. See post,
at 28, n. 29 (citing Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact
Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 497 (1998)). But that
could not have been the type of law referred to in Aldridge, because
that practice had stopped 30 years earlier when blacks were excluded
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Opinion of the Court
Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (because free
blacks were treated as a “dangerous population,” “laws
have been passed to prevent their migration into this
State; to make it unlawful for them to bear arms; to guard
even their religious assemblages with peculiar watchfulness”).
An 1829 decision by the Supreme Court of Michigan
said: “The constitution of the United States also
grants to the citizen the right to keep and bear arms. But
the grant of this privilege cannot be construed into the
right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor. No
rights are intended to be granted by the constitution for
an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.” United States v.
Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Michigan 337, 346 (W. Blume ed. 1940) (hereinafter
Blume). It is not possible to read this as discussing
anything other than an individual right unconnected to
militia service. If it did have to do with militia service, the
limitation upon it would not be any “unlawful or unjustifiable
purpose,” but any nonmilitary purpose whatsoever.
In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), the Georgia
Supreme Court construed the Second Amendment as
protecting the “natural right of self-defence” and therefore
struck down a ban on carrying pistols openly. Its opinion
perfectly captured the way in which the operative clause of
the Second Amendment furthers the purpose announced
——————
entirely from the militia by the First Militia Act. See Siegel, supra, at
498, n. 120. JUSTICE STEVENS further suggests that laws barring blacks
from militia service could have been said to violate the “right to bear
arms.” But under JUSTICE STEVENS’ reading of the Second Amendment
(we think), the protected right is the right to carry arms to the extent
one is enrolled in the militia, not the right to be in the militia. Perhaps
JUSTICE STEVENS really does adopt the full-blown idiomatic meaning of
“bear arms,” in which case every man and woman in this country has a
right “to be a soldier” or even “to wage war.” In any case, it is clear to
us that Aldridge’s allusion to the existing Virginia “restriction” upon
the right of free blacks “to bear arms” could only have referred to “laws
prohibiting blacks from keeping weapons,” Siegel, supra, at 497–498.
40 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
in the prefatory clause, in continuity with the English
right:
“The right of the whole people, old and young, men,
women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and
bear arms of every description, and not such merely as
are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed,
or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and
all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing
up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally
necessary to the security of a free State. Our
opinion is, that any law, State or Federal, is repugnant
to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes
this right, originally belonging to our forefathers,
trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two wicked
sons and successors, re-established by the revolution
of 1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists,
and finally incorporated conspicuously in our
own Magna Charta!”
Likewise, in State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490
(1850), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that citizens
had a right to carry arms openly: “This is the right guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States, and
which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble
defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country,
without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly
assassinations.”
Those who believe that the Second Amendment preserves
only a militia-centered right place great reliance on
the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1840 decision in Aymette
v. State, 21 Tenn. 154. The case does not stand for that
broad proposition; in fact, the case does not mention the
word “militia” at all, except in its quoting of the Second
Amendment. Aymette held that the state constitutional
guarantee of the right to “bear” arms did not prohibit the
banning of concealed weapons. The opinion first recogCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 41
Opinion of the Court
nized that both the state right and the federal right were
descendents of the 1689 English right, but (erroneously,
and contrary to virtually all other authorities) read that
right to refer only to “protect[ion of] the public liberty” and
“keep[ing] in awe those in power,” id., at 158. The court
then adopted a sort of middle position, whereby citizens
were permitted to carry arms openly, unconnected with
any service in a formal militia, but were given the right to
use them only for the military purpose of banding together
to oppose tyranny. This odd reading of the right is, to be
sure, not the one we adopt—but it is not petitioners’ reading
either. More importantly, seven years earlier the
Tennessee Supreme Court had treated the state constitutional
provision as conferring a right “of all the free citizens
of the State to keep and bear arms for their defence,”
Simpson, 5 Yer., at 360; and 21 years later the court held
that the “keep” portion of the state constitutional right
included the right to personal self-defense: “[T]he right to
keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such
arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary
modes usual in the country, and to which arms are
adapted, limited by the duties of a good citizen in times of
peace.” Andrews, 50 Tenn., at 178; see also ibid. (equating
state provision with Second Amendment).
3. Post-Civil War Legislation.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, there was an outpouring
of discussion of the Second Amendment in Congress
and in public discourse, as people debated whether and
how to secure constitutional rights for newly free slaves.
See generally S. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866–1876
(1998) (hereinafter Halbrook); Brief for Institute for Justice
as Amicus Curiae. Since those discussions took place
75 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment,
they do not provide as much insight into its original mean42
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
ing as earlier sources. Yet those born and educated in the
early 19th century faced a widespread effort to limit arms
ownership by a large number of citizens; their understanding
of the origins and continuing significance of the
Amendment is instructive.
Blacks were routinely disarmed by Southern States
after the Civil War. Those who opposed these injustices
frequently stated that they infringed blacks’ constitutional
right to keep and bear arms. Needless to say, the claim
was not that blacks were being prohibited from carrying
arms in an organized state militia. A Report of the Commission
of the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1866 stated plainly:
“[T]he civil law [of Kentucky] prohibits the colored man
from bearing arms. . . . Their arms are taken from them
by the civil authorities. . . . Thus, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms as provided in the Constitution is
infringed.” H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
233, 236. A joint congressional Report decried:
“in some parts of [South Carolina], armed parties are,
without proper authority, engaged in seizing all firearms
found in the hands of the freemen. Such conduct
is in clear and direct violation of their personal
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States, which declares that ‘the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.’ The
freedmen of South Carolina have shown by their
peaceful and orderly conduct that they can safely be
trusted with fire-arms, and they need them to kill
game for subsistence, and to protect their crops from
destruction by birds and animals.” Joint Comm. on
Reconstruction, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, p. 229 (1866) (Proposed Circular of Brigadier
General R. Saxton).
The view expressed in these statements was widely
reported and was apparently widely held. For example,
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 43
Opinion of the Court
an editorial in The Loyal Georgian (Augusta) on February
3, 1866, assured blacks that “[a]ll men, without distinction
of color, have the right to keep and bear arms to defend
their homes, families or themselves.” Halbrook 19.
Congress enacted the Freedmen’s Bureau Act on July
16, 1866. Section 14 stated:
“[T]he right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty,
personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and
disposition of estate, real and personal, including the
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to
and enjoyed by all the citizens . . . without respect to
race or color, or previous condition of slavery. . . . ” 14
Stat. 176–177.
The understanding that the Second Amendment gave
freed blacks the right to keep and bear arms was reflected
in congressional discussion of the bill, with even an opponent
of it saying that the founding generation “were for
every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them
in his house, his castle, for his own defense.” Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess., 362, 371 (1866) (Sen. Davis).
Similar discussion attended the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, Representative Butler said of the Act: “Section
eight is intended to enforce the well-known constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right of the citizen to ‘keep and
bear arms,’ and provides that whoever shall take away, by
force or violence, or by threats and intimidation, the arms
and weapons which any person may have for his defense,
shall be deemed guilty of larceny of the same.” H. R. Rep.
No. 37, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 7–8 (1871). With respect
to the proposed Amendment, Senator Pomeroy described
as one of the three “indispensable” “safeguards of liberty
. . . under the Constitution” a man’s “right to bear arms for
the defense of himself and family and his homestead.”
44 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1182 (1866). Representative
Nye thought the Fourteenth Amendment unnecessary
because “[a]s citizens of the United States [blacks]
have equal right to protection, and to keep and bear arms
for self-defense.” Id., at 1073 (1866).
It was plainly the understanding in the post-Civil War
Congress that the Second Amendment protected an individual
right to use arms for self-defense.
4. Post-Civil War Commentators.
Every late-19th-century legal scholar that we have read
interpreted the Second Amendment to secure an individual
right unconnected with militia service. The most
famous was the judge and professor Thomas Cooley, who
wrote a massively popular 1868 Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations. Concerning the Second Amendment it said:
“Among the other defences to personal liberty
should be mentioned the right of the people to keep
and bear arms. . . . The alternative to a standing army
is ‘a well-regulated militia,’ but this cannot exist
unless the people are trained to bearing arms. How
far it is in the power of the legislature to regulate this
right, we shall not undertake to say, as happily there
has been very little occasion to discuss that subject by
the courts.” Id., at 350.
That Cooley understood the right not as connected to
militia service, but as securing the militia by ensuring a
populace familiar with arms, is made even clearer in his
1880 work, General Principles of Constitutional Law. The
Second Amendment, he said, “was adopted with some
modification and enlargement from the English Bill of
Rights of 1688, where it stood as a protest against arbitrary
action of the overturned dynasty in disarming the
people.” Id., at 270. In a section entitled “The Right in
General,” he continued:
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 45
Opinion of the Court
“It might be supposed from the phraseology of this
provision that the right to keep and bear arms was
only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an
interpretation not warranted by the intent. The militia,
as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those
persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance
of military duty, and are officered and enrolled
for service when called upon. But the law may make
provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform
military duty, or of a small number only, or it
may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and if
the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of
this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action
or neglect to act of the government it was meant
to hold in check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly
is, that the people, from whom the militia
must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear
arms; and they need no permission or regulation of
law for the purpose. But this enables government to
have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the
learning to handle and use them in a way that makes
those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in
other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary
discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of
public order.” Id., at 271.
All other post-Civil War 19th-century sources we have
found concurred with Cooley. One example from each
decade will convey the general flavor:
“[The purpose of the Second Amendment is] to secure
a well-armed militia. . . . But a militia would be useless
unless the citizens were enabled to exercise themselves
in the use of warlike weapons. To preserve this
privilege, and to secure to the people the ability to oppose
themselves in military force against the usurpa46
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
tions of government, as well as against enemies from
without, that government is forbidden by any law or
proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and
bear arms. . . . The clause is analogous to the one securing
the freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom,
not license, is secured; the fair use, not the libellous
abuse, is protected.” J. Pomeroy, An Introduction
to the Constitutional Law of the United States 152–
153 (1868) (hereinafter Pomeroy).
“As the Constitution of the United States, and the
constitutions of several of the states, in terms more or
less comprehensive, declare the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of grave discussion,
in some of the state courts, whether a statute
prohibiting persons, when not on a journey, or as
travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons,
be constitutional. There has been a great difference
of opinion on the question.” 2 J. Kent, Commentaries
on American Law *340, n. 2 (O. Holmes ed.,
12th ed. 1873) (hereinafter Kent).
“Some general knowledge of firearms is important to
the public welfare; because it would be impossible, in
case of war, to organize promptly an efficient force of
volunteers unless the people had some familiarity
with weapons of war. The Constitution secures the
right of the people to keep and bear arms. No doubt, a
citizen who keeps a gun or pistol under judicious precautions,
practices in safe places the use of it, and in
due time teaches his sons to do the same, exercises his
individual right. No doubt, a person whose residence
or duties involve peculiar peril may keep a pistol for
prudent self-defence.” B. Abbott, Judge and Jury: A
Popular Explanation of the Leading Topics in the Law
of the Land 333 (1880) (hereinafter Abbott).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 47
Opinion of the Court
“The right to bear arms has always been the distinctive
privilege of freemen. Aside from any necessity
of self-protection to the person, it represents
among all nations power coupled with the exercise of a
certain jurisdiction. . . . [I]t was not necessary that the
right to bear arms should be granted in the Constitution,
for it had always existed.” J. Ordronaux, Constitutional
Legislation in the United States 241–242
(1891).
E
We now ask whether any of our precedents forecloses
the conclusions we have reached about the meaning of the
Second Amendment.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, in the course
of vacating the convictions of members of a white mob for
depriving blacks of their right to keep and bear arms, held
that the Second Amendment does not by its own force
apply to anyone other than the Federal Government. The
opinion explained that the right “is not a right granted by
the Constitution [or] in any manner dependent upon that
instrument for its existence. The second amendment . . .
means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.”
92 U. S., at 553. States, we said, were free to
restrict or protect the right under their police powers. The
limited discussion of the Second Amendment in Cruikshank
supports, if anything, the individual-rights interpretation.
There was no claim in Cruikshank that the
victims had been deprived of their right to carry arms in a
militia; indeed, the Governor had disbanded the local
militia unit the year before the mob’s attack, see C. Lane,
The Day Freedom Died 62 (2008). We described the right
protected by the Second Amendment as “ ‘bearing arms for
a lawful purpose’ ”22 and said that “the people [must] look
——————
22 JUSTICE STEVENS’ accusation that this is “not accurate,” post, at 39,
48 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
for their protection against any violation by their fellowcitizens
of the rights it recognizes” to the States’ police
power. 92 U. S., at 553. That discussion makes little
sense if it is only a right to bear arms in a state militia.23
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the
right to keep and bear arms was not violated by a law that
forbade “bodies of men to associate together as military
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and
towns unless authorized by law.” Id., at 264–265. This
does not refute the individual-rights interpretation of the
Amendment; no one supporting that interpretation has
contended that States may not ban such groups. JUSTICE
STEVENS presses Presser into service to support his view
that the right to bear arms is limited to service in the
militia by joining Presser’s brief discussion of the Second
Amendment with a later portion of the opinion making the
seemingly relevant (to the Second Amendment) point that
the plaintiff was not a member of the state militia. Unfortunately
for JUSTICE STEVENS’ argument, that later portion
deals with the Fourteenth Amendment; it was the
Fourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff’s nonmembership
in the militia was relevant. Thus, JUSTICE
STEVENS’ statement that Presser “suggested that. . . nothing
in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside
the context of a militia,” post, at 40, is simply wrong.
——————
is wrong. It is true it was the indictment that described the right as
“bearing arms for a lawful purpose.” But, in explicit reference to the
right described in the indictment, the Court stated that “The second
amendment declares that it [i.e., the right of bearing arms for a lawful
purpose] shall not be infringed.” 92 U. S., at 553.
23 With respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation,
a question not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank also
said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did
not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by
our later cases. Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252,
265 (1886) and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed
that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 49
Opinion of the Court
Presser said nothing about the Second Amendment’s
meaning or scope, beyond the fact that it does not prevent
the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.
JUSTICE STEVENS places overwhelming reliance upon
this Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S.
174 (1939). “[H]undreds of judges,” we are told, “have
relied on the view of the amendment we endorsed there,”
post, at 2, and “[e]ven if the textual and historical arguments
on both side of the issue were evenly balanced,
respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors
on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would
prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic
upheaval in the law,” post, at 4. And what is, according to
JUSTICE STEVENS, the holding of Miller that demands
such obeisance? That the Second Amendment “protects
the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes,
but that it does not curtail the legislature’s power to
regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”
Post, at 2.
Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of
JUSTICE STEVENS’ case. Miller did not hold that and
cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment
in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge
two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered
short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, in
violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat. 1236. It is
entirely clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the
Second Amendment did not apply was not that the defendants
were “bear[ing] arms” not “for . . . military purposes”
but for “nonmilitary use,” post, at 2. Rather, it was that
the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second
Amendment protection: “In the absence of any evidence
tending to show that the possession or use of a [shortbarreled
shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
50 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”
307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). “Certainly,”
the Court continued, “it is not within judicial notice that
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment
or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”
Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation
of the content of the right.
This holding is not only consistent with, but positively
suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual
right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that
“have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia”). Had the Court
believed that the Second Amendment protects only those
serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine
the character of the weapon rather than simply note that
the two crooks were not militiamen. JUSTICE STEVENS can
say again and again that Miller did “not turn on the difference
between muskets and sawed-off shotguns, it
turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military
and nonmilitary use and possession of guns,” post, at
42–43, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The
most JUSTICE STEVENS can plausibly claim for Miller is
that it declined to decide the nature of the Second
Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General’s argument
(made in the alternative) that the right was collective,
see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696,
pp. 4–5. Miller stands only for the proposition that the
Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends
only to certain types of weapons.
It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more
than what it said, because the case did not even purport to
be a thorough examination of the Second Amendment.
JUSTICE STEVENS claims, post, at 42, that the opinion
reached its conclusion “[a]fter reviewing many of the same
sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court
today.” Not many, which was not entirely the Court’s
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 51
Opinion of the Court
fault. The respondent made no appearance in the case,
neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the
Court heard from no one but the Government (reason
enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning
and the end of this Court’s consideration of the Second
Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United
States v. Miller, 3 N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65–68
(2008). The Government’s brief spent two pages discussing
English legal sources, concluding “that at least the
carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was
always a crime” and that (because of the class-based restrictions
and the prohibition on terrorizing people with
dangerous or unusual weapons) “the early English law did
not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms.” Brief
for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9–11. It then
went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English
right to bear arms in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for
the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the
Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia,
not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938,
No. 696, at 12–18. The final section of the brief recognized
that “some courts have said that the right to bear arms
includes the right of the individual to have them for the
protection of his person and property,” and launched an
alternative argument that “weapons which are commonly
used by criminals,” such as sawed-off shotguns, are not
protected. See id., at 18–21. The Government’s Miller
brief thus provided scant discussion of the history of the
Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with
no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court’s opinion
itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second
Amendment. It assumes from the prologue that the
Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307
U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews
some historical materials dealing with the nature of the
militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their
52 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
members were expected to possess, id., at 178–182. Not a
word (not a word) about the history of the Second Amendment.
This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent
rests its case.24
We may as well consider at this point (for we will have
to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller
permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary
military equipment” could mean that only those
weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a
startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that
the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns
(not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional,
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think
that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must
be read in tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily
when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves
and of the kind in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at
179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of
men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful
purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary
war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen
and weapons used in defense of person and home were one
and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614
P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and
Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)).
Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second
——————
24 As for the “hundreds of judges,” post, at 2, who have relied on the
view of the Second Amendment JUSTICE STEVENS claims we endorsed in
Miller: If so, they overread Miller. And their erroneous reliance upon
an uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the
reliance of millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown)
upon the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms. In any
event, it should not be thought that the cases decided by these judges
would necessarily have come out differently under a proper interpretation
of the right.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 53
Opinion of the Court
Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced
in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say
only that the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
That accords with the historical understanding of the
scope of the right, see Part III, infra.25
We conclude that nothing in our precedents forecloses
our adoption of the original understanding of the Second
Amendment. It should be unsurprising that such a significant
matter has been for so long judicially unresolved.
For most of our history, the Bill of Rights was not thought
applicable to the States, and the Federal Government did
not significantly regulate the possession of firearms by
law-abiding citizens. Other provisions of the Bill of Rights
have similarly remained unilluminated for lengthy periods.
This Court first held a law to violate the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech in 1931,
almost 150 years after the Amendment was ratified, see
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), and
it was not until after World War II that we held a law
——————
25 Miller was briefly mentioned in our decision in Lewis v. United
States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal from a conviction for being a felon
in possession of a firearm. The challenge was based on the contention
that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional. No Second
Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the course of
rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in
a footnote, that “[t]hese legislative restrictions on the use of firearms
are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they
trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States
v. Miller . . . (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and
bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’).” Id., at 65–66,
n. 8. The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same
effect. It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the
basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon such a
footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not
argued.
54 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
invalid under the Establishment Clause, see Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign
Cty., 333 U. S. 203 (1948). Even a question as basic
as the scope of proscribable libel was not addressed by this
Court until 1964, nearly two centuries after the founding.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964).
It is demonstrably not true that, as JUSTICE STEVENS
claims, post, at 41–42, “for most of our history, the invalidity
of Second-Amendment-based objections to firearms
regulations has been well settled and uncontroversial.”
For most of our history the question did not present itself.
III
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through
the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely
explained that the right was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume
346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example,
the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or
state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann.,
at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2
Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n.
11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an
exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the
Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 55
Opinion of the Court
arms.26
We also recognize another important limitation on the
right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have
explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those
“in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think
that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual
weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson,
Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J.
Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A
Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky
482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable
Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary
of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment
of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F.
Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United
States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C.
381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849);
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier,
71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful
in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be
banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely
detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said,
the conception of the militia at the time of the Second
Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of
lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia
duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as
effective as militias in the 18th century, would require
sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small
arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and
——————
26 We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.
56 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited
the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the
protected right cannot change our interpretation of the
right.
IV
We turn finally to the law at issue here. As we have
said, the law totally bans handgun possession in the home.
It also requires that any lawful firearm in the home be
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering
it inoperable.
As the quotations earlier in this opinion demonstrate,
the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the
Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a
prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly
chosen by American society for that lawful purpose.
The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.
Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied
to enumerated constitutional rights,27 banning from
——————
27 JUSTICE BREYER correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws,
would pass rational-basis scrutiny. Post, at 8. But rational-basis
scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws
under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on
irrational laws. See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553
U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 9–10). In those cases, “rational basis”
is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the
constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test could not be used to
evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against
double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear
arms. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152,
n. 4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by
rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments. . .”). If all that was required to overcome the right to
keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would
be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irraCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 57
Opinion of the Court
the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to
‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,”
478 F. 3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster.
Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to
the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban. And
some of those few have been struck down. In Nunn v.
State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a prohibition
on carrying pistols openly (even though it upheld a
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons). See 1 Ga., at
251. In Andrews v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court
likewise held that a statute that forbade openly carrying a
pistol “publicly or privately, without regard to time or
place, or circumstances,” 50 Tenn., at 187, violated the
state constitutional provision (which the court equated
with the Second Amendment). That was so even though
the statute did not restrict the carrying of long guns. Ibid.
See also State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–617 (1840) (“A
statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts
to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be
so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose
of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional”).
It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible
to ban the possession of handguns so long as the
possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed. It
is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American
people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential
self-defense weapon. There are many reasons that a
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier
to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency;
it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by
an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upperbody
strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed
at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the
police. Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popu-
——————
tional laws, and would have no effect.
58 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
lar weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the
home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.
We must also address the District’s requirement (as
applied to respondent’s handgun) that firearms in the
home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times. This
makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core
lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.
The District argues that we should interpret this
element of the statute to contain an exception for selfdefense.
See Brief for Petitioners 56–57. But we think
that is precluded by the unequivocal text, and by the
presence of certain other enumerated exceptions: “Except
for law enforcement personnel . . . , each registrant shall
keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled
or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless
such firearm is kept at his place of business, or while
being used for lawful recreational purposes within the
District of Columbia.” D. C. Code §7–2507.02. The nonexistence
of a self-defense exception is also suggested by
the D. C. Court of Appeals’ statement that the statute
forbids residents to use firearms to stop intruders, see
McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A. 2d 744, 755–756 (1978).28
Apart from his challenge to the handgun ban and the
trigger-lock requirement respondent asked the District
Court to enjoin petitioners from enforcing the separate
licensing requirement “in such a manner as to forbid the
carrying of a firearm within one’s home or possessed land
without a license.” App. 59a. The Court of Appeals did
not invalidate the licensing requirement, but held only
——————
28 McIntosh upheld the law against a claim that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause by arbitrarily distinguishing between residences and
businesses. See 395 A. 2d, at 755. One of the rational bases listed for
that distinction was the legislative finding “that for each intruder
stopped by a firearm there are four gun-related accidents within the
home.” Ibid. That tradeoff would not bear mention if the statute did
not prevent stopping intruders by firearms.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 59
Opinion of the Court
that the District “may not prevent [a handgun] from being
moved throughout one’s house.” 478 F. 3d, at 400. It then
ordered the District Court to enter summary judgment
“consistent with [respondent’s] prayer for relief.” Id., at
401. Before this Court petitioners have stated that “if the
handgun ban is struck down and respondent registers a
handgun, he could obtain a license, assuming he is not
otherwise disqualified,” by which they apparently mean if
he is not a felon and is not insane. Brief for Petitioners
58. Respondent conceded at oral argument that he does
not “have a problem with . . . licensing” and that the District’s
law is permissible so long as it is “not enforced in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–75.
We therefore assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license
will satisfy respondent’s prayer for relief and do not address
the licensing requirement.
JUSTICE BREYER has devoted most of his separate dissent
to the handgun ban. He says that, even assuming the
Second Amendment is a personal guarantee of the right to
bear arms, the District’s prohibition is valid. He first tries
to establish this by founding-era historical precedent,
pointing to various restrictive laws in the colonial period.
These demonstrate, in his view, that the District’s law
“imposes a burden upon gun owners that seems proportionately
no greater than restrictions in existence at the
time the Second Amendment was adopted.” Post, at 2. Of
the laws he cites, only one offers even marginal support
for his assertion. A 1783 Massachusetts law forbade the
residents of Boston to “take into” or “receive into” “any
Dwelling House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house,
Store, Shop or other Building” loaded firearms, and permitted
the seizure of any loaded firearms that “shall be
found” there. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 13, 1783 Mass. Acts
p. 218. That statute’s text and its prologue, which makes
clear that the purpose of the prohibition was to eliminate
the danger to firefighters posed by the “depositing of
60 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
loaded Arms” in buildings, give reason to doubt that colonial
Boston authorities would have enforced that general
prohibition against someone who temporarily loaded a
firearm to confront an intruder (despite the law’s application
in that case). In any case, we would not stake our
interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single
law, in effect in a single city, that contradicts the overwhelming
weight of other evidence regarding the right to
keep and bear arms for defense of the home. The other
laws JUSTICE BREYER cites are gunpowder-storage laws
that he concedes did not clearly prohibit loaded weapons,
but required only that excess gunpowder be kept in a
special container or on the top floor of the home. Post, at
6–7. Nothing about those fire-safety laws undermines our
analysis; they do not remotely burden the right of selfdefense
as much as an absolute ban on handguns. Nor,
correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the invalidity
of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent
accidents.
JUSTICE BREYER points to other founding-era laws that
he says “restricted the firing of guns within the city limits
to at least some degree” in Boston, Philadelphia and New
York. Post, at 4 (citing Churchill, Gun Regulation, the
Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America,
25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 162 (2007)). Those laws
provide no support for the severe restriction in the present
case. The New York law levied a fine of 20 shillings on
anyone who fired a gun in certain places (including
houses) on New Year’s Eve and the first two days of January,
and was aimed at preventing the “great Damages . . .
frequently done on [those days] by persons going House to
House, with Guns and other Firearms and being often
intoxicated with Liquor.” 5 Colonial Laws of New York
244–246 (1894). It is inconceivable that this law would
have been enforced against a person exercising his right to
self-defense on New Year’s Day against such drunken
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 61
Opinion of the Court
hooligans. The Pennsylvania law to which JUSTICE
BREYER refers levied a fine of 5 shillings on one who fired
a gun or set off fireworks in Philadelphia without first
obtaining a license from the governor. See Act of Aug. 26,
1721, §4, in 3 Stat. at Large 253–254. Given Justice Wilson’s
explanation that the right to self-defense with arms
was protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is
unlikely that this law (which in any event amounted to at
most a licensing regime) would have been enforced against
a person who used firearms for self-defense. JUSTICE
BREYER cites a Rhode Island law that simply levied a 5-
shilling fine on those who fired guns in streets and taverns,
a law obviously inapplicable to this case. See An Act for
preventing Mischief being done in the town of Newport, or
in any other town in this Government, 1731, Rhode Island
Session Laws. Finally, JUSTICE BREYER points to a Massachusetts
law similar to the Pennsylvania law, prohibiting
“discharg[ing] any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot or
Ball in the Town of Boston.” Act of May 28, 1746, ch. X,
Acts and Laws of Mass. Bay 208. It is again implausible
that this would have been enforced against a citizen acting
in self-defense, particularly given its preambulatory reference
to “the indiscreet firing of Guns.” Ibid. (preamble)
(emphasis added).
A broader point about the laws that JUSTICE BREYER
cites: All of them punished the discharge (or loading) of
guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a
few cases a very brief stay in the local jail), not with significant
criminal penalties.29 They are akin to modern
penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding
——————
29 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described the amount of five
shillings in a contract matter in 1792 as “nominal consideration.”
Morris’s Lessee v. Smith, 4 Dall. 119, 120 (Pa. 1792). Many of the laws
cited punished violation with fine in a similar amount; the 1783 Massachusetts
gunpowder-storage law carried a somewhat larger fine of £10
(200 shillings) and forfeiture of the weapon.
62 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
or jaywalking. And although such public-safety laws may
not contain exceptions for self-defense, it is inconceivable
that the threat of a jaywalking ticket would deter someone
from disregarding a “Do Not Walk” sign in order to flee an
attacker, or that the Government would enforce those laws
under such circumstances. Likewise, we do not think that
a law imposing a 5-shilling fine and forfeiture of the gun
would have prevented a person in the founding era from
using a gun to protect himself or his family from violence,
or that if he did so the law would be enforced against him.
The District law, by contrast, far from imposing a minor
fine, threatens citizens with a year in prison (five years for
a second violation) for even obtaining a gun in the first
place. See D. C. Code §7–2507.06.
JUSTICE BREYER moves on to make a broad jurisprudential
point: He criticizes us for declining to establish a level
of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions.
He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally
expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis), but rather a judge-empowering “interestbalancing
inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens
a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of
proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests.” Post, at 10. After an
exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and against
gun control, JUSTICE BREYER arrives at his interestbalanced
answer: because handgun violence is a problem,
because the law is limited to an urban area, and because
there were somewhat similar restrictions in the founding
period (a false proposition that we have already discussed),
the interest-balancing inquiry results in the
constitutionality of the handgun ban. QED.
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
“interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of
the right takes out of the hands of government—even the
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 63
Opinion of the Court
Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional
guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with
the scope they were understood to have when the people
adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad. We would
not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition
of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. See
National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43
(1977) (per curiam). The First Amendment contains the
freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified,
which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure
of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely
unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second
Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very
product of an interest-balancing by the people—which
JUSTICE BREYER would now conduct for them anew. And
whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely
elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.
JUSTICE BREYER chides us for leaving so many applications
of the right to keep and bear arms in doubt, and for
not providing extensive historical justification for those
regulations of the right that we describe as permissible.
See post, at 42–43. But since this case represents this
Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,
one should not expect it to clarify the entire field,
any more than Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145
(1879), our first in-depth Free Exercise Clause case, left
that area in a state of utter certainty. And there will be
time enough to expound upon the historical justifications
for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those
exceptions come before us.
64 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
Opinion of the Court
In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment,
as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm
in the home operable for the purpose of immediate
self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not disqualified
from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District
must permit him to register his handgun and must
issue him a license to carry it in the home.
* * *
We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this
country, and we take seriously the concerns raised by the
many amici who believe that prohibition of handgun
ownership is a solution. The Constitution leaves the
District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating that
problem, including some measures regulating handguns,
see supra, at 54–55, and n. 26. But the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition
of handguns held and used for self-defense in the
home. Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment
is outmoded in a society where our standing army is
the pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces
provide personal security, and where gun violence is a
serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is
not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
STEVENS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 07–290
_________________
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2008]
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE
GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
The question presented by this case is not whether the
Second Amendment protects a “collective right” or an
“individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be
enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us
anything about the scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit
crimes, for sporting activities, and to perform military
duties. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect
the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that
it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain
military purposes. Whether it also protects the right to
possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting
and personal self-defense is the question presented by
this case. The text of the Amendment, its history, and our
decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939),
provide a clear answer to that question.
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the
right of the people of each of the several States to maintain
a well-regulated militia. It was a response to concerns
raised during the ratification of the Constitution
that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias
and create a national standing army posed an intolerable
2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
threat to the sovereignty of the several States. Neither
the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced
by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting
any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian
uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that
the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the
common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act,
the first major federal firearms law.1 Upholding a conviction
under that Act, this Court held that, “[i]n the absence
of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,
we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.” Miller, 307
U. S., at 178. The view of the Amendment we took in
Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms
for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail
the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use
and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural
reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation
most faithful to the history of its adoption.
Since our decision in Miller, hundreds of judges have
relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there;2
——————
1 There was some limited congressional activity earlier: A 10% federal
excise tax on firearms was passed as part of the Revenue Act of 1918,
40 Stat. 1057, and in 1927 a statute was enacted prohibiting the
shipment of handguns, revolvers, and other concealable weapons
through the United States mails. Ch. 75, 44 Stat. 1059–1060 (hereinafter
1927 Act).
2 Until the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Emerson, 270
F. 3d 203 (2001), every Court of Appeals to consider the question had
understood Miller to hold that the Second Amendment does not protect
the right to possess and use guns for purely private, civilian purposes.
See, e.g., United States v. Haney, 264 F. 3d 1161, 1164–1166 (CA10
2001); United States v. Napier, 233 F. 3d 394, 402–404 (CA6 2000);
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
STEVENS, J., dissenting
we ourselves affirmed it in 1980. See Lewis v. United
States, 445 U. S. 55, 65–66, n. 8 (1980).3 No new evidence
has surfaced since 1980 supporting the view that the
Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress
to regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons. Indeed, a
review of the drafting history of the Amendment demonstrates
that its Framers rejected proposals that would
have broadened its coverage to include such uses.
The opinion the Court announces today fails to identify
any new evidence supporting the view that the Amendment
was intended to limit the power of Congress to regulate
civilian uses of weapons. Unable to point to any such
evidence, the Court stakes its holding on a strained and
——————
Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F. 3d 693, 710–711 (CA7 1999); United
States v. Scanio, No. 97–1584, 1998 WL 802060, *2 (CA2, Nov. 12,
1998) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Wright, 117 F. 3d 1265,
1271–1274 (CA11 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F. 3d 273, 285–286
(CA3 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F. 3d 98, 100–103 (CA9 1996); United
States v. Hale, 978 F. 2d 1016, 1018–1020 (CA8 1992); Thomas v. City
Council of Portland, 730 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA1 1984) (per curiam); United
States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548, 550 (CA4 1974) (per curiam); United
States v. Johnson, 441 F. 2d 1134, 1136 (CA5 1971); see also Sandidge
v. United States, 520 A. 2d 1057, 1058–1059 (DC App. 1987). And a
number of courts have remained firm in their prior positions, even after
considering Emerson. See, e.g., United States v. Lippman, 369 F. 3d
1039, 1043–1045 (CA8 2004); United States v. Parker, 362 F. 3d 1279,
1282–1284 (CA10 2004); United States v. Jackubowski, 63 Fed. Appx.
959, 961 (CA7 2003) (unpublished opinion); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312
F. 3d 1052, 1060–1066 (CA9 2002); United States v. Milheron, 231
F. Supp. 2d 376, 378 (Me. 2002); Bach v. Pataki, 289 F. Supp. 2d 217,
224–226 (NDNY 2003); United States v. Smith, 56 M. J. 711, 716 (C. A.
Armed Forces 2001).
3 Our discussion in Lewis was brief but significant. Upholding a conviction
for receipt of a firearm by a felon, we wrote: “These legislative
restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally
suspect criteria, nor do they entrench upon any constitutionally
protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 178
(1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia’).” 445 U. S., at 65, n. 8.
4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
unpersuasive reading of the Amendment’s text; significantly
different provisions in the 1689 English Bill of
Rights, and in various 19th-century State Constitutions;
postenactment commentary that was available to the
Court when it decided Miller; and, ultimately, a feeble
attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis
on the Court’s decisional process than on the reasoning in
the opinion itself.
Even if the textual and historical arguments on both
sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the
well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court,
and for the rule of law itself, see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 416 U. S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic
upheaval in the law.4 As Justice Cardozo observed
years ago, the “labor of judges would be increased almost
to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened
in every case, and one could not lay one’s own
——————
4 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265, 266 (1986) (“[Stare decisis]
permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby
contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government,
both in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis is not an inexorable
command, the careful observer will discern that any detours from the
straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions
into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained.’
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)”); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429,
652 (1895) (White, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental conception of a
judicial body is that of one hedged about by precedents which are
binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members.
Break down this belief in judicial continuity and let it be felt that on
great constitutional questions this Court is to depart from the settled
conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all according to
the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our
Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and become a most
dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the people”).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
STEVENS, J., dissenting
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses
laid by others who had gone before him.” The Nature of
the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
In this dissent I shall first explain why our decision in
Miller was faithful to the text of the Second Amendment
and the purposes revealed in its drafting history. I shall
then comment on the postratification history of the
Amendment, which makes abundantly clear that the
Amendment should not be interpreted as limiting the
authority of Congress to regulate the use or possession of
firearms for purely civilian purposes.
I
The text of the Second Amendment is brief. It provides:
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”
Three portions of that text merit special focus: the introductory
language defining the Amendment’s purpose,
the class of persons encompassed within its reach, and the
unitary nature of the right that it protects.
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State”
The preamble to the Second Amendment makes three
important points. It identifies the preservation of the
militia as the Amendment’s purpose; it explains that the
militia is necessary to the security of a free State; and it
recognizes that the militia must be “well regulated.” In all
three respects it is comparable to provisions in several
State Declarations of Rights that were adopted roughly
contemporaneously with the Declaration of Independence.5
——————
5 The Virginia Declaration of Rights ¶13 (1776), provided: “That a
well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that
Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to
6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Those state provisions highlight the importance members
of the founding generation attached to the maintenance of
state militias; they also underscore the profound fear
shared by many in that era of the dangers posed by standing
armies.6 While the need for state militias has not been
——————
liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under strict
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” 1 B. Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights 235 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz).
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, Arts. XXV–XXVII (1776), provided:
“That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a
free government”; “That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be raised or kept up, without consent of the Legislature”;
“That in all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict
subordination to and control of the civil power.” 1 Schwartz 282.
Delaware’s Declaration of Rights, §§18–20 (1776), provided: “That a
well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
government”; “That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the Legislature”;
“That in all cases and at all times the military ought to be under
strict subordination to and governed by the civil power.” 1 Schwartz
278.
Finally, New Hampshire’s Bill of Rights, Arts. XXIV–XXVI (1783),
read: “A well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and sure defence
of a state”; “Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to
be raised or kept up without consent of the legislature”; “In all cases,
and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to,
and governed by the civil power.” 1 Schwartz 378. It elsewhere provided:
“No person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness
of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto, provided he will pay
an equivalent.” Id., at 377 (Art. XIII).
6 The language of the Amendment’s preamble also closely tracks the
language of a number of contemporaneous state militia statutes, many
of which began with nearly identical statements. Georgia’s 1778 militia
statute, for example, began, “[w]hereas a well ordered and disciplined
Militia, is essentially necessary, to the Safety, peace and prosperity, of
this State.” Act of Nov. 15, 1778, 19 Colonial Records of the State of
Georgia 103 (Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)). North Carolina’s 1777 militia
statute started with this language: “Whereas a well regulated Militia is
absolutely necessary for the defending and securing the Liberties of a
free State.” N. C. Sess. Laws ch. 1, §I, p. 1. And Connecticut’s 1782
“Acts and Laws Regulating the Militia” began, “Whereas the Defence
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
STEVENS, J., dissenting
a matter of significant public interest for almost two centuries,
that fact should not obscure the contemporary
concerns that animated the Framers.
The parallels between the Second Amendment and
these state declarations, and the Second Amendment’s
omission of any statement of purpose related to the right
to use firearms for hunting or personal self-defense, is
especially striking in light of the fact that the Declarations
of Rights of Pennsylvania and Vermont did expressly
protect such civilian uses at the time. Article XIII of
Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of Rights announced that
“the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state,” 1 Schwartz 266 (emphasis
added); §43 of the Declaration assured that “the inhabitants
of this state shall have the liberty to fowl and hunt
in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all
other lands therein not inclosed,” id., at 274. And Article
XV of the 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights guaranteed
“[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defence
of themselves and the State.” Id., at 324 (emphasis added).
The contrast between those two declarations and the
Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of
purpose announced in the Amendment’s preamble. It
——————
and Security of all free States depends (under God) upon the Exertions
of a well regulated Militia, and the Laws heretofore enacted have
proved inadequate to the End designed.” Conn. Acts and Laws p. 585
(hereinafter 1782 Conn. Acts).
These state militia statutes give content to the notion of a “wellregulated
militia.” They identify those persons who compose the State’s
militia; they create regiments, brigades, and divisions; they set forth
command structures and provide for the appointment of officers; they
describe how the militia will be assembled when necessary and provide
for training; and they prescribe penalties for nonappearance, delinquency,
and failure to keep the required weapons, ammunition, and
other necessary equipment. The obligation of militia members to
“keep” certain specified arms is detailed further, n. 14, infra, and
accompanying text.
8 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
confirms that the Framers’ single-minded focus in crafting
the constitutional guarantee “to keep and bear arms” was
on military uses of firearms, which they viewed in the
context of service in state militias.
The preamble thus both sets forth the object of the
Amendment and informs the meaning of the remainder of
its text. Such text should not be treated as mere surplusage,
for “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect.” Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803).
The Court today tries to denigrate the importance of
this clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis
with the Amendment’s operative provision and returning
to the preamble merely “to ensure that our reading of the
operative clause is consistent with the announced purpose.”
Ante, at 5. That is not how this Court ordinarily
reads such texts, and it is not how the preamble would
have been viewed at the time the Amendment was
adopted. While the Court makes the novel suggestion that
it need only find some “logical connection” between the
preamble and the operative provision, it does acknowledge
that a prefatory clause may resolve an ambiguity in the
text. Ante, at 4.7 Without identifying any language in the
——————
7 The sources the Court cites simply do not support the proposition
that some “logical connection” between the two clauses is all that is
required. The Dwarris treatise, for example, merely explains that
“[t]he general purview of a statute is not . . . necessarily to be restrained
by any words introductory to the enacting clauses.” F. Dwarris, A
General Treatise on Statutes 268 (P. Potter ed. 1871) (emphasis added).
The treatise proceeds to caution that “the preamble cannot control the
enacting part of a statute, which is expressed in clear and unambiguous
terms, yet, if any doubt arise on the words of the enacting part, the
preamble may be resorted to, to explain it.” Id., at 269. Sutherland
makes the same point. Explaining that “[i]n the United States preambles
are not as important as they are in England,” the treatise notes
that in the United States “the settled principle of law is that the preamble
cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
STEVENS, J., dissenting
text that even mentions civilian uses of firearms, the
Court proceeds to “find” its preferred reading in what is at
best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its reading
is not foreclosed by the preamble. Perhaps the Court’s
approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is surely
an unusual approach for judges to follow.
“The right of the people”
The centerpiece of the Court’s textual argument is its
insistence that the words “the people” as used in the Second
Amendment must have the same meaning, and protect
the same class of individuals, as when they are used
in the First and Fourth Amendments. According to the
Court, in all three provisions—as well as the Constitution’s
preamble, section 2 of Article I, and the Tenth
Amendment—“the term unambiguously refers to all members
of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”
Ante, at 6. But the Court itself reads the Second
Amendment to protect a “subset” significantly narrower
than the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth
Amendments; when it finally drills down on the substantive
meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits
the protected class to “law-abiding, responsible citizens,”
ante, at 63. But the class of persons protected by the First
and Fourth Amendments is not so limited; for even felons
(and presumably irresponsible citizens as well) may invoke
the protections of those constitutional provisions.
The Court offers no way to harmonize its conflicting pronouncements.
The Court also overlooks the significance of the way the
——————
enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.” 2A N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.04, p. 146 (rev. 5th ed. 1992)
(emphasis added). Surely not even the Court believes that the
Amendment’s operative provision, which, though only 14 words in
length, takes the Court the better part of 18 pages to parse, is perfectly
“clear and unambiguous.”
10 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Framers used the phrase “the people” in these constitutional
provisions. In the First Amendment, no words
define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish,
or to worship; in that Amendment it is only the right
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of “the
people.” These rights contemplate collective action. While
the right peaceably to assemble protects the individual
rights of those persons participating in the assembly, its
concern is with action engaged in by members of a group,
rather than any single individual. Likewise, although the
act of petitioning the Government is a right that can be
exercised by individuals, it is primarily collective in nature.
For if they are to be effective, petitions must involve
groups of individuals acting in concert.
Similarly, the words “the people” in the Second Amendment
refer back to the object announced in the Amendment’s
preamble. They remind us that it is the collective
action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia
that the text directly protects and, perhaps more importantly,
that the ultimate purpose of the Amendment was
to protect the States’ share of the divided sovereignty
created by the Constitution.
As used in the Fourth Amendment, “the people” describes
the class of persons protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures by Government officials. It is true
that the Fourth Amendment describes a right that need
not be exercised in any collective sense. But that observation
does not settle the meaning of the phrase “the people”
when used in the Second Amendment. For, as we have
seen, the phrase means something quite different in the
Petition and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment.
Although the abstract definition of the phrase “the people”
could carry the same meaning in the Second Amendment
as in the Fourth Amendment, the preamble of the Second
Amendment suggests that the uses of the phrase in the
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11
STEVENS, J., dissenting
First and Second Amendments are the same in referring
to a collective activity. By way of contrast, the Fourth
Amendment describes a right against governmental interference
rather than an affirmative right to engage in
protected conduct, and so refers to a right to protect a
purely individual interest. As used in the Second
Amendment, the words “the people” do not enlarge the
right to keep and bear arms to encompass use or ownership
of weapons outside the context of service in a wellregulated
militia.
“To keep and bear Arms”
Although the Court’s discussion of these words treats
them as two “phrases”—as if they read “to keep” and “to
bear”—they describe a unitary right: to possess arms if
needed for military purposes and to use them in conjunction
with military activities.
As a threshold matter, it is worth pausing to note an
oddity in the Court’s interpretation of “to keep and bear
arms.” Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Court does not
read that phrase to create a right to possess arms for
“lawful, private purposes.” Parker v. District of Columbia,
478 F. 3d 370, 382 (CADC 2007). Instead, the Court limits
the Amendment’s protection to the right “to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Ante, at 19. No
party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears
to have fashioned it out of whole cloth. But although
this novel limitation lacks support in the text of
the Amendment, the Amendment’s text does justify a
different limitation: the “right to keep and bear arms”
protects only a right to possess and use firearms in connection
with service in a state-organized militia.
The term “bear arms” is a familiar idiom; when used
unadorned by any additional words, its meaning is “to
serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.” 1 Oxford
English Dictionary 634 (2d ed. 1989). It is derived from
12 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
the Latin arma ferre, which, translated literally, means “to
bear [ferre] war equipment [arma].” Brief for Professors of
Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae 19. One 18thcentury
dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence,
or armour of defence,” 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language (1755), and another contemporaneous
source explained that “[b]y arms, we understand those
instruments of offence generally made use of in war; such
as firearms, swords, & c. By weapons, we more particularly
mean instruments of other kinds (exclusive of firearms),
made use of as offensive, on special occasions.” 1 J.
Trusler, The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous
in the English Language 37 (1794).8 Had the
Framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase
“bear arms” to encompass civilian possession and use, they
could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for
the defense of themselves,” as was done in the Pennsylvania
and Vermont Declarations of Rights. The unmodified
use of “bear arms,” by contrast, refers most naturally
to a military purpose, as evidenced by its use in literally
dozens of contemporary texts.9 The absence of any refer-
——————
8 The Court’s repeated citation to the dissenting opinion in Muscarello
v. United States, 524 U. S. 125 (1998), ante, at 10, 13, as illuminating
the meaning of “bear arms,” borders on the risible. At issue in Muscarello
was the proper construction of the word “carries” in 18 U. S. C.
§924(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. V); the dissent in that case made passing
reference to the Second Amendment only in the course of observing that
both the Constitution and Black’s Law Dictionary suggested that
something more active than placement of a gun in a glove compartment
might be meant by the phrase “ ‘carries a firearm.’ ” 524 U. S., at 143.
9 Amici professors of Linguistics and English reviewed uses of the
term “bear arms” in a compilation of books, pamphlets, and other
sources disseminated in the period between the Declaration of Independence
and the adoption of the Second Amendment. See Brief for
Professors of Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae 23–25. Amici
determined that of 115 texts that employed the term, all but five usages
were in a clearly military context, and in four of the remaining five
instances, further qualifying language conveyed a different meaning.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13
STEVENS, J., dissenting
ence to civilian uses of weapons tailors the text of the
Amendment to the purpose identified in its preamble.10
——————
The Court allows that the phrase “bear Arms” did have as an idiomatic
meaning, “ ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,’ ” ante, at 12,
but asserts that it “unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only
when followed by the preposition ‘against,’ which was in turn followed
by the target of the hostilities,” ante, at 12–13. But contemporary
sources make clear that the phrase “bear arms” was often used to
convey a military meaning without those additional words. See, e.g., To
The Printer, Providence Gazette, (May 27, 1775) (“By the common
estimate of three millions of people in America, allowing one in five to
bear arms, there will be found 600,000 fighting men”); Letter of Henry
Laurens to the Mass. Council (Jan. 21, 1778), in Letters of Delegates to
Congress 1774–1789, p. 622 (P. Smith ed. 1981) (“Congress were
yesterday informed . . . that those Canadians who returned from
Saratoga . . . had been compelled by Sir Guy Carleton to bear Arms”);
Of the Manner of Making War among the Indians of North-America,
Connecticut Courant (May 23, 1785) (“The Indians begin to bear arms
at the age of fifteen, and lay them aside when they arrive at the age of
sixty. Some nations to the southward, I have been informed, do not
continue their military exercises after they are fifty”); 28 Journals of
the Continental Congress 1030 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (“That hostages be
mutually given as a security that the Convention troops and those
received in exchange for them do not bear arms prior to the first day of
May next”); H. R. J., 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 217 (Feb. 12, 1806) (“Whereas
the commanders of British armed vessels have impressed many American
seamen, and compelled them to bear arms on board said vessels,
and assist in fighting their battles with nations in amity and peace
with the United States”); H. R. J., 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 182–183 (Jan.
14, 1819) (“[The petitioners] state that they were residing in the British
province of Canada, at the commencement of the late war, and that
owing to their attachment to the United States, they refused to bear
arms, when called upon by the British authorities . . .”).
10 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 156 (1840), a case we cited in Miller,
further confirms this reading of the phrase. In Aymette, the Tennessee
Supreme Court construed the guarantee in Tennessee’s 1834 Constitution
that “ ‘the free white men of this State, have a right to keep and
bear arms for their common defence.’ ” Explaining that the provision
was adopted with the same goals as the Federal Constitution’s Second
Amendment, the court wrote: “The words ‘bear arms’ . . . have reference
to their military use, and were not employed to mean wearing them
about the person as part of the dress. As the object for which the right
14 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
But when discussing these words, the Court simply ignores
the preamble.
The Court argues that a “qualifying phrase that contradicts
the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side
of the looking glass.” Ante, at 15. But this fundamentally
fails to grasp the point. The stand-alone phrase “bear
arms” most naturally conveys a military meaning unless
the addition of a qualifying phrase signals that a different
meaning is intended. When, as in this case, there is no
such qualifier, the most natural meaning is the military
one; and, in the absence of any qualifier, it is all the more
appropriate to look to the preamble to confirm the natural
meaning of the text.11 The Court’s objection is particularly
——————
to keep and bear arms is secured, is of general and public nature, to be
exercised by the people in a body, for their common defence, so the
arms, the right to keep which is secured, are such as are usually
employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military
equipment.” 21 Tenn., at 158. The court elaborated: “[W]e may remark,
that the phrase ‘bear arms’ is used in the Kentucky Constitution
as well as our own, and implies, as has already been suggested, their
military use. . . . A man in the pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes, might
carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would never be said
of him, that he had borne arms, much less could it be said, that a
private citizen bears arms, because he has a dirk or pistol concealed
under his clothes, or a spear in a cane.” Id., at 161.
11 As lucidly explained in the context of a statute mandating a sentencing
enhancement for any person who “uses” a firearm during a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime:
“To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose. When someone asks, ‘Do you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring
whether you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on
display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane.
Similarly, to speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to speak of using it for its
distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon. To be sure, one can use a firearm
in a number of ways, including as an article of exchange, just as one
can ‘use’ a cane as a hall decoration—but that is not the ordinary
meaning of ‘using’ the one or the other. The Court does not appear to
grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it
ordinarily is used.” Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 242 (1993)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (some internal marks, footnotes, and citations
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15
STEVENS, J., dissenting
puzzling in light of its own contention that the addition of
the modifier “against” changes the meaning of “bear
arms.” Compare ante, at 10 (defining “bear arms” to mean
“carrying [a weapon] for a particular purpose—
confrontation”), with ante, at 12 (“The phrase ‘bear Arms’
also had at the time of the founding an idiomatic meaning
that was significantly different from its natural meaning:
to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight or to wage
war. But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning
only when followed by the preposition ‘against.’ ” (citations
and some internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Amendment’s use of the term “keep” in no way
contradicts the military meaning conveyed by the phrase
“bear arms” and the Amendment’s preamble. To the
contrary, a number of state militia laws in effect at the
time of the Second Amendment’s drafting used the term
“keep” to describe the requirement that militia members
store their arms at their homes, ready to be used for service
when necessary. The Virginia military law, for example,
ordered that “every one of the said officers, noncommissioned
officers, and privates, shall constantly keep
the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition,
ready to be produced whenever called for by his commanding
officer.” Act for Regulating and Disciplining the Militia,
1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, §3, p. 2 (emphasis added).12
——————
omitted).
12 See also Act for the regulating, training, and arraying of the Militia,
. . . of the State, 1781 N. J. Laws, ch. XIII, §12, p. 43 (“And be it
Enacted, That each Person enrolled as aforesaid, shall also keep at his
Place of Abode one Pound of good merchantable Gunpowder and three
Pounds of Ball sized to his Musket or Rifle” (emphasis added)); An Act
for establishing a Militia, 1785 Del. Laws §7, p. 59 (“And be it enacted,
That every person between the ages of eighteen and fifty . . . shall at his
own expense, provide himself . . . with a musket or firelock, with a
bayonet, a cartouch box to contain twenty three cartridges, a priming
wire, a brush and six flints, all in good order, on or before the first day
of April next, under the penalty of forty shillings, and shall keep the
16 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
“[K]eep and bear arms” thus perfectly describes the responsibilities
of a framing-era militia member.
This reading is confirmed by the fact that the clause
protects only one right, rather than two. It does not describe
a right “to keep arms” and a separate right “to bear
arms.” Rather, the single right that it does describe is
both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready
for military service, and to use them for military purposes
when necessary.13 Different language surely would have
been used to protect nonmilitary use and possession of
weapons from regulation if such an intent had played any
role in the drafting of the Amendment.
* * *
When each word in the text is given full effect, the
Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people
a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service
in a well-regulated militia. So far as appears, no more
than that was contemplated by its drafters or is encompassed
within its terms. Even if the meaning of the text
were genuinely susceptible to more than one interpretation,
the burden would remain on those advocating a
departure from the purpose identified in the preamble and
——————
same by him at all times, ready and fit for service, under the penalty of
two shillings and six pence for each neglect or default thereof on every
muster day” (second emphasis added)); 1782 Conn. Acts 590 (“And it
shall be the duty of the Regional Quarter-Master to provide and keep a
sufficient quantity of Ammunition and warlike stores for the use of
their respective regiments, to be kept in such place or places as shall be
ordered by the Field Officers” (emphasis added)).
13 The Court notes that the First Amendment protects two separate
rights with the phrase “the ‘right [singular] of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ ”
Ante, at 18. But this only proves the point: In contrast to the language
quoted by the Court, the Second Amendment does not protect a “right
to keep and to bear arms,” but rather a “right to keep and bear arms.”
The state constitutions cited by the Court are distinguishable on the
same ground.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17
STEVENS, J., dissenting
from settled law to come forward with persuasive new
arguments or evidence. The textual analysis offered by
respondent and embraced by the Court falls far short of
sustaining that heavy burden.14 And the Court’s emphatic
reliance on the claim “that the Second Amendment . . .
codified a pre-existing right,” ante, at 19, is of course beside
the point because the right to keep and bear arms for
service in a state militia was also a pre-existing right.
Indeed, not a word in the constitutional text even arguably
supports the Court’s overwrought and novel description
of the Second Amendment as “elevat[ing] above
all other interests” “the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Ante,
at 63.
II
The proper allocation of military power in the new
Nation was an issue of central concern for the Framers.
The compromises they ultimately reached, reflected in
Article I’s Militia Clauses and the Second Amendment,
represent quintessential examples of the Framers’ “splitting
the atom of sovereignty.” 15
——————
14 The Court’s atomistic, word-by-word approach to construing the
Amendment calls to mind the parable of the six blind men and the
elephant, famously set in verse by John Godfrey Saxe. The Poems of
John Godfrey Saxe 135–136 (1873). In the parable, each blind man
approaches a single elephant; touching a different part of the elephant’s
body in isolation, each concludes that he has learned its true nature.
One touches the animal’s leg, and concludes that the elephant is like a
tree; another touches the trunk and decides that the elephant is like a
snake; and so on. Each of them, of course, has fundamentally failed to
grasp the nature of the creature.
15 By “ ‘split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,’ ” the Framers created “ ‘two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from
incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it
18 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Two themes relevant to our current interpretive task
ran through the debates on the original Constitution. “On
the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national
standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual
liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate States.”
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U. S. 334, 340
(1990).16 Governor Edmund Randolph, reporting on the
Constitutional Convention to the Virginia Ratification
Convention, explained: “With respect to a standing army, I
believe there was not a member in the federal Convention,
who did not feel indignation at such an institution.” 3 J.
Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 401 (2d ed. 1863)
(hereinafter Elliot). On the other hand, the Framers
recognized the dangers inherent in relying on inadequately
trained militia members “as the primary means of
providing for the common defense,” Perpich, 496 U. S., at
340; during the Revolutionary War, “[t]his force, though
armed, was largely untrained, and its deficiencies were
the subject of bitter complaint.” Wiener, The Militia
Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181, 182
(1940).17 In order to respond to those twin concerns, a
——————
and are governed by it.’ ” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S. 489, 504, n. 17 (1999)
(quoting U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995)
(KENNEDY, J., concurring)).
16 Indeed, this was one of the grievances voiced by the colonists: Paragraph
13 of the Declaration of Independence charged of King George,
“He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislatures.”
17 George Washington, writing to Congress on September 24, 1776,
warned that for Congress “[t]o place any dependance upon Militia, is,
assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.” 6 Writings of George Washington
106, 110 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1932). Several years later he reiterated
this view in another letter to Congress: “Regular Troops alone are equal
to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as offence . . . . No
Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular
force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only
to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service.” 20 id., at
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19
STEVENS, J., dissenting
compromise was reached: Congress would be authorized to
raise and support a national Army18 and Navy, and also to
organize, arm, discipline, and provide for the calling forth
of “the Militia.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cls. 12–16. The
President, at the same time, was empowered as the “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States.” Art.
II, §2. But, with respect to the militia, a significant reservation
was made to the States: Although Congress would
have the power to call forth,19 organize, arm, and discipline
the militia, as well as to govern “such Part of them
as may be employed in the Service of the United States,”
the States respectively would retain the right to appoint
the officers and to train the militia in accordance with the
discipline prescribed by Congress. Art. I, §8, cl. 16.20
——————
49, 49–50 (Sept. 15, 1780). And Alexander Hamilton argued this view
in many debates. In 1787, he wrote:
“Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its
natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national
defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our
independence. . . . War, like most other things, is a science to be
acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by
practice.” The Federalist No. 25, p. 166 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
18 “[B]ut no Appropriation of Money to that Use [raising and supporting
Armies] shall be for a longer Term than two Years.” U. S. Const.,
Art I, §8, cl. 12
19 This “calling forth” power was only permitted in order for the militia
“to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions.” Id., Art. I, §8, cl. 15.
20 The Court assumes—incorrectly, in my view—that even when a
state militia was not called into service, Congress would have had the
power to exclude individuals from enlistment in that state militia. See
ante, at 27. That assumption is not supported by the text of the Militia
Clauses of the original Constitution, which confer upon Congress the
power to “organiz[e], ar[m], and disciplin[e], the Militia,” Art. I, §8, cl.
16, but not the power to say who will be members of a state militia. It
is also flatly inconsistent with the Second Amendment. The States’
power to create their own militias provides an easy answer to the
20 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
But the original Constitution’s retention of the militia
and its creation of divided authority over that body did not
prove sufficient to allay fears about the dangers posed by a
standing army. For it was perceived by some that Article
I contained a significant gap: While it empowered Congress
to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, it did not
prevent Congress from providing for the militia’s disarmament.
As George Mason argued during the debates in
Virginia on the ratification of the original Constitution:
“The militia may be here destroyed by that method
which has been practiced in other parts of the world
before; that is, by rendering them useless—by disarming
them. Under various pretences, Congress may
neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia;
and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress
has the exclusive right to arm them.” Elliot 379.
This sentiment was echoed at a number of state ratification
conventions; indeed, it was one of the primary objections
to the original Constitution voiced by its opponents.
The Anti-Federalists were ultimately unsuccessful in
persuading state ratification conventions to condition their
approval of the Constitution upon the eventual inclusion
of any particular amendment. But a number of States did
propose to the first Federal Congress amendments reflecting
a desire to ensure that the institution of the militia
would remain protected under the new Government. The
proposed amendments sent by the States of Virginia,
North Carolina, and New York focused on the importance
of preserving the state militias and reiterated the dangers
posed by standing armies. New Hampshire sent a proposal
that differed significantly from the others; while also
——————
Court’s complaint that the right as I have described it is empty because
it merely guarantees “citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization
from which Congress has plenary authority to exclude them.” Ante, at
28.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 21
STEVENS, J., dissenting
invoking the dangers of a standing army, it suggested that
the Constitution should more broadly protect the use and
possession of weapons, without tying such a guarantee
expressly to the maintenance of the militia. The States of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts sent no
relevant proposed amendments to Congress, but in each of
those States a minority of the delegates advocated related
amendments. While the Maryland minority proposals
were exclusively concerned with standing armies and
conscientious objectors, the unsuccessful proposals in both
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania would have protected a
more broadly worded right, less clearly tied to service in a
state militia. Faced with all of these options, it is telling
that James Madison chose to craft the Second Amendment
as he did.
The relevant proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying
Convention read as follows:
“17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear
arms; that a well regulated Militia composed of the
body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural
and safe defence of a free State. That standing
armies are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought
to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection
of the Community will admit; and that in all
cases the military should be under strict subordination
to and be governed by the civil power.” Elliot
659.
“19th. That any person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of
an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his
stead.” Ibid.
North Carolina adopted Virginia’s proposals and sent
them to Congress as its own, although it did not actually
ratify the original Constitution until Congress had sent
the proposed Bill of Rights to the States for ratification. 2
22 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Schwartz 932–933; see The Complete Bill of Rights 182–
183 (N. Cogan ed. 1997) (hereinafter Cogan).
New York produced a proposal with nearly identical
language. It read:
“That the people have a right to keep and bear
Arms; that a well regulated Militia, including the
body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State. . . .
That standing Armies, in time of Peace, are dangerous
to Liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in
Cases of necessity; and that at all times, the Military
should be kept under strict Subordination to the civil
Power.” 2 Schwartz 912.
Notably, each of these proposals used the phrase “keep
and bear arms,” which was eventually adopted by Madison.
And each proposal embedded the phrase within
a group of principles that are distinctly military in
meaning.21
By contrast, New Hampshire’s proposal, although it
followed another proposed amendment that echoed the
familiar concern about standing armies,22 described the
protection involved in more clearly personal terms. Its
——————
21 In addition to the cautionary references to standing armies and to
the importance of civil authority over the military, each of the proposals
contained a guarantee that closely resembled the language of what
later became the Third Amendment. The 18th proposal from Virginia
and North Carolina read “That no soldier in time of peace ought to be
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of
war in such manner only as the law directs.” Elliott 659. And New
York’s language read: “That in time of Peace no Soldier ought to be
quartered in any House without the consent of the Owner, and in time
of War only by the Civil Magistrate in such manner as the Laws may
direct.” 2 Schwartz 912.
22 “Tenth, That no standing Army shall be Kept up in time of Peace
unless with the consent of three fourths of the Members of each branch
of Congress, nor shall Soldiers in Time of Peace be quartered upon
private Houses with out the consent of the Owners.”
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 23
STEVENS, J., dissenting
proposal read:
“Twelfth, Congress shall never disarm any Citizen
unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.”
Id., at 758, 761.
The proposals considered in the other three States,
although ultimately rejected by their respective ratification
conventions, are also relevant to our historical inquiry.
First, the Maryland proposal, endorsed by a minority
of the delegates and later circulated in pamphlet form,
read:
“4. That no standing army shall be kept up in time
of peace, unless with the consent of two thirds of the
members present of each branch of Congress.
. . . . .
“10. That no person conscientiously scrupulous of
bearing arms in any case, shall be compelled personally
to serve as a soldier.” Id., at 729, 735.
The rejected Pennsylvania proposal, which was later
incorporated into a critique of the Constitution titled “The
Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority
of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to
Their Constituents (1787),” signed by a minority of the
State’s delegates (those who had voted against ratification
of the Constitution), id., at 628, 662, read:
7. “That the people have a right to bear arms for the
defense of themselves and their own State, or the
United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and
no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any
of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of
public injury from individuals; and as standing armies
in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they
ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be
kept under strict subordination to, and be governed by
the civil powers.” Id., at 665.
24 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Finally, after the delegates at the Massachusetts Ratification
Convention had compiled a list of proposed amendments
and alterations, a motion was made to add to the
list the following language: “[T]hat the said Constitution
never be construed to authorize Congress to . . . prevent
the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens,
from keeping their own arms.” Cogan 181. This
motion, however, failed to achieve the necessary support,
and the proposal was excluded from the list of amendments
the State sent to Congress. 2 Schwartz 674–675.
Madison, charged with the task of assembling the proposals
for amendments sent by the ratifying States, was
the principal draftsman of the Second Amendment.23 He
had before him, or at the very least would have been
aware of, all of these proposed formulations. In addition,
Madison had been a member, some years earlier, of the
committee tasked with drafting the Virginia Declaration
of Rights. That committee considered a proposal by Thomas
Jefferson that would have included within the Virginia
Declaration the following language: “No freeman
shall ever be debarred the use of arms [within his own
lands or tenements].” 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 363
(J. Boyd ed. 1950). But the committee rejected that language,
adopting instead the provision drafted by George
Mason.24
——————
23 Madison explained in a letter to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789, the
paramount importance of preparing a list of amendments to placate
those States that had ratified the Constitution in reliance on a commitment
that amendments would follow: “In many States the [Constitution]
was adopted under a tacit compact in [favor] of some subsequent
provisions on this head. In [Virginia]. It would have been certainly
rejected, had no assurances been given by its advocates that such
provisions would be pursued. As an honest man I feel my self bound by
this consideration.” Creating the Bill of Rights 281, 282 (H. Veit, K.
Bowling, & C. Bickford eds. 1991) (hereinafter Veit).
24 The adopted language, Virginia Declaration of Rights ¶13 (1776),
read as follows: “That a well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 25
STEVENS, J., dissenting
With all of these sources upon which to draw, it is strikingly
significant that Madison’s first draft omitted any
mention of nonmilitary use or possession of weapons.
Rather, his original draft repeated the essence of the two
proposed amendments sent by Virginia, combining the
substance of the two provisions succinctly into one, which
read: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia
being the best security of a free country; but no person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled
to render military service in person.” Cogan 169.
Madison’s decision to model the Second Amendment on
the distinctly military Virginia proposal is therefore revealing,
since it is clear that he considered and rejected
formulations that would have unambiguously protected
civilian uses of firearms. When Madison prepared his first
draft, and when that draft was debated and modified, it is
reasonable to assume that all participants in the drafting
process were fully aware of the other formulations that
would have protected civilian use and possession of weapons
and that their choice to craft the Amendment as they
did represented a rejection of those alternative formulations.
Madison’s initial inclusion of an exemption for conscientious
objectors sheds revelatory light on the purpose of the
Amendment. It confirms an intent to describe a duty as
well as a right, and it unequivocally identifies the military
character of both. The objections voiced to the conscientious-
objector clause only confirm the central meaning of
the text. Although records of the debate in the Senate,
which is where the conscientious-objector clause was
——————
the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a
free State; that Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.” 1 Schwartz
234.
26 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
removed, do not survive, the arguments raised in the
House illuminate the perceived problems with the clause:
Specifically, there was concern that Congress “can declare
who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them
from bearing arms.”25 The ultimate removal of the clause,
therefore, only serves to confirm the purpose of the
Amendment—to protect against congressional disarmament,
by whatever means, of the States’ militias.
The Court also contends that because “Quakers opposed
the use of arms not just for militia service, but for any
violent purpose whatsoever,” ante, at 17, the inclusion of a
conscientious-objector clause in the original draft of the
Amendment does not support the conclusion that the
phrase “bear arms” was military in meaning. But that
claim cannot be squared with the record. In the proposals
cited supra, at 21–22, both Virginia and North Carolina
included the following language: “That any person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted,
upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear
arms in his stead” (emphasis added).26 There is no plausible
argument that the use of “bear arms” in those provisions
was not unequivocally and exclusively military: The
State simply does not compel its citizens to carry arms for
the purpose of private “confrontation,” ante, at 10, or for
self-defense.
The history of the adoption of the Amendment thus
describes an overriding concern about the potential threat
to state sovereignty that a federal standing army would
——————
25 Veit 182. This was the objection voiced by Elbridge Gerry, who
went on to remark, in the next breath: “What, sir, is the use of a militia?
It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of
liberty. . .. Whenever government mean to invade the rights and
liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in
order to raise an army upon their ruins.” Ibid.
26 The failed Maryland proposals contained similar language. See
supra, at 23.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 27
STEVENS, J., dissenting
pose, and a desire to protect the States’ militias as the
means by which to guard against that danger. But state
militias could not effectively check the prospect of a federal
standing army so long as Congress retained the power
to disarm them, and so a guarantee against such disarmament
was needed.27 As we explained in Miller: “With
obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration
and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”
307 U. S., at 178. The evidence plainly refutes the claim
that the Amendment was motivated by the Framers’ fears
that Congress might act to regulate any civilian uses of
weapons. And even if the historical record were genuinely
ambiguous, the burden would remain on the parties advocating
a change in the law to introduce facts or arguments
“ ‘newly ascertained,’ ” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 266; the
Court is unable to identify any such facts or arguments.
III
Although it gives short shrift to the drafting history of
the Second Amendment, the Court dwells at length on
four other sources: the 17th-century English Bill of Rights;
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England;
postenactment commentary on the Second Amendment;
and post-Civil War legislative history.28 All of these
——————
27 The Court suggests that this historical analysis casts the Second
Amendment as an “odd outlier,” ante, at 30; if by “outlier,” the Court
means that the Second Amendment was enacted in a unique and novel
context, and responded to the particular challenges presented by the
Framers’ federalism experiment, I have no quarrel with the Court’s
characterization.
28 The Court’s fixation on the last two types of sources is particularly
puzzling, since both have the same characteristics as postenactment
legislative history, which is generally viewed as the least reliable
source of authority for ascertaining the intent of any provision’s drafters.
As has been explained:
28 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
sources shed only indirect light on the question before
us, and in any event offer little support for the Court’s
conclusion.29
——————
“The legislative history of a statute is the history of its consideration
and enactment. ‘Subsequent legislative history’—which presumably
means the post-enactment history of a statute’s consideration and
enactment—is a contradiction in terms. The phrase is used to smuggle
into judicial consideration legislators’ expression not of what a bill
currently under consideration means (which, the theory goes, reflects
what their colleagues understood they were voting for), but of what a
law previously enacted means. . . . In my opinion, the views of a legislator
concerning a statute already enacted are entitled to no more weight
than the views of a judge concerning a statute not yet passed.” Sullivan
v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 631–632 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring
in part).
29 The Court stretches to derive additional support from scattered
state-court cases primarily concerned with state constitutional provisions.
See ante, at 38–41. To the extent that those state courts assumed
that the Second Amendment was coterminous with their differently
worded state constitutional arms provisions, their discussions
were of course dicta. Moreover, the cases on which the Court relies
were decided between 30 and 60 years after the ratification of the
Second Amendment, and there is no indication that any of them engaged
in a careful textual or historical analysis of the federal constitutional
provision. Finally, the interpretation of the Second Amendment
advanced in those cases is not as clear as the Court apparently believes.
In Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (Gen. Ct. 1824), for
example, a Virginia court pointed to the restriction on free blacks’
“right to bear arms” as evidence that the protections of the State and
Federal Constitutions did not extend to free blacks. The Court asserts
that “[t]he claim was obviously not that blacks were prevented from
carrying guns in the militia.” Ante, at 39. But it is not obvious at all.
For in many States, including Virginia, free blacks during the colonial
period were prohibited from carrying guns in the militia, instead being
required to “muste[r] without arms”; they were later barred from
serving in the militia altogether. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s
Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 477, 497–498, and n. 120 (1998). But my point is not that
the Aldridge court endorsed my view of the Amendment—plainly it did
not, as the premise of the relevant passage was that the Second
Amendment applied to the States. Rather, my point is simply that the
court could have understood the Second Amendment to protect a
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 29
STEVENS, J., dissenting
The English Bill of Rights
The Court’s reliance on Article VII of the 1689 English
Bill of Rights—which, like most of the evidence offered by
the Court today, was considered in Miller30—is misguided
both because Article VII was enacted in response to different
concerns from those that motivated the Framers of the
Second Amendment, and because the guarantees of the
two provisions were by no means coextensive. Moreover,
the English text contained no preamble or other provision
identifying a narrow, militia-related purpose.
The English Bill of Rights responded to abuses by the
Stuart monarchs; among the grievances set forth in the
Bill of Rights was that the King had violated the law “[b]y
causing several good Subjects being Protestants to be
disarmed at the same time when Papists were both armed
and Employed contrary to Law.” Article VII of the Bill of
Rights was a response to that selective disarmament; it
guaranteed that “the Subjects which are Protestants may
have Armes for their defence, Suitable to their condition
and as allowed by Law.” L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of
Rights, 1689 (App. 1, pp. 295, 297) (1981). This grant did
——————
militia-focused right, and thus that its passing mention of the right to
bear arms provides scant support for the Court’s position.
30 The Government argued in its brief that:
“[I]t would seem that the early English law did not guarantee an
unrestricted right to bear arms. Such recognition as existed of a right
in the people to keep and bear arms appears to have resulted from
oppression by rulers who disarmed their political opponents and who
organized large standing armies which were obnoxious and burdensome
to the people. This right, however, it is clear, gave sanction only
to the arming of the people as a body to defend their rights against
tyrannical and unprincipled rulers. It did not permit the keeping of
arms for purposes of private defense.” Brief for United States in United
States v. Miller, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp. 11–12 (citations omitted). The
Government then cited at length the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
opinion in Aymette, 21 Tenn. 154, which further situated the English
Bill of Rights in its historical context. See n. 10, supra.
30 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
not establish a general right of all persons, or even of all
Protestants, to possess weapons. Rather, the right was
qualified in two distinct ways: First, it was restricted to
those of adequate social and economic status (“suitable to
their Condition”); second, it was only available subject to
regulation by Parliament (“as allowed by Law”).31
The Court may well be correct that the English Bill of
Rights protected the right of some English subjects to use
some arms for personal self-defense free from restrictions
by the Crown (but not Parliament). But that right—
adopted in a different historical and political context and
framed in markedly different language—tells us little
about the meaning of the Second Amendment.
Blackstone’s Commentaries
The Court’s reliance on Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England is unpersuasive for the same reason
as its reliance on the English Bill of Rights. Blackstone’s
invocation of “ ‘the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation,’
” ante, at 20, and “ ‘the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defence’ ” ibid., referred
specifically to Article VII in the English Bill of
Rights. The excerpt from Blackstone offered by the Court,
therefore, is, like Article VII itself, of limited use in interpreting
the very differently worded, and differently historically
situated, Second Amendment.
What is important about Blackstone is the instruction
he provided on reading the sort of text before us today.
Blackstone described an interpretive approach that gave
far more weight to preambles than the Court allows.
——————
31 Moreover, it was the Crown, not Parliament, that was bound by the
English provision; indeed, according to some prominent historians,
Article VII is best understood not as announcing any individual right to
unregulated firearm ownership (after all, such a reading would fly in
the face of the text), but as an assertion of the concept of parliamentary
supremacy. See Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae 6–9.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 31
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Counseling that “[t]he fairest and most rational method to
interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his
intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs
the most natural and probable,” Blackstone explained that
“[i]f words happen to be still dubious, we may establish
their meaning from the context; with which it may be of
singular use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever
they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus, the
proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction
of an act of parliament.” 1 Commentaries on the
Laws of England 59–60 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone).
In light of the Court’s invocation of Blackstone as “ ‘the
preeminent authority on English law for the founding
generation,’ ” ante, at 20 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527
U. S. 706, 715 (1999)), its disregard for his guidance on
matters of interpretation is striking.
Postenactment Commentary
The Court also excerpts, without any real analysis,
commentary by a number of additional scholars, some
near in time to the framing and others post-dating it by
close to a century. Those scholars are for the most part of
limited relevance in construing the guarantee of the Second
Amendment: Their views are not altogether clear,32
——————
32 For example, St. George Tucker, on whom the Court relies heavily,
did not consistently adhere to the position that the Amendment was
designed to protect the “Blackstonian” self-defense right, ante, at 33. In
a series of unpublished lectures, Tucker suggested that the Amendment
should be understood in the context of the compromise over military
power represented by the original Constitution and the Second and
Tenth Amendments:
“If a State chooses to incur the expense of putting arms into the Hands
of its own Citizens for their defense, it would require no small ingenuity
to prove that they have no right to do it, or that it could by any means
contravene the Authority of the federal Govt. It may be alleged indeed
that this might be done for the purpose of resisting the laws of the
federal Government, or of shaking off the union: to which the plainest
32 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
they tended to collapse the Second Amendment with
Article VII of the English Bill of Rights, and they appear
to have been unfamiliar with the drafting history of the
Second Amendment.33
The most significant of these commentators was Joseph
Story. Contrary to the Court’s assertions, however, Story
actually supports the view that the Amendment was
designed to protect the right of each of the States to maintain
a well-regulated militia. When Story used the term
“palladium” in discussions of the Second Amendment, he
merely echoed the concerns that animated the Framers of
the Amendment and led to its adoption. An excerpt from
——————
answer seems to be, that whenever the States think proper to adopt
either of these measures, they will not be with-held by the fear of
infringing any of the powers of the federal Government. But to contend
that such a power would be dangerous for the reasons above maintained
would be subversive of every principle of Freedom in our Government;
of which the first Congress appears to have been sensible by
proposing an Amendment to the Constitution, which has since been
ratified and has become part of it, viz., ‘That a well regulated militia
being necessary to the Security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.’ To this we may add that
this power of arming the militia, is not one of those prohibited to the
States by the Constitution, and, consequently, is reserved to them
under the twelfth Article of the ratified aments.” S. Tucker, Ten
Notebooks of Law Lectures, 1790’s, Tucker-Coleman Papers, pp. 127–
128 (College of William and Mary).
See also Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment:
Original Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1123 (2006).
33 The Court does acknowledge that at least one early commentator
described the Second Amendment as creating a right conditioned upon
service in a state militia. See ante, at 37–38 (citing B. Oliver, The
Rights of an American Citizen (1832)). Apart from the fact that Oliver
is the only commentator in the Court’s exhaustive survey who appears
to have inquired into the intent of the drafters of the Amendment, what
is striking about the Court’s discussion is its failure to refute Oliver’s
description of the meaning of the Amendment or the intent of its
drafters; rather, the Court adverts to simple nose-counting to dismiss
his view.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 33
STEVENS, J., dissenting
his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States—the same passage cited by the Court in Miller34—
merits reproducing at some length:
“The importance of [the Second Amendment] will
scarcely be doubted by any persons who have duly reflected
upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence
of a free country against sudden foreign invasions,
domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of
power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free
people to keep up large military establishments and
standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous
expenses with which they are attended and the
facile means which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled
rulers to subvert the government, or trample
upon the rights of the people. The right of the citizens
to keep and bear arms has justly been considered
as the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since it
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation
and arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even
if these are successful in the first instance, enable the
people to resist and triumph over them. And yet,
though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance
of a well-regulated militia would seem so undeniable,
it cannot be disguised that, among the American
people, there is a growing indifference to any
system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition,
from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all regulations.
How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed
without some organization, it is difficult to see. There
is certainly no small danger that indifference may
lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus
gradually undermine all the protection intended by
the clause of our national bill of rights.” 2 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
——————
34 Miller, 307 U. S., at 182, n. 3.
34 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
States §1897, pp. 620–621 (4th ed. 1873) (footnote
omitted).
Story thus began by tying the significance of the
Amendment directly to the paramount importance of the
militia. He then invoked the fear that drove the Framers
of the Second Amendment—specifically, the threat to
liberty posed by a standing army. An important check on
that danger, he suggested, was a “well-regulated militia,”
id., at 621, for which he assumed that arms would have to
be kept and, when necessary, borne. There is not so much
as a whisper in the passage above that Story believed that
the right secured by the Amendment bore any relation to
private use or possession of weapons for activities like
hunting or personal self-defense.
After extolling the virtues of the militia as a bulwark
against tyranny, Story went on to decry the “growing
indifference to any system of militia discipline.” Ibid.
When he wrote, “[h]ow it is practicable to keep the people
duly armed without some organization it is difficult to
see,” ibid., he underscored the degree to which he viewed
the arming of the people and the militia as indissolubly
linked. Story warned that the “growing indifference” he
perceived would “gradually undermine all the protection
intended by this clause of our national bill of rights,” ibid.
In his view, the importance of the Amendment was directly
related to the continuing vitality of an institution in
the process of apparently becoming obsolete.
In an attempt to downplay the absence of any reference
to nonmilitary uses of weapons in Story’s commentary, the
Court relies on the fact that Story characterized Article
VII of the English Declaration of Rights as a “ ‘similar
provision,’ ” ante, at 36. The two provisions were indeed
similar, in that both protected some uses of firearms. But
Story’s characterization in no way suggests that he believed
that the provisions had the same scope. To the
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 35
STEVENS, J., dissenting
contrary, Story’s exclusive focus on the militia in his discussion
of the Second Amendment confirms his understanding
of the right protected by the Second Amendment
as limited to military uses of arms.
Story’s writings as a Justice of this Court, to the extent
that they shed light on this question, only confirm that
Justice Story did not view the Amendment as conferring
upon individuals any “self-defense” right disconnected
from service in a state militia. Justice Story dissented
from the Court’s decision in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1,
24 (1820), which held that a state court “had a concurrent
jurisdiction” with the federal courts “to try a militia man
who had disobeyed the call of the President, and to enforce
the laws of Congress against such delinquent.” Id., at 31–
32. Justice Story believed that Congress’ power to provide
for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia
was, when Congress acted, plenary; but he explained that
in the absence of congressional action, “I am certainly not
prepared to deny the legitimacy of such an exercise of
[state] authority.” Id., at 52. As to the Second Amendment,
he wrote that it “may not, perhaps, be thought to
have any important bearing on this point. If it have, it
confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the reasoning
already suggested.” Id., at 52–53. The Court contends
that had Justice Story understood the Amendment to have
a militia purpose, the Amendment would have had “enormous
and obvious bearing on the point.” Ante, at 38. But
the Court has it quite backwards: If Story had believed
that the purpose of the Amendment was to permit civilians
to keep firearms for activities like personal selfdefense,
what “confirm[ation] and illustrat[ion],” Houston,
5 Wheat., at 53, could the Amendment possibly have
provided for the point that States retained the power to
organize, arm, and discipline their own militias?
36 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
Post-Civil War Legislative History
The Court suggests that by the post-Civil War period,
the Second Amendment was understood to secure a right
to firearm use and ownership for purely private purposes
like personal self-defense. While it is true that some of the
legislative history on which the Court relies supports that
contention, see ante, at 41–44, such sources are entitled to
limited, if any, weight. All of the statements the Court
cites were made long after the framing of the Amendment
and cannot possibly supply any insight into the intent of
the Framers; and all were made during pitched political
debates, so that they are better characterized as advocacy
than good-faith attempts at constitutional interpretation.
What is more, much of the evidence the Court offers is
decidedly less clear than its discussion allows. The Court
notes that “[b]lacks were routinely disarmed by Southern
States after the Civil War. Those who opposed these
injustices frequently stated that they infringed blacks’
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.” Ante, at 42.
The Court hastily concludes that “[n]eedless to say, the
claim was not that blacks were being prohibited from
carrying arms in an organized state militia,” ibid. But
some of the claims of the sort the Court cites may have
been just that. In some Southern States, Reconstructionera
Republican governments created state militias in
which both blacks and whites were permitted to serve.
Because “[t]he decision to allow blacks to serve alongside
whites meant that most southerners refused to join the
new militia,” the bodies were dubbed “Negro militia[s].” S.
Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia 176–177 (2006). The
“arming of the Negro militias met with especially fierce
resistance in South Carolina. . . . The sight of organized,
armed freedmen incensed opponents of Reconstruction
and led to an intensified campaign of Klan terror. Leading
members of the Negro militia were beaten or lynched and
their weapons stolen.” Id., at 177.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 37
STEVENS, J., dissenting
One particularly chilling account of Reconstruction-era
Klan violence directed at a black militia member is recounted
in the memoir of Louis F. Post, A “Carpetbagger”
in South Carolina, 10 Journal of Negro History 10 (1925).
Post describes the murder by local Klan members of Jim
Williams, the captain of a “Negro militia company,” id., at
59, this way:
“[A] cavalcade of sixty cowardly white men, completely
disguised with face masks and body gowns,
rode up one night in March, 1871, to the house of Captain
Williams . . . in the wood [they] hanged [and shot]
him . . . [and on his body they] then pinned a slip of
paper inscribed, as I remember it, with these grim
words: ‘Jim Williams gone to his last muster.’ ” Id., at
61.
In light of this evidence, it is quite possible that at least
some of the statements on which the Court relies actually
did mean to refer to the disarmament of black militia
members.
IV
The brilliance of the debates that resulted in the Second
Amendment faded into oblivion during the ensuing years,
for the concerns about Article I’s Militia Clauses that
generated such pitched debate during the ratification
process and led to the adoption of the Second Amendment
were short lived.
In 1792, the year after the Amendment was ratified,
Congress passed a statute that purported to establish “an
Uniform Militia throughout the United States.” 1 Stat.
271. The statute commanded every able-bodied white
male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 to be enrolled
therein and to “provide himself with a good musket or
38 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
firelock” and other specified weaponry.35 Ibid. The statute
is significant, for it confirmed the way those in the
founding generation viewed firearm ownership: as a duty
linked to military service. The statute they enacted,
however, “was virtually ignored for more than a century,”
and was finally repealed in 1901. See Perpich, 496 U. S.,
at 341.
The postratification history of the Second Amendment is
strikingly similar. The Amendment played little role in
any legislative debate about the civilian use of firearms for
most of the 19th century, and it made few appearances in
the decisions of this Court. Two 19th-century cases, however,
bear mentioning.
In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876), the
Court sustained a challenge to respondents’ convictions
under the Enforcement Act of 1870 for conspiring to deprive
any individual of “ ‘any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United
States.’ ” Id., at 548. The Court wrote, as to counts 2 and
10 of respondents’ indictment:
“The right there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a
lawful purpose.’ This is not a right granted by the
Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent
on that instrument for its existence. The second
amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this, as has been seen, means no more than that it
shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict
the powers of the national government.” Id., at 553.
——————
35 The additional specified weaponry included: “a sufficient bayonet
and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein
to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his
musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of
powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powderhorn,
twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle and a quarter of a
pound of powder.” 1 Stat. 271.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 39
STEVENS, J., dissenting
The majority’s assertion that the Court in Cruikshank
“described the right protected by the Second Amendment
as ‘ “bearing arms for a lawful purpose,” ’ ” ante, at 47
(quoting Cruikshank, 92 U. S., at 553), is not accurate.
The Cruikshank Court explained that the defective indictment
contained such language, but the Court did not
itself describe the right, or endorse the indictment’s description
of the right.
Moreover, it is entirely possible that the basis for the
indictment’s counts 2 and 10, which charged respondents
with depriving the victims of rights secured by the Second
Amendment, was the prosecutor’s belief that the victims—
members of a group of citizens, mostly black but also
white, who were rounded up by the Sheriff, sworn in as a
posse to defend the local courthouse, and attacked by a
white mob—bore sufficient resemblance to members of a
state militia that they were brought within the reach of
the Second Amendment. See generally C. Lane, The Day
Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, The Supreme Court,
and the Betrayal of Reconstruction (2008).
Only one other 19th-century case in this Court, Presser
v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), engaged in any significant
discussion of the Second Amendment. The petitioner in
Presser was convicted of violating a state statute that
prohibited organizations other than the Illinois National
Guard from associating together as military companies or
parading with arms. Presser challenged his conviction,
asserting, as relevant, that the statute violated both the
Second and the Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to
the Second Amendment, the Court wrote:
“We think it clear that the sections under consideration,
which only forbid bodies of men to associate together
as military organizations, or to drill or parade
with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by
law, do not infringe the right of the people to keep and
40 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
bear arms. But a conclusive answer to the contention
that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question
lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation
only upon the power of Congress and the National
government, and not upon that of the States.” Id., at
264–265.
And in discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
explained:
“The plaintiff in error was not a member of the organized
volunteer militia of the State of Illinois, nor did
he belong to the troops of the United States or to any
organization under the militia law of the United
States. On the contrary, the fact that he did not belong
to the organized militia or the troops of the
United States was an ingredient in the offence for
which he was convicted and sentenced. The question
is, therefore, had he a right as a citizen of the United
States, in disobedience of the State law, to associate
with others as a military company, and to drill and
parade with arms in the towns and cities of the State?
If the plaintiff in error has any such privilege he must
be able to point to the provision of the Constitution or
statutes of the United States by which it is conferred.”
Id., at 266.
Presser, therefore, both affirmed Cruikshank’s holding
that the Second Amendment posed no obstacle to regulation
by state governments, and suggested that in any
event nothing in the Constitution protected the use of
arms outside the context of a militia “authorized by law”
and organized by the State or Federal Government.36
——————
36 In another case the Court endorsed, albeit indirectly, the reading of
Miller that has been well settled until today. In Burton v. Sills, 394
U. S. 812 (1969) (per curiam), the Court dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question an appeal from a decision of the New Jersey
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 41
STEVENS, J., dissenting
In 1901 the President revitalized the militia by creating
“ ‘the National Guard of the several States,’ ” Perpich, 496
U. S., at 341, and nn. 9–10; meanwhile, the dominant
understanding of the Second Amendment’s inapplicability
to private gun ownership continued well into the 20th
century. The first two federal laws directly restricting
civilian use and possession of firearms—the 1927 Act
prohibiting mail delivery of “pistols, revolvers, and other
firearms capable of being concealed on the person,” Ch. 75,
44 Stat. 1059, and the 1934 Act prohibiting the possession
of sawed-off shotguns and machine guns—were enacted
over minor Second Amendment objections dismissed by
the vast majority of the legislators who participated in the
debates.37 Members of Congress clashed over the wisdom
and efficacy of such laws as crime-control measures. But
since the statutes did not infringe upon the military use or
possession of weapons, for most legislators they did not
even raise the specter of possible conflict with the Second
Amendment.
Thus, for most of our history, the invalidity of Second-
Amendment-based objections to firearms regulations has
——————
Supreme Court upholding, against a Second Amendment challenge,
New Jersey’s gun control law. Although much of the analysis in the
New Jersey court’s opinion turned on the inapplicability of the Second
Amendment as a constraint on the States, the court also quite correctly
read Miller to hold that “Congress, though admittedly governed by the
second amendment, may regulate interstate firearms so long as the
regulation does not impair the maintenance of the active, organized
militia of the states.” Burton v. Sills, 53 N. J. 86, 98, 248 A. 2d 521, 527
(1968).
37 The 1927 statute was enacted with no mention of the Second
Amendment as a potential obstacle, although an earlier version of the
bill had generated some limited objections on Second Amendment
grounds; see 66 Cong. Rec. 725–735 (1924). And the 1934 Act featured
just one colloquy, during the course of lengthy Committee debates, on
whether the Second Amendment constrained Congress’ ability to
legislate in this sphere; see Hearings on House Committee on Ways and
Means H. R. 9006, before the 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 19 (1934).
42 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
been well settled and uncontroversial.38 Indeed, the Second
Amendment was not even mentioned in either full
House of Congress during the legislative proceedings that
led to the passage of the 1934 Act. Yet enforcement of
that law produced the judicial decision that confirmed the
status of the Amendment as limited in reach to military
usage. After reviewing many of the same sources that are
discussed at greater length by the Court today, the Miller
Court unanimously concluded that the Second Amendment
did not apply to the possession of a firearm that did
not have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation
or efficiency of a well regulated militia.” 307 U. S., at 178.
The key to that decision did not, as the Court belatedly
suggests, ante, at 49–51, turn on the difference between
——————
38 The majority appears to suggest that even if the meaning of the
Second Amendment has been considered settled by courts and legislatures
for over two centuries, that settled meaning is overcome by the
“reliance of millions of Americans” “upon the true meaning of the right
to keep and bear arms.” Ante, at 52, n. 24. Presumably by this the
Court means that many Americans own guns for self-defense, recreation,
and other lawful purposes, and object to government interference
with their gun ownership. I do not dispute the correctness of this
observation. But it is hard to see how Americans have “relied,” in the
usual sense of the word, on the existence of a constitutional right that,
until 2001, had been rejected by every federal court to take up the
question. Rather, gun owners have “relied” on the laws passed by
democratically elected legislatures, which have generally adopted only
limited gun-control measures.
Indeed, reliance interests surely cut the other way: Even apart from
the reliance of judges and legislators who properly believed, until today,
that the Second Amendment did not reach possession of firearms for
purely private activities, “millions of Americans,” have relied on the
power of government to protect their safety and well-being, and that of
their families. With respect to the case before us, the legislature of the
District of Columbia has relied on its ability to act to “reduce the
potentiality for gun-related crimes and gun-related deaths from occurring
within the District of Columbia,” H. Con. Res. 694, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 25 (1976); see post, at 14–17 (BREYER, J., dissenting); so, too have
the residents of the District.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 43
STEVENS, J., dissenting
muskets and sawed-off shotguns; it turned, rather, on the
basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use
and possession of guns. Indeed, if the Second Amendment
were not limited in its coverage to military uses of weapons,
why should the Court in Miller have suggested that
some weapons but not others were eligible for Second
Amendment protection? If use for self-defense were the
relevant standard, why did the Court not inquire into
the suitability of a particular weapon for self-defense
purposes?
Perhaps in recognition of the weakness of its attempt to
distinguish Miller, the Court argues in the alternative
that Miller should be discounted because of its decisional
history. It is true that the appellee in Miller did not file a
brief or make an appearance, although the court below
had held that the relevant provision of the National Firearms
Act violated the Second Amendment (albeit without
any reasoned opinion). But, as our decision in Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, in which only one side appeared
and presented arguments, demonstrates, the absence of
adversarial presentation alone is not a basis for refusing
to accord stare decisis effect to a decision of this Court.
See Bloch, Marbury Redux, in Arguing Marbury v. Madison
59, 63 (M. Tushnet ed. 2005). Of course, if it can be
demonstrated that new evidence or arguments were genuinely
not available to an earlier Court, that fact should be
given special weight as we consider whether to overrule a
prior case. But the Court does not make that claim, because
it cannot. Although it is true that the drafting
history of the Amendment was not discussed in the Government’s
brief, see ante, at 51, it is certainly not the
drafting history that the Court’s decision today turns on.
And those sources upon which the Court today relies most
heavily were available to the Miller Court. The Government
cited the English Bill of Rights and quoted a lengthy
passage from Aymette detailing the history leading to the
44 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
English guarantee, Brief for United States in United
States v. Miller, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp 12–13; it also cited
Blackstone, id., at 9, n. 2, Cooley, id., at 12, 15, and Story,
id., at 15. The Court is reduced to critiquing the number
of pages the Government devoted to exploring the English
legal sources. Only two (in a brief 21 pages in length)!
Would the Court be satisfied with four? Ten?
The Court is simply wrong when it intones that Miller
contained “not a word” about the Amendment’s history.
Ante, at 52. The Court plainly looked to history to construe
the term “Militia,” and, on the best reading of Miller,
the entire guarantee of the Second Amendment. After
noting the original Constitution’s grant of power to Congress
and to the States over the militia, the Court explained:
“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of such forces the
declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment
were made. It must be interpreted and applied with
that end in view.
“The Militia which the States were expected to
maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops
which they were forbidden to keep without the consent
of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly
disfavored standing armies; the common view was
that adequate defense of country and laws could be
secured through the Militia—civilians primarily, soldiers
on occasion.
“The signification attributed to the term Militia appears
from the debates in the Convention, the history
and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings
of approved commentators.” Miller, 307 U. S., at
178–179.
The majority cannot seriously believe that the Miller
Court did not consider any relevant evidence; the majority
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 45
STEVENS, J., dissenting
simply does not approve of the conclusion the Miller Court
reached on that evidence. Standing alone, that is insufficient
reason to disregard a unanimous opinion of this
Court, upon which substantial reliance has been placed by
legislators and citizens for nearly 70 years.
V
The Court concludes its opinion by declaring that it is
not the proper role of this Court to change the meaning of
rights “enshrine[d]” in the Constitution. Ante, at 64. But
the right the Court announces was not “enshrined” in the
Second Amendment by the Framers; it is the product of
today’s law-changing decision. The majority’s exegesis has
utterly failed to establish that as a matter of text or history,
“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home” is “elevate[d] above
all other interests” by the Second Amendment. Ante, at
64.
Until today, it has been understood that legislatures
may regulate the civilian use and misuse of firearms so
long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a
well-regulated militia. The Court’s announcement of a
new constitutional right to own and use firearms for private
purposes upsets that settled understanding, but
leaves for future cases the formidable task of defining the
scope of permissible regulations. Today judicial craftsmen
have confidently asserted that a policy choice that denies a
“law-abiding, responsible citize[n]” the right to keep and
use weapons in the home for self-defense is “off the table.”
Ante, at 64. Given the presumption that most citizens are
law abiding, and the reality that the need to defend oneself
may suddenly arise in a host of locations outside the
home, I fear that the District’s policy choice may well be
just the first of an unknown number of dominoes to be
46 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
STEVENS, J., dissenting
knocked off the table.39
I do not know whether today’s decision will increase the
labor of federal judges to the “breaking point” envisioned
by Justice Cardozo, but it will surely give rise to a far
more active judicial role in making vitally important
national policy decisions than was envisioned at any time
in the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries.
The Court properly disclaims any interest in evaluating
the wisdom of the specific policy choice challenged in this
case, but it fails to pay heed to a far more important policy
choice—the choice made by the Framers themselves. The
Court would have us believe that over 200 years ago, the
Framers made a choice to limit the tools available to
elected officials wishing to regulate civilian uses of weapons,
and to authorize this Court to use the common-law
process of case-by-case judicial lawmaking to define the
contours of acceptable gun control policy. Absent compelling
evidence that is nowhere to be found in the Court’s
opinion, I could not possibly conclude that the Framers
made such a choice.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
——————
39 It was just a few years after the decision in Miller that Justice
Frankfurter (by any measure a true judicial conservative) warned of
the perils that would attend this Court’s entry into the “political
thicket” of legislative districting. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556
(1946) (plurality opinion). The equally controversial political thicket
that the Court has decided to enter today is qualitatively different from
the one that concerned Justice Frankfurter: While our entry into that
thicket was justified because the political process was manifestly
unable to solve the problem of unequal districts, no one has suggested
that the political process is not working exactly as it should in mediating
the debate between the advocates and opponents of gun control.
What impact the Court’s unjustified entry into this thicket will have on
that ongoing debate—or indeed on the Court itself—is a matter that
future historians will no doubt discuss at length. It is, however, clear
to me that adherence to a policy of judicial restraint would be far wiser
than the bold decision announced today.
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
BREYER, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 07–290
_________________
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
DICK ANTHONY HELLER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2008]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE
SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.
We must decide whether a District of Columbia law that
prohibits the possession of handguns in the home violates
the Second Amendment. The majority, relying upon its
view that the Second Amendment seeks to protect a right
of personal self-defense, holds that this law violates that
Amendment. In my view, it does not.
I
The majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent
reasons. The first reason is that set forth by JUSTICE
STEVENS—namely, that the Second Amendment protects
militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. These
two interests are sometimes intertwined. To assure 18thcentury
citizens that they could keep arms for militia
purposes would necessarily have allowed them to keep
arms that they could have used for self-defense as well.
But self-defense alone, detached from any militia-related
objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.
The second independent reason is that the protection
the Amendment provides is not absolute. The Amendment
permits government to regulate the interests that it
serves. Thus, irrespective of what those interests are—
whether they do or do not include an independent interest
2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
in self-defense—the majority’s view cannot be correct
unless it can show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable
or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.
This the majority cannot do.
In respect to the first independent reason, I agree with
JUSTICE STEVENS, and I join his opinion. In this opinion I
shall focus upon the second reason. I shall show that the
District’s law is consistent with the Second Amendment
even if that Amendment is interpreted as protecting a
wholly separate interest in individual self-defense. That is
so because the District’s regulation, which focuses upon
the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas,
represents a permissible legislative response to a serious,
indeed life-threatening, problem.
Thus I here assume that one objective (but, as the majority
concedes, ante, at 26, not the primary objective) of
those who wrote the Second Amendment was to help
assure citizens that they would have arms available for
purposes of self-defense. Even so, a legislature could
reasonably conclude that the law will advance goals of
great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing
injury, and reducing crime. The law is tailored to the
urban crime problem in that it is local in scope and thus
affects only a geographic area both limited in size and
entirely urban; the law concerns handguns, which are
specially linked to urban gun deaths and injuries, and
which are the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed
criminals; and at the same time, the law imposes a burden
upon gun owners that seems proportionately no greater
than restrictions in existence at the time the Second
Amendment was adopted. In these circumstances, the
District’s law falls within the zone that the Second
Amendment leaves open to regulation by legislatures.
II
The Second Amendment says that: “A well regulated
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
BREYER, J., dissenting
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” In interpreting and applying this Amendment,
I take as a starting point the following four propositions,
based on our precedent and today’s opinions, to which I
believe the entire Court subscribes:
(1) The Amendment protects an “individual” right—i.e.,
one that is separately possessed, and may be separately
enforced, by each person on whom it is conferred. See,
e.g., ante, at 22 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting).
(2) As evidenced by its preamble, the Amendment was
adopted “[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation
and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces.”
United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 178 (1939); see
ante, at 26 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting).
(3) The Amendment “must be interpreted and applied
with that end in view.” Miller, supra, at 178.
(4) The right protected by the Second Amendment is not
absolute, but instead is subject to government regulation.
See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281–282 (1897);
ante, at 22, 54 (opinion of the Court).
My approach to this case, while involving the first three
points, primarily concerns the fourth. I shall, as I said,
assume with the majority that the Amendment, in addition
to furthering a militia-related purpose, also furthers
an interest in possessing guns for purposes of self-defense,
at least to some degree. And I shall then ask whether the
Amendment nevertheless permits the District handgun
restriction at issue here.
Although I adopt for present purposes the majority’s
position that the Second Amendment embodies a general
concern about self-defense, I shall not assume that the
Amendment contains a specific untouchable right to keep
guns in the house to shoot burglars. The majority, which
4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
presents evidence in favor of the former proposition, does
not, because it cannot, convincingly show that the Second
Amendment seeks to maintain the latter in pristine, unregulated
form.
To the contrary, colonial history itself offers important
examples of the kinds of gun regulation that citizens
would then have thought compatible with the “right to
keep and bear arms,” whether embodied in Federal or
State Constitutions, or the background common law. And
those examples include substantial regulation of firearms
in urban areas, including regulations that imposed obstacles
to the use of firearms for the protection of the home.
Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, the three
largest cities in America during that period, all restricted
the firing of guns within city limits to at least some degree.
See Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power,
and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America, 25 Law &
Hist. Rev. 139, 162 (2007); Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, C. Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities
and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to
1990 (1998) (Table 2), online at http://www.census.gov/
population/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt (all Internet
materials as visited June 19, 2008, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file). Boston in 1746 had a law prohibiting
the “discharge” of “any Gun or Pistol charged with
Shot or Ball in the Town” on penalty of 40 shillings, a law
that was later revived in 1778. See Act of May 28, 1746,
ch. 10; An Act for Reviving and Continuing Sundry Laws
that are Expired, and Near Expiring, 1778 Massachusetts
Session Laws, ch. 5, pp. 193, 194. Philadelphia prohibited,
on penalty of 5 shillings (or two days in jail if the fine were
not paid), firing a gun or setting off fireworks in Philadelphia
without a “governor’s special license.” See Act of
Aug. 26, 1721, §4, in 3 Mitchell, Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania 253–254. And New York City banned, on
penalty of a 20-shilling fine, the firing of guns (even in
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
BREYER, J., dissenting
houses) for the three days surrounding New Year’s Day. 5
Colonial Laws of New York, ch. 1501, pp. 244–246 (1894);
see also An Act to Suppress the Disorderly Practice of
Firing Guns, & c., on the Times Therein Mentioned, 8
Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 1770–1776, pp. 410–
412 (1902) (similar law for all “inhabited parts” of Pennsylvania).
See also An Act for preventing Mischief being
done in the Town of Newport, or in any other Town in this
Government, 1731, Rhode Island Session Laws (prohibiting,
on penalty of 5 shillings for a first offense and more
for subsequent offenses, the firing of “any Gun or Pistol
. . . in the Streets of any of the Towns of this Government,
or in any Tavern of the same, after dark, on any Night
whatsoever”).
Furthermore, several towns and cities (including Philadelphia,
New York, and Boston) regulated, for fire-safety
reasons, the storage of gunpowder, a necessary component
of an operational firearm. See Cornell & DeDino, A Well
Regulated Right, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 510–512 (2004).
Boston’s law in particular impacted the use of firearms in
the home very much as the District’s law does today.
Boston’s gunpowder law imposed a £10 fine upon “any
Person” who “shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable,
Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other Building,
within the Town of Boston, any . . . Fire-Arm, loaded
with, or having Gun-Powder.” An Act in Addition to the
several Acts already made for the prudent Storage of Gun-
Powder within the Town of Boston, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass.
Acts 218–219; see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language 751 (4th ed. 1773) (defining “firearms”
as “[a]rms which owe their efficacy to fire; guns”). Even
assuming, as the majority does, see ante, at 59–60, that
this law included an implicit self-defense exception, it
would nevertheless have prevented a homeowner from
keeping in his home a gun that he could immediately pick
up and use against an intruder. Rather, the homeowner
6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
would have had to get the gunpowder and load it into the
gun, an operation that would have taken a fair amount of
time to perform. See Hicks, United States Military Shoulder
Arms, 1795–1935, 1 Am. Military Hist. Foundation 23,
30 (1937) (experienced soldier could, with specially prepared
cartridges as opposed to plain gunpowder and ball,
load and fire musket 3-to-4 times per minute); id., at 26–
30 (describing the loading process); see also Grancsay, The
Craft of the Early American Gunsmith, 6 Metropolitan
Museum of Art Bulletin 54, 60 (1947) (noting that rifles
were slower to load and fire than muskets).
Moreover, the law would, as a practical matter, have
prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms anywhere in the
city, unless the carrier had no plans to enter any building
or was willing to unload or discard his weapons before
going inside. And Massachusetts residents must have
believed this kind of law compatible with the provision in
the Massachusetts Constitution that granted “the people
. . . a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence”—
a provision that the majority says was interpreted
as “secur[ing] an individual right to bear arms for defensive
purposes.” Art. XVII (1780), in 3 The Federal and
State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws 1888, 1892 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (hereinafter
Thorpe); ante, at 28–29 (opinion of the Court).
The New York City law, which required that gunpowder
in the home be stored in certain sorts of containers, and
laws in certain Pennsylvania towns, which required that
gunpowder be stored on the highest story of the home,
could well have presented similar obstacles to in-home use
of firearms. See Act of April 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N. Y.
Laws p. 627; An Act for Erecting the Town of Carlisle, in
the County of Cumberland, into a Borough, ch. XIV,
§XLII, 1782 Pa. Laws p. 49; An Act for Erecting the Town
of Reading, in the County of Berks, into a Borough, ch.
LXXVI, §XLII, 1783 Pa. Laws p. 211. Although it is unCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
BREYER, J., dissenting
clear whether these laws, like the Boston law, would have
prohibited the storage of gunpowder inside a firearm, they
would at the very least have made it difficult to reload the
gun to fire a second shot unless the homeowner happened
to be in the portion of the house where the extra gunpowder
was required to be kept. See 7 United States Encyclopedia
of History 1297 (P. Oehser ed. 1967) (“Until 1835 all
small arms [were] single-shot weapons, requiring reloading
by hand after every shot”). And Pennsylvania, like
Massachusetts, had at the time one of the self-defenseguaranteeing
state constitutional provisions on which the
majority relies. See ante, at 28 (citing Pa. Declaration of
Rights, Art. XIII (1776), in 5 Thorpe 3083).
The majority criticizes my citation of these colonial laws.
See ante, at 59–62. But, as much as it tries, it cannot
ignore their existence. I suppose it is possible that, as the
majority suggests, see ante, at 59–61, they all in practice
contained self-defense exceptions. But none of them expressly
provided one, and the majority’s assumption that
such exceptions existed relies largely on the preambles to
these acts—an interpretive methodology that it elsewhere
roundly derides. Compare ibid. (interpreting 18th-century
statutes in light of their preambles), with ante, at 4–5, and
n. 3 (contending that the operative language of an 18thcentury
enactment may extend beyond its preamble). And
in any event, as I have shown, the gunpowder-storage
laws would have burdened armed self-defense, even if they
did not completely prohibit it.
This historical evidence demonstrates that a selfdefense
assumption is the beginning, rather than the end,
of any constitutional inquiry. That the District law impacts
self-defense merely raises questions about the law’s
constitutionality. But to answer the questions that are
raised (that is, to see whether the statute is unconstitutional)
requires us to focus on practicalities, the statute’s
rationale, the problems that called it into being, its rela8
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
tion to those objectives—in a word, the details. There are
no purely logical or conceptual answers to such questions.
All of which to say that to raise a self-defense question is
not to answer it.
III
I therefore begin by asking a process-based question:
How is a court to determine whether a particular firearm
regulation (here, the District’s restriction on handguns) is
consistent with the Second Amendment? What kind of
constitutional standard should the court use? How high a
protective hurdle does the Amendment erect?
The question matters. The majority is wrong when it
says that the District’s law is unconstitutional “[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights.” Ante, at 56. How could
that be? It certainly would not be unconstitutional under,
for example, a “rational basis” standard, which requires a
court to uphold regulation so long as it bears a “rational
relationship” to a “legitimate governmental purpose.”
Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993). The law at issue
here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents,
at least bears a “rational relationship” to that “legitimate”
life-saving objective. And nothing in the three 19thcentury
state cases to which the majority turns for support
mandates the conclusion that the present District law
must fall. See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 177, 186–
187, 192 (1871) (striking down, as violating a state constitutional
provision adopted in 1870, a statewide ban on a
carrying a broad class of weapons, insofar as it applied to
revolvers); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 246, 250–251 (1846)
(striking down similarly broad ban on openly carrying
weapons, based on erroneous view that the Federal Second
Amendment applied to the States); State v. Reid, 1 Ala.
612, 614–615, 622 (1840) (upholding a concealed-weapon
ban against a state constitutional challenge). These cases
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
BREYER, J., dissenting
were decided well (80, 55, and 49 years, respectively) after
the framing; they neither claim nor provide any special
insight into the intent of the Framers; they involve laws
much less narrowly tailored that the one before us; and
state cases in any event are not determinative of federal
constitutional questions, see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 549 (1985)
(citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816)).
Respondent proposes that the Court adopt a “strict
scrutiny” test, which would require reviewing with care
each gun law to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U. S. 74, 82 (1997); see Brief for Respondent
54–62. But the majority implicitly, and appropriately,
rejects that suggestion by broadly approving a set of
laws—prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by
criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on
firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of
commercial firearm sales—whose constitutionality under
a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear. See
ante, at 54.
Indeed, adoption of a true strict-scrutiny standard for
evaluating gun regulations would be impossible. That is
because almost every gun-control regulation will seek to
advance (as the one here does) a “primary concern of every
government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives
of its citizens.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739,
755 (1987). The Court has deemed that interest, as well
as “the Government’s general interest in preventing
crime,” to be “compelling,” see id., at 750, 754, and the
Court has in a wide variety of constitutional contexts
found such public-safety concerns sufficiently forceful to
justify restrictions on individual liberties, see e.g., Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
(First Amendment free speech rights); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (First Amendment religious
10 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
rights); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404
(2006) (Fourth Amendment protection of the home); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 655 (1984) (Fifth Amendment
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966)); Salerno, supra, at 755 (Eighth Amendment bail
rights). Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny
to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-
balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the
Second Amendment on one side and the governmental
public-safety concerns on the other, the only question
being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens
the former in the course of advancing the latter.
I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry
explicitly. The fact that important interests lie on both
sides of the constitutional equation suggests that review of
gun-control regulation is not a context in which a court
should effectively presume either constitutionality (as in
rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict
scrutiny). Rather, “where a law significantly implicates
competing constitutionally protected interests in complex
ways,” the Court generally asks whether the statute burdens
a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon
other important governmental interests. See Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 402
(2000) (BREYER, J., concurring). Any answer would take
account both of the statute’s effects upon the competing
interests and the existence of any clearly superior less
restrictive alternative. See ibid. Contrary to the majority’s
unsupported suggestion that this sort of “proportionality”
approach is unprecedented, see ante, at 62, the
Court has applied it in various constitutional contexts,
including election-law cases, speech cases, and due process
cases. See 528 U. S., at 403 (citing examples where the
Court has taken such an approach); see also, e.g., Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U. S. 357, 388
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11
BREYER, J., dissenting
(2002) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (commercial speech); Burdick
v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433 (1992) (election regulation);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 339–349 (1976)
(procedural due process); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of
Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563,
568 (1968) (government employee speech).
In applying this kind of standard the Court normally
defers to a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters
where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and
greater institutional factfinding capacity. See Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195–196
(1997); see also Nixon, supra, at 403 (BREYER, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, a court, not a legislature, must make
the ultimate constitutional conclusion, exercising its “independent
judicial judgment” in light of the whole record
to determine whether a law exceeds constitutional
boundaries. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 249 (2006)
(opinion of BREYER, J.) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984)).
The above-described approach seems preferable to a
more rigid approach here for a further reason. Experience
as much as logic has led the Court to decide that in one
area of constitutional law or another the interests are
likely to prove stronger on one side of a typical constitutional
case than on the other. See, e.g., United States v.
Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 531–534 (1996) (applying heightened
scrutiny to gender-based classifications, based upon
experience with prior cases); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) (applying rationalbasis
scrutiny to economic legislation, based upon experience
with prior cases). Here, we have little prior experience.
Courts that do have experience in these matters
have uniformly taken an approach that treats empiricallybased
legislative judgment with a degree of deference. See
Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich.
L. Rev. 683, 687, 716–718 (2007) (describing hundreds of
12 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
gun-law decisions issued in the last half-century by Supreme
Courts in 42 States, which courts with “surprisingly
little variation,” have adopted a standard more deferential
than strict scrutiny). While these state cases obviously
are not controlling, they are instructive. Cf., e.g., Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 134 (1959) (looking to the “experience
of state courts” as informative of a constitutional
question). And they thus provide some comfort regarding
the practical wisdom of following the approach that I
believe our constitutional precedent would in any event
suggest.
IV
The present suit involves challenges to three separate
District firearm restrictions. The first requires a license
from the District’s Chief of Police in order to carry a “pistol,”
i.e., a handgun, anywhere in the District. See D. C.
Code §22–4504(a) (2001); see also §§22–4501(a), 22–4506.
Because the District assures us that respondent could
obtain such a license so long as he meets the statutory
eligibility criteria, and because respondent concedes that
those criteria are facially constitutional, I, like the majority,
see no need to address the constitutionality of the
licensing requirement. See ante, at 58–59.
The second District restriction requires that the lawful
owner of a firearm keep his weapon “unloaded and disassembled
or bound by a trigger lock or similar device”
unless it is kept at his place of business or being used for
lawful recreational purposes. See §7–2507.02. The only
dispute regarding this provision appears to be whether the
Constitution requires an exception that would allow someone
to render a firearm operational when necessary for
self-defense (i.e., that the firearm may be operated under
circumstances where the common law would normally
permit a self-defense justification in defense against a
criminal charge). See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13
BREYER, J., dissenting
F. 3d 370, 401 (2007) (case below); ante, at 57–58 (opinion
of the Court); Brief for Respondent 52–54. The District
concedes that such an exception exists. See Brief for
Petitioners 56–57. This Court has final authority (albeit
not often used) to definitively interpret District law, which
is, after all, simply a species of federal law. See, e.g.,
Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 687–688 (1980);
see also Griffin v. United States, 336 U. S. 704, 716–718
(1949). And because I see nothing in the District law that
would preclude the existence of a background common-law
self-defense exception, I would avoid the constitutional
question by interpreting the statute to include it. See
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
I am puzzled by the majority’s unwillingness to adopt a
similar approach. It readily reads unspoken self-defense
exceptions into every colonial law, but it refuses to accept
the District’s concession that this law has one. Compare
ante, at 59–61, with ante, at 57–58. The one District case
it cites to support that refusal, McIntosh v. Washington,
395 A. 2d 744, 755–756 (1978), merely concludes that the
District Legislature had a rational basis for applying the
trigger-lock law in homes but not in places of business.
Nowhere does that case say that the statute precludes a
self-defense exception of the sort that I have just described.
And even if it did, we are not bound by a lower
court’s interpretation of federal law.
The third District restriction prohibits (in most cases)
the registration of a handgun within the District. See §7–
2502.02(a)(4). Because registration is a prerequisite to
firearm possession, see §7–2502.01(a), the effect of this
provision is generally to prevent people in the District
from possessing handguns. In determining whether this
regulation violates the Second Amendment, I shall ask
how the statute seeks to further the governmental interests
that it serves, how the statute burdens the interests
14 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
that the Second Amendment seeks to protect, and whether
there are practical less burdensome ways of furthering
those interests. The ultimate question is whether the
statute imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the
statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate. See
Nixon, 528 U. S., at 402 (BREYER, J., concurring).
A
No one doubts the constitutional importance of the
statute’s basic objective, saving lives. See, e.g., Salerno,
481 U. S., at 755. But there is considerable debate about
whether the District’s statute helps to achieve that objective.
I begin by reviewing the statute’s tendency to secure
that objective from the perspective of (1) the legislature
(namely, the Council of the District of Columbia) that
enacted the statute in 1976, and (2) a court that seeks to
evaluate the Council’s decision today.
1
First, consider the facts as the legislature saw them
when it adopted the District statute. As stated by the
local council committee that recommended its adoption,
the major substantive goal of the District’s handgun restriction
is “to reduce the potentiality for gun-related
crimes and gun-related deaths from occurring within the
District of Columbia.” Hearing and Disposition before the
House Committee on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., on H. Con. Res. 694, Ser. No. 94–24, p. 25 (1976)
(herinafter DC Rep.) (reproducing, inter alia, the Council
committee report). The committee concluded, on the basis
of “extensive public hearings” and “lengthy research,” that
“[t]he easy availability of firearms in the United States
has been a major factor contributing to the drastic increase
in gun-related violence and crime over the past 40
years.” Id., at 24, 25. It reported to the Council “startling
statistics,” id., at 26, regarding gun-related crime, acciCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15
BREYER, J., dissenting
dents, and deaths, focusing particularly on the relation
between handguns and crime and the proliferation of
handguns within the District. See id., at 25–26.
The committee informed the Council that guns were
“responsible for 69 deaths in this country each day,” for a
total of “[a]pproximately 25,000 gun-deaths . . . each year,”
along with an additional 200,000 gun-related injuries. Id.,
at 25. Three thousand of these deaths, the report stated,
were accidental. Ibid. A quarter of the victims in those
accidental deaths were children under the age of 14. Ibid.
And according to the committee, “[f]or every intruder
stopped by a homeowner with a firearm, there are 4 gunrelated
accidents within the home.” Ibid.
In respect to local crime, the committee observed that
there were 285 murders in the District during 1974—a
record number. Id., at 26. The committee also stated
that, “[c]ontrary to popular opinion on the subject, firearms
are more frequently involved in deaths and violence
among relatives and friends than in premeditated criminal
activities.” Ibid. Citing an article from the American
Journal of Psychiatry, the committee reported that “[m]ost
murders are committed by previously law-abiding citizens,
in situations where spontaneous violence is generated by
anger, passion or intoxication, and where the killer and
victim are acquainted.” Ibid. “Twenty-five percent of
these murders,” the committee informed the Council,
“occur within families.” Ibid.
The committee report furthermore presented statistics
strongly correlating handguns with crime. Of the 285
murders in the District in 1974, 155 were committed with
handguns. Ibid. This did not appear to be an aberration,
as the report revealed that “handguns [had been] used in
roughly 54% of all murders” (and 87% of murders of law
enforcement officers) nationwide over the preceding several
years. Ibid. Nor were handguns only linked to murders,
as statistics showed that they were used in roughly
16 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
60% of robberies and 26% of assaults. Ibid. “A crime
committed with a pistol,” the committee reported, “is 7
times more likely to be lethal than a crime committed with
any other weapon.” Id., at 25. The committee furthermore
presented statistics regarding the availability of
handguns in the United States, ibid., and noted that they
had “become easy for juveniles to obtain,” even despite
then-current District laws prohibiting juveniles from
possessing them, id., at 26.
In the committee’s view, the current District firearms
laws were unable “to reduce the potentiality for gunrelated
violence,” or to “cope with the problems of gun
control in the District” more generally. Ibid. In the absence
of adequate federal gun legislation, the committee
concluded, it “becomes necessary for local governments to
act to protect their citizens, and certainly the District of
Columbia as the only totally urban statelike jurisdiction
should be strong in its approach.” Id., at 27. It recommended
that the Council adopt a restriction on handgun
registration to reflect “a legislative decision that, at this
point in time and due to the gun-control tragedies and
horrors enumerated previously” in the committee report,
“pistols . . . are no longer justified in this jurisdiction.” Id.,
at 31; see also ibid. (handgun restriction “denotes a policy
decision that handguns . . . have no legitimate use in the
purely urban environment of the District”).
The District’s special focus on handguns thus reflects
the fact that the committee report found them to have a
particularly strong link to undesirable activities in the
District’s exclusively urban environment. See id., at 25–
26. The District did not seek to prohibit possession of
other sorts of weapons deemed more suitable for an “urban
area.” See id., at 25. Indeed, an original draft of the bill,
and the original committee recommendations, had sought
to prohibit registration of shotguns as well as handguns,
but the Council as a whole decided to narrow the prohibiCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17
BREYER, J., dissenting
tion. Compare id., at 30 (describing early version of the
bill), with D. C. Code §7–2502.02).
2
Next, consider the facts as a court must consider them
looking at the matter as of today. See, e.g., Turner, 520
U. S., at 195 (discussing role of court as factfinder in a
constitutional case). Petitioners, and their amici, have
presented us with more recent statistics that tell much the
same story that the committee report told 30 years ago.
At the least, they present nothing that would permit us to
second-guess the Council in respect to the numbers of gun
crimes, injuries, and deaths, or the role of handguns.
From 1993 to 1997, there were 180,533 firearm-related
deaths in the United States, an average of over 36,000 per
year. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, M.
Zawitz & K. Strom, Firearm Injury and Death from
Crime, 1993–97, p. 2 (Oct. 2000), online at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fidc9397.pdf (hereinafter
Firearm Injury and Death from Crime). Fifty-one percent
were suicides, 44% were homicides, 1% were legal interventions,
3% were unintentional accidents, and 1% were of
undetermined causes. See ibid. Over that same period
there were an additional 411,800 nonfatal firearm-related
injuries treated in U. S. hospitals, an average of over
82,000 per year. Ibid. Of these, 62% resulted from assaults,
17% were unintentional, 6% were suicide attempts,
1% were legal interventions, and 13% were of unknown
causes. Ibid.
The statistics are particularly striking in respect to
children and adolescents. In over one in every eight firearm-
related deaths in 1997, the victim was someone under
the age of 20. American Academy of Pediatrics, Firearm-
Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 105
Pediatrics 888 (2000) (hereinafter Firearm-Related Injuries).
Firearm-related deaths account for 22.5% of all
18 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
injury deaths between the ages of 1 and 19. Ibid. More
male teenagers die from firearms than from all natural
causes combined. Dresang, Gun Deaths in Rural and
Urban Settings, 14 J. Am. Bd. Family Practice 107 (2001).
Persons under 25 accounted for 47% of hospital-treated
firearm injuries between June 1, 1992 and May 31, 1993.
Firearm-Related Injuries 891.
Handguns are involved in a majority of firearm deaths
and injuries in the United States. Id., at 888. From 1993
to 1997, 81% of firearm-homicide victims were killed by
handgun. Firearm Injury and Death from Crime 4; see
also Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, C. Perkins,
Weapon Use and Violent Crime, p. 8 (Sept. 2003),
(Table 10), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wuvc01.
pdf (hereinafter Weapon Use and Violent Crime) (statistics
indicating roughly the same rate for 1993–2001). In
the same period, for the 41% of firearm injuries for which
the weapon type is known, 82% of them were from handguns.
Firearm Injury and Death From Crime 4. And
among children under the age of 20, handguns account for
approximately 70% of all unintentional firearm-related
injuries and deaths. Firearm-Related Injuries 890. In
particular, 70% of all firearm-related teenage suicides in
1996 involved a handgun. Id., at 889; see also Zwerling,
Lynch, Burmeister, & Goertz, The Choice of Weapons in
Firearm Suicides in Iowa, 83 Am. J. Public Health 1630,
1631 (1993) (Table 1) (handguns used in 36.6% of all firearm
suicides in Iowa from 1980–1984 and 43.8% from
1990–1991).
Handguns also appear to be a very popular weapon
among criminals. In a 1997 survey of inmates who were
armed during the crime for which they were incarcerated,
83.2% of state inmates and 86.7% of federal inmates
said that they were armed with a handgun. See Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, C. Harlow, Firearm
Use by Offenders, p. 3 (Nov. 2001), online at http://
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19
BREYER, J., dissenting
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fuo.pdf; see also Weapon
Use and Violent Crime 2 (Table 2) (statistics indicating
that handguns were used in over 84% of nonlethal violent
crimes involving firearms from 1993 to 2001). And handguns
are not only popular tools for crime, but popular
objects of it as well: the FBI received on average over
274,000 reports of stolen guns for each year between 1985
and 1994, and almost 60% of stolen guns are handguns.
Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, M. Zawitz,
Guns Used in Crime, p. 3 (July 1995), online at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/guic.pdf. Department
of Justice studies have concluded that stolen handguns in
particular are an important source of weapons for both
adult and juvenile offenders. Ibid.
Statistics further suggest that urban areas, such as the
District, have different experiences with gun-related
death, injury, and crime, than do less densely populated
rural areas. A disproportionate amount of violent and
property crimes occur in urban areas, and urban criminals
are more likely than other offenders to use a firearm
during the commission of a violent crime. See Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, D. Duhart, Urban,
Suburban, and Rural Victimization, 1993–98, pp. 1, 9 (Oct.
2000), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
usrv98.pdf. Homicide appears to be a much greater issue
in urban areas; from 1985 to 1993, for example, “half of all
homicides occurred in 63 cities with 16% of the nation’s
population.” Wintemute, The Future of Firearm Violence
Prevention, 282 JAMA 475 (1999). One study concluded
that although the overall rate of gun death between 1989
and 1999 was roughly the same in urban than rural areas,
the urban homicide rate was three times as high; even
after adjusting for other variables, it was still twice as
high. Branas, Nance, Elliott, Richmond, & Schwab, Urban-
Rural Shifts in Intentional Firearm Death, 94 Am. J.
Public Health 1750, 1752 (2004); see also ibid. (noting that
20 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
rural areas appear to have a higher rate of firearm suicide).
And a study of firearm injuries to children and
adolescents in Pennsylvania between 1987 and 2000
showed an injury rate in urban counties 10 times higher
than in nonurban counties. Nance & Branas, The Rural-
Urban Continuum, 156 Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent
Medicine 781, 782 (2002).
Finally, the linkage of handguns to firearms deaths and
injuries appears to be much stronger in urban than in
rural areas. “[S]tudies to date generally support the hypothesis
that the greater number of rural gun deaths are
from rifles or shotguns, whereas the greater number of
urban gun deaths are from handguns.” Dresang, supra, at
108. And the Pennsylvania study reached a similar conclusion
with respect to firearm injuries—they are much
more likely to be caused by handguns in urban areas than
in rural areas. See Nance & Branas, supra, at 784.
3
Respondent and his many amici for the most part do not
disagree about the figures set forth in the preceding subsection,
but they do disagree strongly with the District’s
predictive judgment that a ban on handguns will help
solve the crime and accident problems that those figures
disclose. In particular, they disagree with the District
Council’s assessment that “freezing the pistol . . . population
within the District,” DC Rep., at 26, will reduce crime,
accidents, and deaths related to guns. And they provide
facts and figures designed to show that it has not done so
in the past, and hence will not do so in the future.
First, they point out that, since the ban took effect,
violent crime in the District has increased, not decreased.
See Brief for Criminologists et al. as Amici Curiae 4–8, 3a
(hereinafter Criminologists’ Brief); Brief for Congress of
Racial Equality as Amicus Curiae 35–36; Brief for National
Rifle Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 28–30 (hereinafter
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 21
BREYER, J., dissenting
NRA Brief). Indeed, a comparison with 49 other major
cities reveals that the District’s homicide rate is actually
substantially higher relative to these other cities than it
was before the handgun restriction went into effect. See
Brief for Academics as Amici Curiae 7–10 (hereinafter
Academics’ Brief); see also Criminologists’ Brief 6–9, 3a–
4a, 7a. Respondent’s amici report similar results in comparing
the District’s homicide rates during that period to
that of the neighboring States of Maryland and Virginia
(neither of which restricts handguns to the same degree),
and to the homicide rate of the Nation as a whole. See
Academics’ Brief 11–17; Criminologists’ Brief 6a, 8a.
Second, respondent’s amici point to a statistical analysis
that regresses murder rates against the presence or absence
of strict gun laws in 20 European nations. See
Criminologists’ Brief 23 (citing Kates & Mauser, Would
Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide? 30 Harv.
J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 649, 651–694 (2007)). That analysis
concludes that strict gun laws are correlated with more
murders, not fewer. See Criminologists’ Brief 23; see also
id., at 25–28. They also cite domestic studies, based on
data from various cities, States, and the Nation as a
whole, suggesting that a reduction in the number of guns
does not lead to a reduction in the amount of violent crime.
See id., at 17–20. They further argue that handgun bans
do not reduce suicide rates, see id., at 28–31, 9a, or rates
of accidents, even those involving children, see Brief for
International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers
Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae App. 7–15 (hereinafter
ILEETA Brief).
Third, they point to evidence indicating that firearm
ownership does have a beneficial self-defense effect.
Based on a 1993 survey, the authors of one study estimated
that there were 2.2-to-2.5 million defensive uses of
guns (mostly brandishing, about a quarter involving the
actual firing of a gun) annually. See Kleck & Gertz,
22 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
Armed Resistance to Crime, 86 J. Crim. L. & C. 150, 164
(1995); see also ILEETA Brief App. 1–6 (summarizing
studies regarding defensive uses of guns). Another study
estimated that for a period of 12 months ending in 1994,
there were 503,481 incidents in which a burglar found
himself confronted by an armed homeowner, and that in
497,646 (98.8%) of them, the intruder was successfully
scared away. See Ikida, Dahlberg, Sacks, Mercy, & Powell,
Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in
U. S. Households, 12 Violence & Victims 363 (1997). A
third study suggests that gun-armed victims are substantially
less likely than non-gun-armed victims to be injured
in resisting robbery or assault. Barnett & Kates, Under
Fire, 45 Emory L. J. 1139, 1243–1244, n. 478 (1996). And
additional evidence suggests that criminals are likely to be
deterred from burglary and other crimes if they know the
victim is likely to have a gun. See Kleck, Crime Control
Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 Social Problems
1, 15 (1988) (reporting a substantial drop in the
burglary rate in an Atlanta suburb that required heads of
households to own guns); see also ILEETA Brief 17–18
(describing decrease in sexual assaults in Orlando when
women were trained in the use of guns).
Fourth, respondent’s amici argue that laws criminalizing
gun possession are self-defeating, as evidence suggests
that they will have the effect only of restricting lawabiding
citizens, but not criminals, from acquiring guns.
See, e.g., Brief for President Pro Tempore of Senate of
Pennsylvania as Amicus Curiae 35, 36, and n. 15. That
effect, they argue, will be especially pronounced in the
District, whose proximity to Virginia and Maryland will
provide criminals with a steady supply of guns. See Brief
for Heartland Institute as Amicus Curiae 20.
In the view of respondent’s amici, this evidence shows
that other remedies—such as less restriction on gun ownership,
or liberal authorization of law-abiding citizens to
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 23
BREYER, J., dissenting
carry concealed weapons—better fit the problem. See, e.g.,
Criminologists’ Brief 35–37 (advocating easily obtainable
gun licenses); Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation,
Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae 15 (hereinafter SLF Brief)
(advocating “widespread gun ownership” as a deterrent to
crime); see also J. Lott, More Guns, Less Crime (2d ed.
2000). They further suggest that at a minimum the District
fails to show that its remedy, the gun ban, bears a
reasonable relation to the crime and accident problems
that the District seeks to solve. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent
59–61.
These empirically based arguments may have proved
strong enough to convince many legislatures, as a matter
of legislative policy, not to adopt total handgun bans. But
the question here is whether they are strong enough to
destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a
legislature that rejects them. And that they are not. For
one thing, they can lead us more deeply into the uncertainties
that surround any effort to reduce crime, but they
cannot prove either that handgun possession diminishes
crime or that handgun bans are ineffective. The statistics
do show a soaring District crime rate. And the District’s
crime rate went up after the District adopted its handgun
ban. But, as students of elementary logic know, after it
does not mean because of it. What would the District’s
crime rate have looked like without the ban? Higher?
Lower? The same? Experts differ; and we, as judges,
cannot say.
What about the fact that foreign nations with strict gun
laws have higher crime rates? Which is the cause and
which the effect? The proposition that strict gun laws
cause crime is harder to accept than the proposition that
strict gun laws in part grow out of the fact that a nation
already has a higher crime rate. And we are then left with
the same question as before: What would have happened
to crime without the gun laws—a question that respon24
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
dent and his amici do not convincingly answer.
Further, suppose that respondent’s amici are right when
they say that householders’ possession of loaded handguns
help to frighten away intruders. On that assumption, one
must still ask whether that benefit is worth the potential
death-related cost. And that is a question without a directly
provable answer.
Finally, consider the claim of respondent’s amici that
handgun bans cannot work; there are simply too many
illegal guns already in existence for a ban on legal guns to
make a difference. In a word, they claim that, given the
urban sea of pre-existing legal guns, criminals can readily
find arms regardless. Nonetheless, a legislature might
respond, we want to make an effort to try to dry up that
urban sea, drop by drop. And none of the studies can show
that effort is not worthwhile.
In a word, the studies to which respondent’s amici point
raise policy-related questions. They succeed in proving
that the District’s predictive judgments are controversial.
But they do not by themselves show that those judgments
are incorrect; nor do they demonstrate a consensus, academic
or otherwise, supporting that conclusion.
Thus, it is not surprising that the District and its amici
support the District’s handgun restriction with studies of
their own. One in particular suggests that, statistically
speaking, the District’s law has indeed had positive lifesaving
effects. See Loftin, McDowall, Weirsema, & Cottey,
Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide
and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 New England
J. Med. 1615 (1991) (hereinafter Loftin study). Others
suggest that firearm restrictions as a general matter
reduce homicides, suicides, and accidents in the home.
See, e.g., Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. Pol.
Econ. 1086 (2001); Kellerman, Somes, Rivara, Lee, &
Banton, Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the
Home, 45 J. Trauma, Infection & Critical Care 263 (1998);
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 25
BREYER, J., dissenting
Miller, Azrael, & Hemenway, Household Firearm Ownership
and Suicide Rates in the United States, 13 Epidemiology
517 (2002). Still others suggest that the defensive
uses of handguns are not as great in number as respondent’s
amici claim. See, e.g., Brief for American Public
Health Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 17–19 (hereinafter
APHA Brief) (citing studies).
Respondent and his amici reply to these responses; and
in doing so, they seek to discredit as methodologically
flawed the studies and evidence relied upon by the District.
See, e.g., Criminologists’ Brief 9–17, 20–24; Brief for
Assn. Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
12–18; SLF Brief 17–22; Britt, Kleck, & Bordua, A
Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 Law & Soc. Rev.
361 (1996) (criticizing the Loftin study). And, of course,
the District’s amici produce counter-rejoinders, referring
to articles that defend their studies. See, e.g., APHA Brief
23, n. 5 (citing McDowall, Loftin, & Wiersema et al., Using
Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate Firearm Laws, 30 Law &
Soc. Rev. 381 (1996)).
The upshot is a set of studies and counterstudies that,
at most, could leave a judge uncertain about the proper
policy conclusion. But from respondent’s perspective any
such uncertainty is not good enough. That is because
legislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for
drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact. And, given
that constitutional allocation of decisionmaking responsibility,
the empirical evidence presented here is sufficient
to allow a judge to reach a firm legal conclusion.
In particular this Court, in First Amendment cases
applying intermediate scrutiny, has said that our “sole
obligation” in reviewing a legislature’s “predictive judgments”
is “to assure that, in formulating its judgments,”
the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.” Turner, 520 U. S., at 195 (internal
quotation marks omitted). And judges, looking at the
26 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
evidence before us, should agree that the District legislature’s
predictive judgments satisfy that legal standard.
That is to say, the District’s judgment, while open to question,
is nevertheless supported by “substantial evidence.”
There is no cause here to depart from the standard set
forth in Turner, for the District’s decision represents the
kind of empirically based judgment that legislatures, not
courts, are best suited to make. See Nixon, 528 U. S., at
402 (BREYER, J., concurring). In fact, deference to legislative
judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where
the judgment has been made by a local legislature, with
particular knowledge of local problems and insight into
appropriate local solutions. See Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U. S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(“[W]e must acknowledge that the Los Angeles City Council
is in a better position than the Judiciary to gather an
evaluate data on local problems”); cf. DC Rep., at 67
(statement of Rep. Gude) (describing District’s law as “a
decision made on the local level after extensive debate and
deliberations”). Different localities may seek to solve
similar problems in different ways, and a “city must be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems.” Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 52 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The Framers recognized that
the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of government,
where people with firsthand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible
for dealing with them.” Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 575, n. 18
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist No.
17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). We owe that
democratic process some substantial weight in the constitutional
calculus.
For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s statute
properly seeks to further the sort of life-preserving and
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 27
BREYER, J., dissenting
public-safety interests that the Court has called “compelling.”
Salerno, 481 U. S., at 750, 754.
B
I next assess the extent to which the District’s law
burdens the interests that the Second Amendment seeks
to protect. Respondent and his amici, as well as the majority,
suggest that those interests include: (1) the preservation
of a “well regulated Militia”; (2) safeguarding the
use of firearms for sporting purposes, e.g., hunting and
marksmanship; and (3) assuring the use of firearms for
self-defense. For argument’s sake, I shall consider all
three of those interests here.
1
The District’s statute burdens the Amendment’s first
and primary objective hardly at all. As previously noted,
there is general agreement among the Members of the
Court that the principal (if not the only) purpose of the
Second Amendment is found in the Amendment’s text: the
preservation of a “well regulated Militia.” See supra, at 3.
What scant Court precedent there is on the Second
Amendment teaches that the Amendment was adopted
“[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces” and
“must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”
Miller, 307 U. S., at 178. Where that end is implicated
only minimally (or not at all), there is substantially less
reason for constitutional concern. Compare ibid. (“In the
absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument”).
28 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
To begin with, the present case has nothing to do with
actual military service. The question presented presumes
that respondent is “not affiliated with any state-regulated
militia.” 552 U. S. __ (2007) (emphasis added). I am
aware of no indication that the District either now or in
the recent past has called up its citizenry to serve in a
militia, that it has any inkling of doing so anytime in the
foreseeable future, or that this law must be construed to
prevent the use of handguns during legitimate militia
activities. Moreover, even if the District were to call up its
militia, respondent would not be among the citizens whose
service would be requested. The District does not consider
him, at 66 years of age, to be a member of its militia. See
D. C. Code §49–401 (2001) (militia includes only male
residents ages 18 to 45); App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a (indicating
respondent’s date of birth).
Nonetheless, as some amici claim, the statute might
interfere with training in the use of weapons, training
useful for military purposes. The 19th-century constitutional
scholar, Thomas Cooley, wrote that the Second
Amendment protects “learning to handle and use [arms] in
a way that makes those who keep them ready for their
efficient use” during militia service. General Principles of
Constitutional Law 271 (1880); ante, at 45 (opinion of the
Court); see also ante, at 45–46 (citing other scholars agreeing
with Cooley on that point). And former military officers
tell us that “private ownership of firearms makes for
a more effective fighting force” because “[m]ilitary recruits
with previous firearms experience and training are generally
better marksmen, and accordingly, better soldiers.”
Brief for Retired Military Officers as Amici Curiae 1–2
(hereinafter Military Officers’ Brief). An amicus brief filed
by retired Army generals adds that a “well-regulated
militia—whether ad hoc or as part of our organized military—
depends on recruits who have familiarity and training
with firearms—rifles, pistols, and shotguns.” Brief for
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 29
BREYER, J., dissenting
Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr., et al. as Amici
Curiae 4 (hereinafter Generals’ Brief). Both briefs point
out the importance of handgun training. Military Officers’
Brief 26–28; Generals’ Brief 4. Handguns are used in
military service, see id., at 26, and “civilians who are
familiar with handgun marksmanship and safety are
much more likely to be able to safely and accurately fire a
rifle or other firearm with minimal training upon entering
military service,” id., at 28.
Regardless, to consider the military-training objective a
modern counterpart to a similar militia-related colonial
objective and to treat that objective as falling within the
Amendment’s primary purposes makes no difference here.
That is because the District’s law does not seriously affect
military training interests. The law permits residents to
engage in activities that will increase their familiarity
with firearms. They may register (and thus possess in
their homes) weapons other than handguns, such as rifles
and shotguns. See D. C. Code §§7–2502.01, 7–2502.02(a)
(only weapons that cannot be registered are sawed-off
shotguns, machine guns, short-barreled rifles, and pistols
not registered before 1976); compare Generals’ Brief 4
(listing “rifles, pistols, and shotguns” as useful military
weapons; emphasis added). And they may operate those
weapons within the District “for lawful recreational purposes.”
§7–2507.02; see also §7–2502.01(b)(3) (nonresidents
“participating in any lawful recreational firearmrelated
activity in the District, or on his way to or from
such activity in another jurisdiction” may carry even
weapons not registered in the District). These permissible
recreations plainly include actually using and firing the
weapons, as evidenced by a specific D. C. Code provision
contemplating the existence of local firing ranges. See
§7–2507.03.
And while the District law prevents citizens from training
with handguns within the District, the District consists
30 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
of only 61.4 square miles of urban area. See Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Census, United States: 2000 (pt. 1),
p. 11 (2002) (Table 8). The adjacent States do permit the
use of handguns for target practice, and those States are
only a brief subway ride away. See Md. Crim. Law Code
Ann. §4–203(b)(4) (Lexis Supp. 2007) (general handgun
restriction does not apply to “the wearing, carrying, or
transporting by a person of a handgun used in connection
with,” inter alia, “a target shoot, formal or informal target
practice, sport shooting event, hunting, [or] a Department
of Natural Resources-sponsored firearms and hunter
safety class”); Va. Code Ann. §18.2–287.4 (Lexis Supp.
2007) (general restriction on carrying certain loaded pistols
in certain public areas does not apply “to any person
actually engaged in lawful hunting or lawful recreational
shooting activities at an established shooting range or
shooting contest”); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Metrorail System Map, http://www.wmata.com/
metrorail/systemmmap.cfm.
Of course, a subway rider must buy a ticket, and the
ride takes time. It also costs money to store a pistol, say,
at a target range, outside the District. But given the costs
already associated with gun ownership and firearms
training, I cannot say that a subway ticket and a short
subway ride (and storage costs) create more than a minimal
burden. Compare Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 3) (BREYER,
J., dissenting) (acknowledging travel burdens on indigent
persons in the context of voting where public transportation
options were limited). Indeed, respondent and two of
his coplaintiffs below may well use handguns outside the
District on a regular basis, as their declarations indicate
that they keep such weapons stored there. See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 77a (respondent); see also id., at 78a, 84a
(coplaintiffs). I conclude that the District’s law burdens
the Second Amendment’s primary objective little, or not at
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 31
BREYER, J., dissenting
all.
2
The majority briefly suggests that the “right to keep and
bear Arms” might encompass an interest in hunting. See,
e.g., ante, at 26. But in enacting the present provisions,
the District sought “to take nothing away from sportsmen.”
DC Rep., at 33. And any inability of District residents
to hunt near where they live has much to do with
the jurisdiction’s exclusively urban character and little to
do with the District’s firearm laws. For reasons similar to
those I discussed in the preceding subsection—that the
District’s law does not prohibit possession of rifles or
shotguns, and the presence of opportunities for sporting
activities in nearby States—I reach a similar conclusion,
namely, that the District’s law burdens any sports-related
or hunting-related objectives that the Amendment may
protect little, or not at all.
3
The District’s law does prevent a resident from keeping
a loaded handgun in his home. And it consequently makes
it more difficult for the householder to use the handgun for
self-defense in the home against intruders, such as burglars.
As the Court of Appeals noted, statistics suggest
that handguns are the most popular weapon for self defense.
See 478 F. 3d, at 400 (citing Kleck & Gertz, 86 J.
Crim. L. & C., at 182–183). And there are some legitimate
reasons why that would be the case: Amici suggest (with
some empirical support) that handguns are easier to hold
and control (particularly for persons with physical infirmities),
easier to carry, easier to maneuver in enclosed
spaces, and that a person using one will still have a hand
free to dial 911. See ILEETA Brief 37–39; NRA Brief 32–
33; see also ante, at 57. But see Brief for Petitioners 54–
55 (citing sources preferring shotguns and rifles to hand32
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
guns for purposes of self-defense). To that extent the law
burdens to some degree an interest in self-defense that for
present purposes I have assumed the Amendment seeks to
further.
C
In weighing needs and burdens, we must take account of
the possibility that there are reasonable, but less restrictive
alternatives. Are there other potential measures that
might similarly promote the same goals while imposing
lesser restrictions? See Nixon, 528 U. S., at 402 (BREYER,
J., concurring) (“existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive
alternative” can be a factor in determining
whether a law is constitutionally proportionate). Here I
see none.
The reason there is no clearly superior, less restrictive
alternative to the District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s
very objective is to reduce significantly the number of
handguns in the District, say, for example, by allowing a
law enforcement officer immediately to assume that any
handgun he sees is an illegal handgun. And there is no
plausible way to achieve that objective other than to ban
the guns.
It does not help respondent’s case to describe the District’s
objective more generally as an “effort to diminish
the dangers associated with guns.” That is because the
very attributes that make handguns particularly useful
for self-defense are also what make them particularly
dangerous. That they are easy to hold and control means
that they are easier for children to use. See Brief for
American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae 19
(“[C]hildren as young as three are able to pull the trigger
of most handguns”). That they are maneuverable and
permit a free hand likely contributes to the fact that they
are by far the firearm of choice for crimes such as rape and
robbery. See Weapon Use and Violent Crime 2 (Table 2).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 33
BREYER, J., dissenting
That they are small and light makes them easy to steal,
see supra, at 19, and concealable, cf. ante, at 54 (opinion of
the Court) (suggesting that concealed-weapon bans are
constitutional).
This symmetry suggests that any measure less restrictive
in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will,
to that same extent, prove less effective in preventing the
use of handguns for illicit purposes. If a resident has a
handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then
he has a handgun in the home that he can use to commit
suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence. See supra,
at 18 (handguns prevalent in suicides); Brief for National
Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
27 (handguns prevalent in domestic violence). If it is
indeed the case, as the District believes, that the number
of guns contributes to the number of gun-related crimes,
accidents, and deaths, then, although there may be less
restrictive, less effective substitutes for an outright ban,
there is no less restrictive equivalent of an outright ban.
Licensing restrictions would not similarly reduce the
handgun population, and the District may reasonably fear
that even if guns are initially restricted to law-abiding
citizens, they might be stolen and thereby placed in the
hands of criminals. See supra, at 19. Permitting certain
types of handguns, but not others, would affect the commercial
market for handguns, but not their availability.
And requiring safety devices such as trigger locks, or
imposing safe-storage requirements would interfere with
any self-defense interest while simultaneously leaving
operable weapons in the hands of owners (or others capable
of acquiring the weapon and disabling the safety device)
who might use them for domestic violence or other
crimes.
The absence of equally effective alternatives to a complete
prohibition finds support in the empirical fact that
other States and urban centers prohibit particular types of
34 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
weapons. Chicago has a law very similar to the District’s,
and many of its suburbs also ban handgun possession
under most circumstances. See Chicago, Ill., Municipal
Code §§8–20–030(k), 8–20–40, 8–20–50(c) (2008); Evanston,
Ill., City Code §9–8–2 (2007); Morton Grove, Ill.,
Village Code §6–2–3(C) (2008); Oak Park, Ill., Village
Code §27–2–1 (2007); Winnetka, Ill., Village Ordinance
§9.12.020(B) (2008); Wilmette, Ill., Ordinance §12–24(b)
(2008). Toledo bans certain types of handguns. Toledo,
Ohio, Municipal Code, ch. 549.25 (2007). And San Francisco
in 2005 enacted by popular referendum a ban on
most handgun possession by city residents; it has been
precluded from enforcing that prohibition, however, by
state-court decisions deeming it pre-empted by state law.
See Fiscal v. City and County of San Francisco, 158 Cal.
App. 4th 895, 900–901, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 326–328
(2008). (Indeed, the fact that as many as 41 States may
pre-empt local gun regulation suggests that the absence of
more regulation like the District’s may perhaps have more
to do with state law than with a lack of locally perceived
need for them. See Legal Community Against Violence,
Regulating Guns in America 14 (2006), http://www.
lcav.org/Library/reports_analyses/National_Audit_Total_
8.16.06.pdf.
In addition, at least six States and Puerto Rico impose
general bans on certain types of weapons, in particular
assault weapons or semiautomatic weapons. See Cal.
Penal Code §12280(b) (West Supp. 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§53–202c (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–8 (1993); Md.
Crim. Law Code Ann. §4–303(a) (Lexis 2002); Mass. Gen.
Laws, ch. 140, §131M (West 2006); N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§265.02(7) (West Supp. 2008); 25 Laws P. R. Ann. §456m
(Supp. 2006); see also 18 U. S. C. §922(o) (federal machinegun
ban). And at least 14 municipalities do the
same. See Albany, N. Y., Municipal Code §193–16(A)
(2005); Aurora, Ill., Ordinance §29–49(a) (2007); Buffalo,
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 35
BREYER, J., dissenting
N. Y., City Code §180–1(F) (2000); Chicago, Ill., Municipal
Code §8–24–025(a), 8–20–030(h); Cincinnati, Ohio, Admin.
Code §708–37(a) (Supp. 2008); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance
§628.03(a) (2008); Columbus, Ohio, City Code §2323.31
(2007); Denver, Colo., Municipal Code §38–130(e) (2008);
Morton Grove, Ill., Village Code §6–2–3(B); N. Y. C.
Admin. Code §10–303.1 (2007); Oak Park, Ill., Village
Code §27–2-1; Rochester, N. Y., Code §47–5(f) (2008);
South Bend, Ind., Ordinance §§13–97(b), 13–98 (2008);
Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code §549.23(a). These bans, too,
suggest that there may be no substitute to an outright
prohibition in cases where a governmental body has
deemed a particular type of weapon especially dangerous.
D
The upshot is that the District’s objectives are compelling;
its predictive judgments as to its law’s tendency to
achieve those objectives are adequately supported; the law
does impose a burden upon any self-defense interest that
the Amendment seeks to secure; and there is no clear less
restrictive alternative. I turn now to the final portion of
the “permissible regulation” question: Does the District’s
law disproportionately burden Amendment-protected
interests? Several considerations, taken together, convince
me that it does not.
First, the District law is tailored to the life-threatening
problems it attempts to address. The law concerns one
class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to
possess shotguns and rifles, along with ammunition. The
area that falls within its scope is totally urban. Cf. Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 563 (2001) (varied
effect of statewide speech restriction in “rural, urban,
or suburban” locales “demonstrates a lack of narrow tailoring”).
That urban area suffers from a serious handgunfatality
problem. The District’s law directly aims at that
compelling problem. And there is no less restrictive way
36 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
to achieve the problem-related benefits that it seeks.
Second, the self-defense interest in maintaining loaded
handguns in the home to shoot intruders is not the primary
interest, but at most a subsidiary interest, that the
Second Amendment seeks to serve. The Second Amendment’s
language, while speaking of a “Militia,” says nothing
of “self-defense.” As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, the
Second Amendment’s drafting history shows that the
language reflects the Framers’ primary, if not exclusive,
objective. See ante, at 17–28 (dissenting opinion). And
the majority itself says that “the threat that the new
Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by
taking away their arms was the reason that right . . . was
codified in a written Constitution.” Ante, at 26 (emphasis
added). The way in which the Amendment’s operative
clause seeks to promote that interest—by protecting a
right “to keep and bear Arms”—may in fact help further
an interest in self-defense. But a factual connection falls
far short of a primary objective. The Amendment itself
tells us that militia preservation was first and foremost in
the Framers’ minds. See Miller, 307 U. S., at 178 (“With
obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces the declaration
and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made,” and
the amendment “must be interpreted and applied with
that end in view”).
Further, any self-defense interest at the time of the
Framing could not have focused exclusively upon urbancrime
related dangers. Two hundred years ago, most
Americans, many living on the frontier, would likely have
thought of self-defense primarily in terms of outbreaks of
fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays’
Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related dangers to travelers
on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways. See
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Population: 1790 to
1990 (1998) (Table 4), online at http://www.census.gov/
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 37
BREYER, J., dissenting
population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (of the 3,929,214 Americans
in 1790, only 201,655—about 5%—lived in urban
areas). Insofar as the Framers focused at all on the tiny
fraction of the population living in large cities, they would
have been aware that these city dwellers were subject to
firearm restrictions that their rural counterparts were not.
See supra, at 4–7. They are unlikely then to have thought
of a right to keep loaded handguns in homes to confront
intruders in urban settings as central. And the subsequent
development of modern urban police departments,
by diminishing the need to keep loaded guns nearby in
case of intruders, would have moved any such right even
further away from the heart of the amendment’s more
basic protective ends. See, e.g., Sklansky, The Private
Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1206–1207 (1999) (professional
urban police departments did not develop until
roughly the mid-19th century).
Nor, for that matter, am I aware of any evidence that
handguns in particular were central to the Framers’ conception
of the Second Amendment. The lists of militiarelated
weapons in the late 18th-century state statutes
appear primarily to refer to other sorts of weapons, muskets
in particular. See Miller, 307 U. S., at 180–182 (reproducing
colonial militia laws). Respondent points out in
his brief that the Federal Government and two States at
the time of the founding had enacted statutes that listed
handguns as “acceptable” militia weapons. Brief for Respondent
47. But these statutes apparently found them
“acceptable” only for certain special militiamen (generally,
certain soldiers on horseback), while requiring muskets or
rifles for the general infantry. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch.
XXXIII, 1 Stat. 271; Laws of the State of North Carolina
592 (1791); First Laws of the State of Connecticut 150
(1784); see also 25 Journals of the Continental Congress,
pp. 1774–1789 741–742 (1922).
Third, irrespective of what the Framers could have
38 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
thought, we know what they did think. Samuel Adams,
who lived in Boston, advocated a constitutional amendment
that would have precluded the Constitution from
ever being “construed” to “prevent the people of the United
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms.” 6 Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 1453 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 2000).
Samuel Adams doubtless knew that the Massachusetts
Constitution contained somewhat similar protection. And
he doubtless knew that Massachusetts law prohibited
Bostonians from keeping loaded guns in the house. So
how could Samuel Adams have advocated such protection
unless he thought that the protection was consistent with
local regulation that seriously impeded urban residents
from using their arms against intruders? It seems
unlikely that he meant to deprive the Federal Government
of power (to enact Boston-type weapons regulation) that
he know Boston had and (as far as we know) he would
have thought constitutional under the Massachusetts
Constitution. Indeed, since the District of Columbia (the
subject of the Seat of Government Clause, U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §8, cl. 17) was the only urban area under direct
federal control, it seems unlikely that the Framers
thought about urban gun control at all. Cf. Palmore v.
United States, 411 U. S. 389, 397–398 (1973) (Congress
can “legislate for the District in a manner with respect to
subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be
very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted
under other powers delegated to it”).
Of course the District’s law and the colonial Boston law
are not identical. But the Boston law disabled an even
wider class of weapons (indeed, all firearms). And its
existence shows at the least that local legislatures could
impose (as here) serious restrictions on the right to use
firearms. Moreover, as I have said, Boston’s law, though
highly analogous to the District’s, was not the only coloCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 39
BREYER, J., dissenting
nial law that could have impeded a homeowner’s ability to
shoot a burglar. Pennsylvania’s and New York’s laws
could well have had a similar effect. See supra, at 6–7.
And the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania laws were not
only thought consistent with an unwritten common-law
gun-possession right, but also consistent with written
state constitutional provisions providing protections similar
to those provided by the Federal Second Amendment.
See supra, at 6–7. I cannot agree with the majority that
these laws are largely uninformative because the penalty
for violating them was civil, rather than criminal. Ante, at
61–62. The Court has long recognized that the exercise of
a constitutional right can be burdened by penalties far
short of jail time. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating $7 per week solicitation fee
as applied to religious group); see also Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 136 (1992) (“A tax
based on the content of speech does not become more
constitutional because it is a small tax”).
Regardless, why would the majority require a precise
colonial regulatory analogue in order to save a modern
gun regulation from constitutional challenge? After all,
insofar as we look to history to discover how we can constitutionally
regulate a right to self-defense, we must look,
not to what 18th-century legislatures actually did enact,
but to what they would have thought they could enact.
There are innumerable policy-related reasons why a legislature
might not act on a particular matter, despite having
the power to do so. This Court has “frequently cautioned
that it is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.”
United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496 (1997). It is
similarly “treacherous” to reason from the fact that colonial
legislatures did not enact certain kinds of legislation
an unalterable constitutional limitation on the power of a
modern legislature cannot do so. The question should not
40 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
be whether a modern restriction on a right to self-defense
duplicates a past one, but whether that restriction, when
compared with restrictions originally thought possible,
enjoys a similarly strong justification. At a minimum that
similarly strong justification is what the District’s modern
law, compared with Boston’s colonial law, reveals.
Fourth, a contrary view, as embodied in today’s decision,
will have unfortunate consequences. The decision will
encourage legal challenges to gun regulation throughout
the Nation. Because it says little about the standards
used to evaluate regulatory decisions, it will leave the
Nation without clear standards for resolving those challenges.
See ante, at 54, and n. 26. And litigation over the
course of many years, or the mere specter of such litigation,
threatens to leave cities without effective protection
against gun violence and accidents during that time.
As important, the majority’s decision threatens severely
to limit the ability of more knowledgeable, democratically
elected officials to deal with gun-related problems. The
majority says that it leaves the District “a variety of tools
for combating” such problems. Ante, at 64. It fails to list
even one seemingly adequate replacement for the law it
strikes down. I can understand how reasonable individuals
can disagree about the merits of strict gun control as a
crime-control measure, even in a totally urbanized area.
But I cannot understand how one can take from the
elected branches of government the right to decide
whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace in a
city now facing a serious crime problem and which, in the
future, could well face environmental or other emergencies
that threaten the breakdown of law and order.
V
The majority derides my approach as “judgeempowering.”
Ante, at 62. I take this criticism seriously,
but I do not think it accurate. As I have previously exCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 41
BREYER, J., dissenting
plained, this is an approach that the Court has taken in
other areas of constitutional law. See supra, at 10–11.
Application of such an approach, of course, requires judgment,
but the very nature of the approach—requiring
careful identification of the relevant interests and evaluating
the law’s effect upon them—limits the judge’s choices;
and the method’s necessary transparency lays bare the
judge’s reasoning for all to see and to criticize.
The majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially
less transparent than mine. At a minimum, I find it
difficult to understand the reasoning that seems to underlie
certain conclusions that it reaches.
The majority spends the first 54 pages of its opinion
attempting to rebut JUSTICE STEVENS’ evidence that the
Amendment was enacted with a purely militia-related
purpose. In the majority’s view, the Amendment also
protects an interest in armed personal self-defense, at
least to some degree. But the majority does not tell us
precisely what that interest is. “Putting all of [the Second
Amendment’s] textual elements together,” the majority
says, “we find that they guarantee the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Ante,
at 19. Then, three pages later, it says that “we do not read
the Second Amendment to permit citizens to carry arms
for any sort of confrontation.” Ante, at 22. Yet, with one
critical exception, it does not explain which confrontations
count. It simply leaves that question unanswered.
The majority does, however, point to one type of confrontation
that counts, for it describes the Amendment as
“elevat[ing] above all other interests the right of lawabiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.” Ante, at 63. What is its basis for
finding that to be the core of the Second Amendment
right? The only historical sources identified by the majority
that even appear to touch upon that specific matter
consist of an 1866 newspaper editorial discussing the
42 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, see ante, at 43, two quotations
from that 1866 Act’s legislative history, see ante, at 43–44,
and a 1980 state court opinion saying that in colonial
times the same were used to defend the home as to maintain
the militia, see ante, at 52. How can citations such as
these support the far-reaching proposition that the Second
Amendment’s primary concern is not its stated concern
about the militia, but rather a right to keep loaded weapons
at one’s bedside to shoot intruders?
Nor is it at all clear to me how the majority decides
which loaded “arms” a homeowner may keep. The majority
says that that Amendment protects those weapons
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.” Ante, at 53. This definition conveniently excludes
machineguns, but permits handguns, which the
majority describes as “the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home.” Ante, at 57; see
also ante, at 54–55. But what sense does this approach
make? According to the majority’s reasoning, if Congress
and the States lift restrictions on the possession and use of
machineguns, and people buy machineguns to protect
their homes, the Court will have to reverse course and find
that the Second Amendment does, in fact, protect the
individual self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun.
On the majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone
invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous selfdefense
weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it
immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress will no
longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In
essence, the majority determines what regulations are
permissible by looking to see what existing regulations
permit. There is no basis for believing that the Framers
intended such circular reasoning.
I am similarly puzzled by the majority’s list, in Part III
of its opinion, of provisions that in its view would survive
Second Amendment scrutiny. These consist of (1) “prohiCite
as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 43
BREYER, J., dissenting
bitions on carrying concealed weapons”; (2) “prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons”; (3) “prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill”; (4)
“laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings”; and (5)
government “conditions and qualifications” attached “to
the commercial sale of arms.” Ante, at 54. Why these? Is
it that similar restrictions existed in the late 18th century?
The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues.
And even were it possible to find analogous colonial laws
in respect to all these restrictions, why should these colonial
laws count, while the Boston loaded-gun restriction
(along with the other laws I have identified) apparently
does not count? See supra, at 5–6, 38–39.
At the same time the majority ignores a more important
question: Given the purposes for which the Framers enacted
the Second Amendment, how should it be applied to
modern-day circumstances that they could not have anticipated?
Assume, for argument’s sake, that the Framers
did intend the Amendment to offer a degree of self-defense
protection. Does that mean that the Framers also intended
to guarantee a right to possess a loaded gun near
swimming pools, parks, and playgrounds? That they
would not have cared about the children who might pick
up a loaded gun on their parents’ bedside table? That they
(who certainly showed concern for the risk of fire, see
supra, at 5–7) would have lacked concern for the risk of
accidental deaths or suicides that readily accessible loaded
handguns in urban areas might bring? Unless we believe
that they intended future generations to ignore such
matters, answering questions such as the questions in this
case requires judgment—judicial judgment exercised
within a framework for constitutional analysis that guides
that judgment and which makes its exercise transparent.
One cannot answer those questions by combining inconclusive
historical research with judicial ipse dixit.
44 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
BREYER, J., dissenting
The argument about method, however, is by far the less
important argument surrounding today’s decision. Far
more important are the unfortunate consequences that
today’s decision is likely to spawn. Not least of these, as I
have said, is the fact that the decision threatens to throw
into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws throughout the
United States. I can find no sound legal basis for launching
the courts on so formidable and potentially dangerous
a mission. In my view, there simply is no untouchable
constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Amendment
to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden
urban areas.
VI
For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s measure
is a proportionate, not a disproportionate, response to the
compelling concerns that led the District to adopt it. And,
for these reasons as well as the independently sufficient
reasons set forth by JUSTICE STEVENS, I would find the
District’s measure consistent with the Second Amendment’s
demands.
With respect, I dissent.